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d549290448
echo/ip_test.go
Vladimir Buyanov a3b0ba24d3
Fix Real IP logic (#2550) 
* Fix realIP logic
2024-03-10 19:04:54 +02:00

695 lines
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: © 2015 LabStack LLC and Echo contributors
package echo
import (
"net"
"net/http"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
func mustParseCIDR(s string) *net.IPNet {
_, IPNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(s)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return IPNet
}
func TestIPChecker_TrustOption(t *testing.T) {
var testCases = []struct {
name string
givenOptions []TrustOption
whenIP string
expect bool
}{
{
name: "ip is within trust range, trusts additional private IPV6 network",
givenOptions: []TrustOption{
TrustLoopback(false),
TrustLinkLocal(false),
TrustPrivateNet(false),
// this is private IPv6 ip
// CIDR Notation: 2001:0db8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000/48
// Address: 2001:0db8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0103
// Range start: 2001:0db8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000
// Range end: 2001:0db8:0000:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
TrustIPRange(mustParseCIDR("2001:db8::103/48")),
},
whenIP: "2001:0db8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0103",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "ip is within trust range, trusts additional private IPV6 network",
givenOptions: []TrustOption{
TrustIPRange(mustParseCIDR("2001:db8::103/48")),
},
whenIP: "2001:0db8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0103",
expect: true,
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
checker := newIPChecker(tc.givenOptions)
result := checker.trust(net.ParseIP(tc.whenIP))
assert.Equal(t, tc.expect, result)
})
}
}
func TestTrustIPRange(t *testing.T) {
var testCases = []struct {
name string
givenRange string
whenIP string
expect bool
}{
{
name: "ip is within trust range, IPV6 network range",
// CIDR Notation: 2001:0db8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000/48
// Address: 2001:0db8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0103
// Range start: 2001:0db8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000
// Range end: 2001:0db8:0000:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
givenRange: "2001:db8::103/48",
whenIP: "2001:0db8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0103",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "ip is outside (upper bounds) of trust range, IPV6 network range",
givenRange: "2001:db8::103/48",
whenIP: "2001:0db8:0001:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000",
expect: false,
},
{
name: "ip is outside (lower bounds) of trust range, IPV6 network range",
givenRange: "2001:db8::103/48",
whenIP: "2001:0db7:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff",
expect: false,
},
{
name: "ip is within trust range, IPV4 network range",
// CIDR Notation: 8.8.8.8/24
// Address: 8.8.8.8
// Range start: 8.8.8.0
// Range end: 8.8.8.255
givenRange: "8.8.8.0/24",
whenIP: "8.8.8.8",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "ip is within trust range, IPV4 network range",
// CIDR Notation: 8.8.8.8/24
// Address: 8.8.8.8
// Range start: 8.8.8.0
// Range end: 8.8.8.255
givenRange: "8.8.8.0/24",
whenIP: "8.8.8.8",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "ip is outside (upper bounds) of trust range, IPV4 network range",
givenRange: "8.8.8.0/24",
whenIP: "8.8.9.0",
expect: false,
},
{
name: "ip is outside (lower bounds) of trust range, IPV4 network range",
givenRange: "8.8.8.0/24",
whenIP: "8.8.7.255",
expect: false,
},
{
name: "public ip, trust everything in IPV4 network range",
givenRange: "0.0.0.0/0",
whenIP: "8.8.8.8",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "internal ip, trust everything in IPV4 network range",
givenRange: "0.0.0.0/0",
whenIP: "127.0.10.1",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "public ip, trust everything in IPV6 network range",
givenRange: "::/0",
whenIP: "2a00:1450:4026:805::200e",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "internal ip, trust everything in IPV6 network range",
givenRange: "::/0",
whenIP: "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1",
expect: true,
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
cidr := mustParseCIDR(tc.givenRange)
checker := newIPChecker([]TrustOption{
TrustLoopback(false), // disable to avoid interference
TrustLinkLocal(false), // disable to avoid interference
TrustPrivateNet(false), // disable to avoid interference
TrustIPRange(cidr),
})
result := checker.trust(net.ParseIP(tc.whenIP))
assert.Equal(t, tc.expect, result)
})
}
}
func TestTrustPrivateNet(t *testing.T) {
var testCases = []struct {
name string
whenIP string
expect bool
}{
{
name: "do not trust public IPv4 address",
whenIP: "8.8.8.8",
expect: false,
},
{
name: "do not trust public IPv6 address",
whenIP: "2a00:1450:4026:805::200e",
expect: false,
},
{ // Class A: 10.0.0.0 — 10.255.255.255
name: "do not trust IPv4 just outside of class A (lower bounds)",
whenIP: "9.255.255.255",
expect: false,
},
{
name: "do not trust IPv4 just outside of class A (upper bounds)",
whenIP: "11.0.0.0",
expect: false,
},
{
name: "trust IPv4 of class A (lower bounds)",
whenIP: "10.0.0.0",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "trust IPv4 of class A (upper bounds)",
whenIP: "10.255.255.255",
expect: true,
},
{ // Class B: 172.16.0.0 — 172.31.255.255
name: "do not trust IPv4 just outside of class B (lower bounds)",
whenIP: "172.15.255.255",
expect: false,
},
{
name: "do not trust IPv4 just outside of class B (upper bounds)",
whenIP: "172.32.0.0",
expect: false,
},
{
name: "trust IPv4 of class B (lower bounds)",
whenIP: "172.16.0.0",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "trust IPv4 of class B (upper bounds)",
whenIP: "172.31.255.255",
expect: true,
},
{ // Class C: 192.168.0.0 — 192.168.255.255
name: "do not trust IPv4 just outside of class C (lower bounds)",
whenIP: "192.167.255.255",
expect: false,
},
{
name: "do not trust IPv4 just outside of class C (upper bounds)",
whenIP: "192.169.0.0",
expect: false,
},
{
name: "trust IPv4 of class C (lower bounds)",
whenIP: "192.168.0.0",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "trust IPv4 of class C (upper bounds)",
whenIP: "192.168.255.255",
expect: true,
},
{ // fc00::/7 address block = RFC 4193 Unique Local Addresses (ULA)
// splits the address block in two equally sized halves, fc00::/8 and fd00::/8.
// https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unique_local_address
name: "trust IPv6 private address",
whenIP: "fdfc:3514:2cb3:4bd5::",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "do not trust IPv6 just out of /fd (upper bounds)",
whenIP: "/fe00:0000:0000:0000:0000",
expect: false,
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
checker := newIPChecker([]TrustOption{
TrustLoopback(false), // disable to avoid interference
TrustLinkLocal(false), // disable to avoid interference
TrustPrivateNet(true),
})
result := checker.trust(net.ParseIP(tc.whenIP))
assert.Equal(t, tc.expect, result)
})
}
}
func TestTrustLinkLocal(t *testing.T) {
var testCases = []struct {
name string
whenIP string
expect bool
}{
{
name: "trust link local IPv4 address (lower bounds)",
whenIP: "169.254.0.0",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "trust link local IPv4 address (upper bounds)",
whenIP: "169.254.255.255",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "do not trust link local IPv4 address (outside of lower bounds)",
whenIP: "169.253.255.255",
expect: false,
},
{
name: "do not trust link local IPv4 address (outside of upper bounds)",
whenIP: "169.255.0.0",
expect: false,
},
{
name: "trust link local IPv6 address ",
whenIP: "fe80::1",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "do not trust link local IPv6 address ",
whenIP: "fec0::1",
expect: false,
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
checker := newIPChecker([]TrustOption{
TrustLoopback(false), // disable to avoid interference
TrustPrivateNet(false), // disable to avoid interference
TrustLinkLocal(true),
})
result := checker.trust(net.ParseIP(tc.whenIP))
assert.Equal(t, tc.expect, result)
})
}
}
func TestTrustLoopback(t *testing.T) {
var testCases = []struct {
name string
whenIP string
expect bool
}{
{
name: "trust IPv4 as localhost",
whenIP: "127.0.0.1",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "trust IPv6 as localhost",
whenIP: "::1",
expect: true,
},
{
name: "do not trust public ip as localhost",
whenIP: "8.8.8.8",
expect: false,
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
checker := newIPChecker([]TrustOption{
TrustLinkLocal(false), // disable to avoid interference
TrustPrivateNet(false), // disable to avoid interference
TrustLoopback(true),
})
result := checker.trust(net.ParseIP(tc.whenIP))
assert.Equal(t, tc.expect, result)
})
}
}
func TestExtractIPDirect(t *testing.T) {
var testCases = []struct {
name string
whenRequest http.Request
expectIP string
}{
{
name: "request has no headers, extracts IP from request remote addr",
whenRequest: http.Request{
RemoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "203.0.113.1",
},
{
name: "request is from external IP has X-Real-Ip header, extractor still extracts IP from request remote addr",
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXRealIP: []string{"203.0.113.10"},
},
RemoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "203.0.113.1",
},
{
name: "request is from internal IP and has Real-IP header, extractor still extracts internal IP from request remote addr",
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXRealIP: []string{"203.0.113.10"},
},
RemoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "127.0.0.1",
},
{
name: "request is from external IP and has XFF + Real-IP header, extractor still extracts external IP from request remote addr",
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXRealIP: []string{"203.0.113.10"},
HeaderXForwardedFor: []string{"192.0.2.106, 198.51.100.105, fc00::104, 2001:db8::103, 192.168.0.102, 169.254.0.101"},
},
RemoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "203.0.113.1",
},
{
name: "request is from internal IP and has XFF + Real-IP header, extractor still extracts internal IP from request remote addr",
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXRealIP: []string{"127.0.0.1"},
HeaderXForwardedFor: []string{"192.0.2.106, 198.51.100.105, fc00::104, 2001:db8::103, 192.168.0.102, 169.254.0.101"},
},
RemoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "127.0.0.1",
},
{
name: "request is from external IP and has XFF header, extractor still extracts external IP from request remote addr",
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXForwardedFor: []string{"192.0.2.106, 198.51.100.105, fc00::104, 2001:db8::103, 192.168.0.102, 169.254.0.101"},
},
RemoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "203.0.113.1",
},
{
name: "request is from internal IP and has XFF header, extractor still extracts internal IP from request remote addr",
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXForwardedFor: []string{"192.0.2.106, 198.51.100.105, fc00::104, 2001:db8::103, 192.168.0.102, 169.254.0.101"},
},
RemoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "127.0.0.1",
},
{
name: "request is from internal IP and has INVALID XFF header, extractor still extracts internal IP from request remote addr",
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXForwardedFor: []string{"this.is.broken.lol, 169.254.0.101"},
},
RemoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "127.0.0.1",
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
extractedIP := ExtractIPDirect()(&tc.whenRequest)
assert.Equal(t, tc.expectIP, extractedIP)
})
}
}
func TestExtractIPFromRealIPHeader(t *testing.T) {
_, ipForRemoteAddrExternalRange, _ := net.ParseCIDR("203.0.113.0/24")
_, ipv6ForRemoteAddrExternalRange, _ := net.ParseCIDR("2001:db8::/64")
var testCases = []struct {
name string
givenTrustOptions []TrustOption
whenRequest http.Request
expectIP string
}{
{
name: "request has no headers, extracts IP from request remote addr",
whenRequest: http.Request{
RemoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "203.0.113.1",
},
{
name: "request is from external IP has INVALID external X-Real-Ip header, extract IP from remote addr",
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXRealIP: []string{"xxx.yyy.zzz.ccc"}, // <-- this is invalid
},
RemoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "203.0.113.1",
},
{
name: "request is from external IP has valid + UNTRUSTED external X-Real-Ip header, extract IP from remote addr",
givenTrustOptions: []TrustOption{ // case for "trust direct-facing proxy"
TrustIPRange(ipForRemoteAddrExternalRange), // we trust external IP range "203.0.113.199/24"
},
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXRealIP: []string{"203.0.113.199"},
},
RemoteAddr: "8.8.8.8:8080", // <-- this is untrusted
},
expectIP: "8.8.8.8",
},
{
name: "request is from external IP has valid + UNTRUSTED external X-Real-Ip header, extract IP from remote addr",
givenTrustOptions: []TrustOption{ // case for "trust direct-facing proxy"
TrustIPRange(ipv6ForRemoteAddrExternalRange), // we trust external IP range "203.0.113.199/24"
},
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXRealIP: []string{"[bc01:1010::9090:1888]"},
},
RemoteAddr: "[fe64:aa10::1]:8080", // <-- this is untrusted
},
expectIP: "fe64:aa10::1",
},
{
name: "request is from external IP has valid + TRUSTED X-Real-Ip header, extract IP from X-Real-Ip header",
givenTrustOptions: []TrustOption{ // case for "trust direct-facing proxy"
TrustIPRange(ipForRemoteAddrExternalRange), // we trust external IP range "203.0.113.0/24"
},
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXRealIP: []string{"8.8.8.8"},
},
RemoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "8.8.8.8",
},
{
name: "request is from external IP has valid + TRUSTED X-Real-Ip header, extract IP from X-Real-Ip header",
givenTrustOptions: []TrustOption{ // case for "trust direct-facing proxy"
TrustIPRange(ipv6ForRemoteAddrExternalRange), // we trust external IP range "2001:db8::/64"
},
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXRealIP: []string{"[fe64:db8::113:199]"},
},
RemoteAddr: "[2001:db8::113:1]:8080",
},
expectIP: "fe64:db8::113:199",
},
{
name: "request is from external IP has XFF and valid + TRUSTED X-Real-Ip header, extract IP from X-Real-Ip header",
givenTrustOptions: []TrustOption{ // case for "trust direct-facing proxy"
TrustIPRange(ipForRemoteAddrExternalRange), // we trust external IP range "203.0.113.199/24"
},
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXRealIP: []string{"8.8.8.8"},
HeaderXForwardedFor: []string{"1.1.1.1 ,8.8.8.8"}, // <-- should not affect anything
},
RemoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "8.8.8.8",
},
{
name: "request is from external IP has XFF and valid + TRUSTED X-Real-Ip header, extract IP from X-Real-Ip header",
givenTrustOptions: []TrustOption{ // case for "trust direct-facing proxy"
TrustIPRange(ipv6ForRemoteAddrExternalRange), // we trust external IP range "2001:db8::/64"
},
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXRealIP: []string{"[fe64:db8::113:199]"},
HeaderXForwardedFor: []string{"[feab:cde9::113:198], [fe64:db8::113:199]"}, // <-- should not affect anything
},
RemoteAddr: "[2001:db8::113:1]:8080",
},
expectIP: "fe64:db8::113:199",
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
extractedIP := ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader(tc.givenTrustOptions...)(&tc.whenRequest)
assert.Equal(t, tc.expectIP, extractedIP)
})
}
}
func TestExtractIPFromXFFHeader(t *testing.T) {
_, ipForRemoteAddrExternalRange, _ := net.ParseCIDR("203.0.113.199/24")
_, ipv6ForRemoteAddrExternalRange, _ := net.ParseCIDR("2001:db8::/64")
var testCases = []struct {
name string
givenTrustOptions []TrustOption
whenRequest http.Request
expectIP string
}{
{
name: "request has no headers, extracts IP from request remote addr",
whenRequest: http.Request{
RemoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "203.0.113.1",
},
{
name: "request has INVALID external XFF header, extract IP from remote addr",
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXForwardedFor: []string{"xxx.yyy.zzz.ccc, 127.0.0.2"}, // <-- this is invalid
},
RemoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "127.0.0.1",
},
{
name: "request trusts all IPs in XFF header, extract IP from furthest in XFF chain",
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXForwardedFor: []string{"127.0.0.3, 127.0.0.2, 127.0.0.1"},
},
RemoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "127.0.0.3",
},
{
name: "request trusts all IPs in XFF header, extract IP from furthest in XFF chain",
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXForwardedFor: []string{"[fe80::3], [fe80::2], [fe80::1]"},
},
RemoteAddr: "[fe80::1]:8080",
},
expectIP: "fe80::3",
},
{
name: "request is from external IP has valid + UNTRUSTED external XFF header, extract IP from remote addr",
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXForwardedFor: []string{"203.0.113.199"}, // <-- this is untrusted
},
RemoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:8080",
},
expectIP: "203.0.113.1",
},
{
name: "request is from external IP has valid + UNTRUSTED external XFF header, extract IP from remote addr",
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXForwardedFor: []string{"[2001:db8::1]"}, // <-- this is untrusted
},
RemoteAddr: "[2001:db8::2]:8080",
},
expectIP: "2001:db8::2",
},
{
name: "request is from external IP is valid and has some IPs TRUSTED XFF header, extract IP from XFF header",
givenTrustOptions: []TrustOption{
TrustIPRange(ipForRemoteAddrExternalRange), // we trust external IP range "203.0.113.199/24"
},
// from request its seems that request has been proxied through 6 servers.
// 1) 203.0.1.100 (this is external IP set by 203.0.100.100 which we do not trust - could be spoofed)
// 2) 203.0.100.100 (this is outside of our network but set by 203.0.113.199 which we trust to set correct IPs)
// 3) 203.0.113.199 (we trust, for example maybe our proxy from some other office)
// 4) 192.168.1.100 (internal IP, some internal upstream loadbalancer ala SSL offloading with F5 products)
// 5) 127.0.0.1 (is proxy on localhost. maybe we have Nginx in front of our Echo instance doing some routing)
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXForwardedFor: []string{"203.0.1.100, 203.0.100.100, 203.0.113.199, 192.168.1.100"},
},
RemoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:8080", // IP of proxy upstream of our APP
},
expectIP: "203.0.100.100", // this is first trusted IP in XFF chain
},
{
name: "request is from external IP is valid and has some IPs TRUSTED XFF header, extract IP from XFF header",
givenTrustOptions: []TrustOption{
TrustIPRange(ipv6ForRemoteAddrExternalRange), // we trust external IP range "2001:db8::/64"
},
// from request its seems that request has been proxied through 6 servers.
// 1) 2001:db8:1::1:100 (this is external IP set by 2001:db8:2::100:100 which we do not trust - could be spoofed)
// 2) 2001:db8:2::100:100 (this is outside of our network but set by 2001:db8::113:199 which we trust to set correct IPs)
// 3) 2001:db8::113:199 (we trust, for example maybe our proxy from some other office)
// 4) fd12:3456:789a:1::1 (internal IP, some internal upstream loadbalancer ala SSL offloading with F5 products)
// 5) fe80::1 (is proxy on localhost. maybe we have Nginx in front of our Echo instance doing some routing)
whenRequest: http.Request{
Header: http.Header{
HeaderXForwardedFor: []string{"[2001:db8:1::1:100], [2001:db8:2::100:100], [2001:db8::113:199], [fd12:3456:789a:1::1]"},
},
RemoteAddr: "[fe80::1]:8080", // IP of proxy upstream of our APP
},
expectIP: "2001:db8:2::100:100", // this is first trusted IP in XFF chain
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
extractedIP := ExtractIPFromXFFHeader(tc.givenTrustOptions...)(&tc.whenRequest)
assert.Equal(t, tc.expectIP, extractedIP)
})
}
}
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