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oauth2-proxy/oauthproxy.go

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package main
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
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b64 "encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
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"errors"
"fmt"
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"html/template"
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"net"
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"net/http"
"net/http/httputil"
"net/url"
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"regexp"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
"time"
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"github.com/coreos/go-oidc"
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"github.com/mbland/hmacauth"
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ipapi "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/apis/ip"
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"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/apis/options"
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sessionsapi "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/apis/sessions"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/cookies"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/encryption"
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"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/ip"
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"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/logger"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/sessions"
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"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/providers"
"github.com/yhat/wsutil"
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)
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const (
// SignatureHeader is the name of the request header containing the GAP Signature
// Part of hmacauth
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SignatureHeader = "GAP-Signature"
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httpScheme = "http"
httpsScheme = "https"
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applicationJSON = "application/json"
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)
// SignatureHeaders contains the headers to be signed by the hmac algorithm
// Part of hmacauth
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var SignatureHeaders = []string{
"Content-Length",
"Content-Md5",
"Content-Type",
"Date",
"Authorization",
"X-Forwarded-User",
"X-Forwarded-Email",
"X-Forwarded-Preferred-User",
"X-Forwarded-Access-Token",
"Cookie",
"Gap-Auth",
}
var (
// ErrNeedsLogin means the user should be redirected to the login page
ErrNeedsLogin = errors.New("redirect to login page")
// Used to check final redirects are not susceptible to open redirects.
// Matches //, /\ and both of these with whitespace in between (eg / / or / \).
invalidRedirectRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`[/\\](?:[\s\v]*|\.{1,2})[/\\]`)
)
// OAuthProxy is the main authentication proxy
type OAuthProxy struct {
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CookieSeed string
CookieName string
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CSRFCookieName string
CookieDomains []string
CookiePath string
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CookieSecure bool
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CookieHTTPOnly bool
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CookieExpire time.Duration
CookieRefresh time.Duration
CookieSameSite string
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Validator func(string) bool
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RobotsPath string
SignInPath string
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SignOutPath string
OAuthStartPath string
OAuthCallbackPath string
AuthOnlyPath string
UserInfoPath string
redirectURL *url.URL // the url to receive requests at
whitelistDomains []string
provider providers.Provider
providerNameOverride string
sessionStore sessionsapi.SessionStore
ProxyPrefix string
SignInMessage string
HtpasswdFile *HtpasswdFile
DisplayHtpasswdForm bool
serveMux http.Handler
SetXAuthRequest bool
PassBasicAuth bool
SetBasicAuth bool
SkipProviderButton bool
PassUserHeaders bool
BasicAuthPassword string
PassAccessToken bool
SetAuthorization bool
PassAuthorization bool
PreferEmailToUser bool
skipAuthRegex []string
skipAuthPreflight bool
skipAuthStripHeaders bool
skipJwtBearerTokens bool
mainJwtBearerVerifier *oidc.IDTokenVerifier
extraJwtBearerVerifiers []*oidc.IDTokenVerifier
compiledRegex []*regexp.Regexp
templates *template.Template
realClientIPParser ipapi.RealClientIPParser
Implements --trusted-ip option (#552) * Implements --ip-whitelist option * Included IPWhitelist option to allow one-or-more selected CIDR ranges to bypass OAuth2 authentication. * Adds IPWhitelist, a fast lookup table for multiple CIDR ranges. * Renamed IPWhitelist ipCIDRSet * Fixed unessesary pointer usage in ipCIDRSet * Update CHANGELOG.md * Update CHANGELOG.md * Updated to not use err.Error() in printf statements * Imrpoved language for --ip-whitelist descriptions. * Improve IP whitelist options error messages * Clarify options single-host normalization * Wrote a book about ipCIDRSet * Added comment to IsWhitelistedIP in oauthproxy.go * Rewrite oauthproxy test case as table driven * oops * Support whitelisting by low-level remote address * Added more test-cases, improved descriptions * Move ip_cidr_set.go to pkg/ip/net_set.go * Add more whitelist test use cases. * Oops * Use subtests for TestIPWhitelist * Add minimal tests for ip.NetSet * Use switch statment * Renamed ip-whitelist to whitelist-ip * Update documentation with a warning. * Update pkg/apis/options/options.go * Update CHANGELOG.md Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix fmt * Move ParseIPNet into abstraction * Add warning in case of --reverse-proxy * Update pkg/validation/options_test.go * Rename --whitelist-ip to --trusted-ip * Update oauthproxy.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
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trustedIPs *ip.NetSet
Banner string
Footer string
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}
// UpstreamProxy represents an upstream server to proxy to
type UpstreamProxy struct {
upstream string
handler http.Handler
wsHandler http.Handler
auth hmacauth.HmacAuth
}
// ServeHTTP proxies requests to the upstream provider while signing the
// request headers
func (u *UpstreamProxy) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("GAP-Upstream-Address", u.upstream)
if u.auth != nil {
r.Header.Set("GAP-Auth", w.Header().Get("GAP-Auth"))
u.auth.SignRequest(r)
}
if u.wsHandler != nil && strings.EqualFold(r.Header.Get("Connection"), "upgrade") && r.Header.Get("Upgrade") == "websocket" {
u.wsHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
} else {
u.handler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
}
// NewReverseProxy creates a new reverse proxy for proxying requests to upstream
// servers
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func NewReverseProxy(target *url.URL, opts *options.Options) (proxy *httputil.ReverseProxy) {
proxy = httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy(target)
proxy.FlushInterval = opts.FlushInterval
if opts.SSLUpstreamInsecureSkipVerify {
proxy.Transport = &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
}
}
setProxyErrorHandler(proxy, opts)
return proxy
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}
func setProxyErrorHandler(proxy *httputil.ReverseProxy, opts *options.Options) {
templates := loadTemplates(opts.CustomTemplatesDir)
proxy.ErrorHandler = func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, proxyErr error) {
logger.Printf("Error proxying to upstream server: %v", proxyErr)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadGateway)
data := struct {
Title string
Message string
ProxyPrefix string
}{
Title: "Bad Gateway",
Message: "Error proxying to upstream server",
ProxyPrefix: opts.ProxyPrefix,
}
templates.ExecuteTemplate(w, "error.html", data)
}
}
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func setProxyUpstreamHostHeader(proxy *httputil.ReverseProxy, target *url.URL) {
director := proxy.Director
proxy.Director = func(req *http.Request) {
director(req)
// use RequestURI so that we aren't unescaping encoded slashes in the request path
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req.Host = target.Host
req.URL.Opaque = req.RequestURI
req.URL.RawQuery = ""
}
}
func setProxyDirector(proxy *httputil.ReverseProxy) {
director := proxy.Director
proxy.Director = func(req *http.Request) {
director(req)
// use RequestURI so that we aren't unescaping encoded slashes in the request path
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req.URL.Opaque = req.RequestURI
req.URL.RawQuery = ""
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}
}
// NewFileServer creates a http.Handler to serve files from the filesystem
func NewFileServer(path string, filesystemPath string) (proxy http.Handler) {
return http.StripPrefix(path, http.FileServer(http.Dir(filesystemPath)))
}
// NewWebSocketOrRestReverseProxy creates a reverse proxy for REST or websocket based on url
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func NewWebSocketOrRestReverseProxy(u *url.URL, opts *options.Options, auth hmacauth.HmacAuth) http.Handler {
u.Path = ""
proxy := NewReverseProxy(u, opts)
if !opts.PassHostHeader {
setProxyUpstreamHostHeader(proxy, u)
} else {
setProxyDirector(proxy)
}
// this should give us a wss:// scheme if the url is https:// based.
var wsProxy *wsutil.ReverseProxy
if opts.ProxyWebSockets {
wsScheme := "ws" + strings.TrimPrefix(u.Scheme, "http")
wsURL := &url.URL{Scheme: wsScheme, Host: u.Host}
wsProxy = wsutil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy(wsURL)
if opts.SSLUpstreamInsecureSkipVerify {
wsProxy.TLSClientConfig = &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}
}
}
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return &UpstreamProxy{
upstream: u.Host,
handler: proxy,
wsHandler: wsProxy,
auth: auth,
}
}
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// NewOAuthProxy creates a new instance of OAuthProxy from the options provided
func NewOAuthProxy(opts *options.Options, validator func(string) bool) (*OAuthProxy, error) {
sessionStore, err := sessions.NewSessionStore(&opts.Session, &opts.Cookie)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error initialising session store: %v", err)
}
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serveMux := http.NewServeMux()
var auth hmacauth.HmacAuth
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if sigData := opts.GetSignatureData(); sigData != nil {
auth = hmacauth.NewHmacAuth(sigData.Hash, []byte(sigData.Key),
SignatureHeader, SignatureHeaders)
}
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for _, u := range opts.GetProxyURLs() {
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path := u.Path
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host := u.Host
switch u.Scheme {
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case httpScheme, httpsScheme:
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logger.Printf("mapping path %q => upstream %q", path, u)
proxy := NewWebSocketOrRestReverseProxy(u, opts, auth)
serveMux.Handle(path, proxy)
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case "static":
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responseCode, err := strconv.Atoi(host)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("unable to convert %q to int, use default \"200\"", host)
responseCode = 200
}
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serveMux.HandleFunc(path, func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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rw.WriteHeader(responseCode)
fmt.Fprintf(rw, "Authenticated")
})
case "file":
if u.Fragment != "" {
path = u.Fragment
}
logger.Printf("mapping path %q => file system %q", path, u.Path)
proxy := NewFileServer(path, u.Path)
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uProxy := UpstreamProxy{
upstream: path,
handler: proxy,
wsHandler: nil,
auth: nil,
}
serveMux.Handle(path, &uProxy)
default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unknown upstream protocol %s", u.Scheme))
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}
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}
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for _, u := range opts.GetCompiledRegex() {
logger.Printf("compiled skip-auth-regex => %q", u)
}
if opts.SkipJwtBearerTokens {
logger.Printf("Skipping JWT tokens from configured OIDC issuer: %q", opts.OIDCIssuerURL)
for _, issuer := range opts.ExtraJwtIssuers {
logger.Printf("Skipping JWT tokens from extra JWT issuer: %q", issuer)
}
}
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redirectURL := opts.GetRedirectURL()
if redirectURL.Path == "" {
redirectURL.Path = fmt.Sprintf("%s/callback", opts.ProxyPrefix)
}
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logger.Printf("OAuthProxy configured for %s Client ID: %s", opts.GetProvider().Data().ProviderName, opts.ClientID)
refresh := "disabled"
if opts.Cookie.Refresh != time.Duration(0) {
refresh = fmt.Sprintf("after %s", opts.Cookie.Refresh)
}
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logger.Printf("Cookie settings: name:%s secure(https):%v httponly:%v expiry:%s domains:%s path:%s samesite:%s refresh:%s", opts.Cookie.Name, opts.Cookie.Secure, opts.Cookie.HTTPOnly, opts.Cookie.Expire, strings.Join(opts.Cookie.Domains, ","), opts.Cookie.Path, opts.Cookie.SameSite, refresh)
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Implements --trusted-ip option (#552) * Implements --ip-whitelist option * Included IPWhitelist option to allow one-or-more selected CIDR ranges to bypass OAuth2 authentication. * Adds IPWhitelist, a fast lookup table for multiple CIDR ranges. * Renamed IPWhitelist ipCIDRSet * Fixed unessesary pointer usage in ipCIDRSet * Update CHANGELOG.md * Update CHANGELOG.md * Updated to not use err.Error() in printf statements * Imrpoved language for --ip-whitelist descriptions. * Improve IP whitelist options error messages * Clarify options single-host normalization * Wrote a book about ipCIDRSet * Added comment to IsWhitelistedIP in oauthproxy.go * Rewrite oauthproxy test case as table driven * oops * Support whitelisting by low-level remote address * Added more test-cases, improved descriptions * Move ip_cidr_set.go to pkg/ip/net_set.go * Add more whitelist test use cases. * Oops * Use subtests for TestIPWhitelist * Add minimal tests for ip.NetSet * Use switch statment * Renamed ip-whitelist to whitelist-ip * Update documentation with a warning. * Update pkg/apis/options/options.go * Update CHANGELOG.md Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix fmt * Move ParseIPNet into abstraction * Add warning in case of --reverse-proxy * Update pkg/validation/options_test.go * Rename --whitelist-ip to --trusted-ip * Update oauthproxy.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
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trustedIPs := ip.NewNetSet()
for _, ipStr := range opts.TrustedIPs {
if ipNet := ip.ParseIPNet(ipStr); ipNet != nil {
trustedIPs.AddIPNet(*ipNet)
} else {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not parse IP network (%s)", ipStr)
}
}
return &OAuthProxy{
CookieName: opts.Cookie.Name,
CSRFCookieName: fmt.Sprintf("%v_%v", opts.Cookie.Name, "csrf"),
CookieSeed: opts.Cookie.Secret,
CookieDomains: opts.Cookie.Domains,
CookiePath: opts.Cookie.Path,
CookieSecure: opts.Cookie.Secure,
CookieHTTPOnly: opts.Cookie.HTTPOnly,
CookieExpire: opts.Cookie.Expire,
CookieRefresh: opts.Cookie.Refresh,
CookieSameSite: opts.Cookie.SameSite,
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Validator: validator,
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RobotsPath: "/robots.txt",
SignInPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/sign_in", opts.ProxyPrefix),
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SignOutPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/sign_out", opts.ProxyPrefix),
OAuthStartPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/start", opts.ProxyPrefix),
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OAuthCallbackPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/callback", opts.ProxyPrefix),
AuthOnlyPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/auth", opts.ProxyPrefix),
UserInfoPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/userinfo", opts.ProxyPrefix),
ProxyPrefix: opts.ProxyPrefix,
provider: opts.GetProvider(),
providerNameOverride: opts.ProviderName,
sessionStore: sessionStore,
serveMux: serveMux,
redirectURL: redirectURL,
whitelistDomains: opts.WhitelistDomains,
skipAuthRegex: opts.SkipAuthRegex,
skipAuthPreflight: opts.SkipAuthPreflight,
skipAuthStripHeaders: opts.SkipAuthStripHeaders,
skipJwtBearerTokens: opts.SkipJwtBearerTokens,
mainJwtBearerVerifier: opts.GetOIDCVerifier(),
extraJwtBearerVerifiers: opts.GetJWTBearerVerifiers(),
compiledRegex: opts.GetCompiledRegex(),
realClientIPParser: opts.GetRealClientIPParser(),
SetXAuthRequest: opts.SetXAuthRequest,
PassBasicAuth: opts.PassBasicAuth,
SetBasicAuth: opts.SetBasicAuth,
PassUserHeaders: opts.PassUserHeaders,
BasicAuthPassword: opts.BasicAuthPassword,
PassAccessToken: opts.PassAccessToken,
SetAuthorization: opts.SetAuthorization,
PassAuthorization: opts.PassAuthorization,
PreferEmailToUser: opts.PreferEmailToUser,
SkipProviderButton: opts.SkipProviderButton,
templates: loadTemplates(opts.CustomTemplatesDir),
Implements --trusted-ip option (#552) * Implements --ip-whitelist option * Included IPWhitelist option to allow one-or-more selected CIDR ranges to bypass OAuth2 authentication. * Adds IPWhitelist, a fast lookup table for multiple CIDR ranges. * Renamed IPWhitelist ipCIDRSet * Fixed unessesary pointer usage in ipCIDRSet * Update CHANGELOG.md * Update CHANGELOG.md * Updated to not use err.Error() in printf statements * Imrpoved language for --ip-whitelist descriptions. * Improve IP whitelist options error messages * Clarify options single-host normalization * Wrote a book about ipCIDRSet * Added comment to IsWhitelistedIP in oauthproxy.go * Rewrite oauthproxy test case as table driven * oops * Support whitelisting by low-level remote address * Added more test-cases, improved descriptions * Move ip_cidr_set.go to pkg/ip/net_set.go * Add more whitelist test use cases. * Oops * Use subtests for TestIPWhitelist * Add minimal tests for ip.NetSet * Use switch statment * Renamed ip-whitelist to whitelist-ip * Update documentation with a warning. * Update pkg/apis/options/options.go * Update CHANGELOG.md Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix fmt * Move ParseIPNet into abstraction * Add warning in case of --reverse-proxy * Update pkg/validation/options_test.go * Rename --whitelist-ip to --trusted-ip * Update oauthproxy.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2020-07-11 12:10:58 +02:00
trustedIPs: trustedIPs,
Banner: opts.Banner,
Footer: opts.Footer,
}, nil
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}
// GetRedirectURI returns the redirectURL that the upstream OAuth Provider will
// redirect clients to once authenticated
func (p *OAuthProxy) GetRedirectURI(host string) string {
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// default to the request Host if not set
if p.redirectURL.Host != "" {
return p.redirectURL.String()
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}
u := *p.redirectURL
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if u.Scheme == "" {
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if p.CookieSecure {
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u.Scheme = httpsScheme
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} else {
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u.Scheme = httpScheme
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}
}
u.Host = host
return u.String()
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) displayCustomLoginForm() bool {
return p.HtpasswdFile != nil && p.DisplayHtpasswdForm
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) redeemCode(ctx context.Context, host, code string) (s *sessionsapi.SessionState, err error) {
if code == "" {
return nil, errors.New("missing code")
}
redirectURI := p.GetRedirectURI(host)
s, err = p.provider.Redeem(ctx, redirectURI, code)
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if err != nil {
return
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}
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if s.Email == "" {
s.Email, err = p.provider.GetEmailAddress(ctx, s)
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}
if s.PreferredUsername == "" {
s.PreferredUsername, err = p.provider.GetPreferredUsername(ctx, s)
if err != nil && err.Error() == "not implemented" {
err = nil
}
}
if s.User == "" {
s.User, err = p.provider.GetUserName(ctx, s)
if err != nil && err.Error() == "not implemented" {
err = nil
}
}
return
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}
// MakeCSRFCookie creates a cookie for CSRF
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func (p *OAuthProxy) MakeCSRFCookie(req *http.Request, value string, expiration time.Duration, now time.Time) *http.Cookie {
return p.makeCookie(req, p.CSRFCookieName, value, expiration, now)
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) makeCookie(req *http.Request, name string, value string, expiration time.Duration, now time.Time) *http.Cookie {
cookieDomain := cookies.GetCookieDomain(req, p.CookieDomains)
if cookieDomain != "" {
domain := cookies.GetRequestHost(req)
if h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(domain); err == nil {
domain = h
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(domain, cookieDomain) {
logger.Printf("Warning: request host is %q but using configured cookie domain of %q", domain, cookieDomain)
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}
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}
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return &http.Cookie{
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Name: name,
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Value: value,
Path: p.CookiePath,
Domain: cookieDomain,
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HttpOnly: p.CookieHTTPOnly,
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Secure: p.CookieSecure,
Expires: now.Add(expiration),
SameSite: cookies.ParseSameSite(p.CookieSameSite),
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}
}
// ClearCSRFCookie creates a cookie to unset the CSRF cookie stored in the user's
// session
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func (p *OAuthProxy) ClearCSRFCookie(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
http.SetCookie(rw, p.MakeCSRFCookie(req, "", time.Hour*-1, time.Now()))
}
// SetCSRFCookie adds a CSRF cookie to the response
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func (p *OAuthProxy) SetCSRFCookie(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, val string) {
http.SetCookie(rw, p.MakeCSRFCookie(req, val, p.CookieExpire, time.Now()))
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}
// ClearSessionCookie creates a cookie to unset the user's authentication cookie
// stored in the user's session
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func (p *OAuthProxy) ClearSessionCookie(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) error {
return p.sessionStore.Clear(rw, req)
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}
// LoadCookiedSession reads the user's authentication details from the request
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func (p *OAuthProxy) LoadCookiedSession(req *http.Request) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
return p.sessionStore.Load(req)
}
// SaveSession creates a new session cookie value and sets this on the response
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func (p *OAuthProxy) SaveSession(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) error {
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return p.sessionStore.Save(rw, req, s)
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}
// RobotsTxt disallows scraping pages from the OAuthProxy
func (p *OAuthProxy) RobotsTxt(rw http.ResponseWriter) {
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprintf(rw, "User-agent: *\nDisallow: /")
}
// ErrorPage writes an error response
func (p *OAuthProxy) ErrorPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, code int, title string, message string) {
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rw.WriteHeader(code)
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t := struct {
Title string
Message string
ProxyPrefix string
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}{
Title: fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", code, title),
Message: message,
ProxyPrefix: p.ProxyPrefix,
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}
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p.templates.ExecuteTemplate(rw, "error.html", t)
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}
// SignInPage writes the sing in template to the response
func (p *OAuthProxy) SignInPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, code int) {
prepareNoCache(rw)
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p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
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rw.WriteHeader(code)
redirectURL, err := p.GetRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error obtaining redirect: %s", err.Error())
p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", err.Error())
return
}
if redirectURL == p.SignInPath {
redirectURL = "/"
}
t := struct {
ProviderName string
SignInMessage template.HTML
CustomLogin bool
Redirect string
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Version string
ProxyPrefix string
Footer template.HTML
}{
ProviderName: p.provider.Data().ProviderName,
SignInMessage: template.HTML(p.SignInMessage),
CustomLogin: p.displayCustomLoginForm(),
Redirect: redirectURL,
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Version: VERSION,
ProxyPrefix: p.ProxyPrefix,
Footer: template.HTML(p.Footer),
}
if p.providerNameOverride != "" {
t.ProviderName = p.providerNameOverride
}
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p.templates.ExecuteTemplate(rw, "sign_in.html", t)
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}
// ManualSignIn handles basic auth logins to the proxy
func (p *OAuthProxy) ManualSignIn(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (string, bool) {
if req.Method != "POST" || p.HtpasswdFile == nil {
return "", false
}
user := req.FormValue("username")
passwd := req.FormValue("password")
if user == "" {
return "", false
}
// check auth
if p.HtpasswdFile.Validate(user, passwd) {
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logger.PrintAuthf(user, req, logger.AuthSuccess, "Authenticated via HtpasswdFile")
return user, true
}
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logger.PrintAuthf(user, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via HtpasswdFile")
return "", false
}
// GetRedirect reads the query parameter to get the URL to redirect clients to
// once authenticated with the OAuthProxy
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func (p *OAuthProxy) GetRedirect(req *http.Request) (redirect string, err error) {
err = req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
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return
}
redirect = req.Header.Get("X-Auth-Request-Redirect")
if req.Form.Get("rd") != "" {
redirect = req.Form.Get("rd")
}
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if !p.IsValidRedirect(redirect) {
redirect = req.URL.Path
if strings.HasPrefix(redirect, p.ProxyPrefix) {
redirect = "/"
}
}
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return
}
// splitHostPort separates host and port. If the port is not valid, it returns
// the entire input as host, and it doesn't check the validity of the host.
// Unlike net.SplitHostPort, but per RFC 3986, it requires ports to be numeric.
// *** taken from net/url, modified validOptionalPort() to accept ":*"
func splitHostPort(hostport string) (host, port string) {
host = hostport
colon := strings.LastIndexByte(host, ':')
if colon != -1 && validOptionalPort(host[colon:]) {
host, port = host[:colon], host[colon+1:]
}
if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
host = host[1 : len(host)-1]
}
return
}
// validOptionalPort reports whether port is either an empty string
// or matches /^:\d*$/
// *** taken from net/url, modified to accept ":*"
func validOptionalPort(port string) bool {
if port == "" || port == ":*" {
return true
}
if port[0] != ':' {
return false
}
for _, b := range port[1:] {
if b < '0' || b > '9' {
return false
}
}
return true
}
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// IsValidRedirect checks whether the redirect URL is whitelisted
func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {
switch {
case redirect == "":
// The user didn't specify a redirect, should fallback to `/`
return false
case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//") && !invalidRedirectRegex.MatchString(redirect):
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return true
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case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "https://"):
redirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Rejecting invalid redirect %q: scheme unsupported or missing", redirect)
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return false
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}
redirectHostname := redirectURL.Hostname()
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for _, domain := range p.whitelistDomains {
domainHostname, domainPort := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, "."))
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if domainHostname == "" {
continue
}
if (redirectHostname == domainHostname) || (strings.HasPrefix(domain, ".") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) {
// the domain names match, now validate the ports
// if the whitelisted domain's port is '*', allow all ports
// if the whitelisted domain contains a specific port, only allow that port
// if the whitelisted domain doesn't contain a port at all, only allow empty redirect ports ie http and https
redirectPort := redirectURL.Port()
if (domainPort == "*") ||
(domainPort == redirectPort) ||
(domainPort == "" && redirectPort == "") {
return true
}
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}
}
logger.Printf("Rejecting invalid redirect %q: domain / port not in whitelist", redirect)
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return false
default:
logger.Printf("Rejecting invalid redirect %q: not an absolute or relative URL", redirect)
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return false
}
}
// IsWhitelistedRequest is used to check if auth should be skipped for this request
func (p *OAuthProxy) IsWhitelistedRequest(req *http.Request) bool {
isPreflightRequestAllowed := p.skipAuthPreflight && req.Method == "OPTIONS"
Implements --trusted-ip option (#552) * Implements --ip-whitelist option * Included IPWhitelist option to allow one-or-more selected CIDR ranges to bypass OAuth2 authentication. * Adds IPWhitelist, a fast lookup table for multiple CIDR ranges. * Renamed IPWhitelist ipCIDRSet * Fixed unessesary pointer usage in ipCIDRSet * Update CHANGELOG.md * Update CHANGELOG.md * Updated to not use err.Error() in printf statements * Imrpoved language for --ip-whitelist descriptions. * Improve IP whitelist options error messages * Clarify options single-host normalization * Wrote a book about ipCIDRSet * Added comment to IsWhitelistedIP in oauthproxy.go * Rewrite oauthproxy test case as table driven * oops * Support whitelisting by low-level remote address * Added more test-cases, improved descriptions * Move ip_cidr_set.go to pkg/ip/net_set.go * Add more whitelist test use cases. * Oops * Use subtests for TestIPWhitelist * Add minimal tests for ip.NetSet * Use switch statment * Renamed ip-whitelist to whitelist-ip * Update documentation with a warning. * Update pkg/apis/options/options.go * Update CHANGELOG.md Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix fmt * Move ParseIPNet into abstraction * Add warning in case of --reverse-proxy * Update pkg/validation/options_test.go * Rename --whitelist-ip to --trusted-ip * Update oauthproxy.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2020-07-11 12:10:58 +02:00
return isPreflightRequestAllowed || p.IsWhitelistedPath(req.URL.Path) || p.IsTrustedIP(req)
}
// IsWhitelistedPath is used to check if the request path is allowed without auth
func (p *OAuthProxy) IsWhitelistedPath(path string) bool {
for _, u := range p.compiledRegex {
if u.MatchString(path) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// See https://developers.google.com/web/fundamentals/performance/optimizing-content-efficiency/http-caching?hl=en
var noCacheHeaders = map[string]string{
"Expires": time.Unix(0, 0).Format(time.RFC1123),
"Cache-Control": "no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, max-age=0",
"X-Accel-Expires": "0", // https://www.nginx.com/resources/wiki/start/topics/examples/x-accel/
}
// prepareNoCache prepares headers for preventing browser caching.
func prepareNoCache(w http.ResponseWriter) {
// Set NoCache headers
for k, v := range noCacheHeaders {
w.Header().Set(k, v)
}
}
Implements --trusted-ip option (#552) * Implements --ip-whitelist option * Included IPWhitelist option to allow one-or-more selected CIDR ranges to bypass OAuth2 authentication. * Adds IPWhitelist, a fast lookup table for multiple CIDR ranges. * Renamed IPWhitelist ipCIDRSet * Fixed unessesary pointer usage in ipCIDRSet * Update CHANGELOG.md * Update CHANGELOG.md * Updated to not use err.Error() in printf statements * Imrpoved language for --ip-whitelist descriptions. * Improve IP whitelist options error messages * Clarify options single-host normalization * Wrote a book about ipCIDRSet * Added comment to IsWhitelistedIP in oauthproxy.go * Rewrite oauthproxy test case as table driven * oops * Support whitelisting by low-level remote address * Added more test-cases, improved descriptions * Move ip_cidr_set.go to pkg/ip/net_set.go * Add more whitelist test use cases. * Oops * Use subtests for TestIPWhitelist * Add minimal tests for ip.NetSet * Use switch statment * Renamed ip-whitelist to whitelist-ip * Update documentation with a warning. * Update pkg/apis/options/options.go * Update CHANGELOG.md Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix fmt * Move ParseIPNet into abstraction * Add warning in case of --reverse-proxy * Update pkg/validation/options_test.go * Rename --whitelist-ip to --trusted-ip * Update oauthproxy.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2020-07-11 12:10:58 +02:00
// IsTrustedIP is used to check if a request comes from a trusted client IP address.
func (p *OAuthProxy) IsTrustedIP(req *http.Request) bool {
if p.trustedIPs == nil {
return false
}
remoteAddr, err := ip.GetClientIP(p.realClientIPParser, req)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error obtaining real IP for trusted IP list: %v", err)
// Possibly spoofed X-Real-IP header
return false
}
if remoteAddr == nil {
return false
}
return p.trustedIPs.Has(remoteAddr)
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
if req.URL.Path != p.AuthOnlyPath && strings.HasPrefix(req.URL.Path, p.ProxyPrefix) {
prepareNoCache(rw)
}
switch path := req.URL.Path; {
case path == p.RobotsPath:
p.RobotsTxt(rw)
case p.IsWhitelistedRequest(req):
p.SkipAuthProxy(rw, req)
case path == p.SignInPath:
p.SignIn(rw, req)
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case path == p.SignOutPath:
p.SignOut(rw, req)
case path == p.OAuthStartPath:
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
case path == p.OAuthCallbackPath:
p.OAuthCallback(rw, req)
case path == p.AuthOnlyPath:
p.AuthenticateOnly(rw, req)
case path == p.UserInfoPath:
p.UserInfo(rw, req)
default:
p.Proxy(rw, req)
}
}
// SignIn serves a page prompting users to sign in
func (p *OAuthProxy) SignIn(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
redirect, err := p.GetRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error obtaining redirect: %s", err.Error())
p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", err.Error())
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return
}
user, ok := p.ManualSignIn(rw, req)
if ok {
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session := &sessionsapi.SessionState{User: user}
p.SaveSession(rw, req, session)
http.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, http.StatusFound)
} else {
if p.SkipProviderButton {
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
} else {
p.SignInPage(rw, req, http.StatusOK)
}
}
}
//UserInfo endpoint outputs session email and preferred username in JSON format
func (p *OAuthProxy) UserInfo(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
if err != nil {
http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusUnauthorized), http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
userInfo := struct {
Email string `json:"email"`
PreferredUsername string `json:"preferredUsername,omitempty"`
}{
Email: session.Email,
PreferredUsername: session.PreferredUsername,
}
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
json.NewEncoder(rw).Encode(userInfo)
}
// SignOut sends a response to clear the authentication cookie
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func (p *OAuthProxy) SignOut(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
redirect, err := p.GetRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error obtaining redirect: %s", err.Error())
p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", err.Error())
return
}
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p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
http.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, http.StatusFound)
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}
// OAuthStart starts the OAuth2 authentication flow
func (p *OAuthProxy) OAuthStart(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
prepareNoCache(rw)
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nonce, err := encryption.Nonce()
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if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error obtaining nonce: %s", err.Error())
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p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", err.Error())
return
}
p.SetCSRFCookie(rw, req, nonce)
redirect, err := p.GetRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error obtaining redirect: %s", err.Error())
p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", err.Error())
return
}
redirectURI := p.GetRedirectURI(req.Host)
http.Redirect(rw, req, p.provider.GetLoginURL(redirectURI, fmt.Sprintf("%v:%v", nonce, redirect)), http.StatusFound)
}
// OAuthCallback is the OAuth2 authentication flow callback that finishes the
// OAuth2 authentication flow
func (p *OAuthProxy) OAuthCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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remoteAddr := ip.GetClientString(p.realClientIPParser, req, true)
// finish the oauth cycle
err := req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
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logger.Printf("Error while parsing OAuth2 callback: %s" + err.Error())
p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", err.Error())
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return
}
errorString := req.Form.Get("error")
if errorString != "" {
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logger.Printf("Error while parsing OAuth2 callback: %s ", errorString)
p.ErrorPage(rw, 403, "Permission Denied", errorString)
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return
}
session, err := p.redeemCode(req.Context(), req.Host, req.Form.Get("code"))
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error redeeming code during OAuth2 callback: %s ", err.Error())
p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", "Internal Error")
return
}
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s := strings.SplitN(req.Form.Get("state"), ":", 2)
if len(s) != 2 {
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logger.Printf("Error while parsing OAuth2 state: invalid length")
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p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", "Invalid State")
return
}
nonce := s[0]
redirect := s[1]
c, err := req.Cookie(p.CSRFCookieName)
if err != nil {
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logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: unable too obtain CSRF cookie")
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p.ErrorPage(rw, 403, "Permission Denied", err.Error())
return
}
p.ClearCSRFCookie(rw, req)
if c.Value != nonce {
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logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: csrf token mismatch, potential attack")
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p.ErrorPage(rw, 403, "Permission Denied", "csrf failed")
return
}
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if !p.IsValidRedirect(redirect) {
redirect = "/"
}
// set cookie, or deny
if p.Validator(session.Email) && p.provider.ValidateGroup(session.Email) {
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logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthSuccess, "Authenticated via OAuth2: %s", session)
err := p.SaveSession(rw, req, session)
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if err != nil {
logger.Printf("%s %s", remoteAddr, err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", "Internal Error")
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return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, http.StatusFound)
} else {
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: unauthorized")
p.ErrorPage(rw, 403, "Permission Denied", "Invalid Account")
}
}
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// AuthenticateOnly checks whether the user is currently logged in
func (p *OAuthProxy) AuthenticateOnly(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
if err != nil {
http.Error(rw, "unauthorized request", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// we are authenticated
p.addHeadersForProxying(rw, req, session)
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
}
// SkipAuthProxy proxies whitelisted requests and skips authentication
func (p *OAuthProxy) SkipAuthProxy(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
if p.skipAuthStripHeaders {
p.stripAuthHeaders(req)
}
p.serveMux.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
}
// Proxy proxies the user request if the user is authenticated else it prompts
// them to authenticate
func (p *OAuthProxy) Proxy(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
switch err {
case nil:
// we are authenticated
p.addHeadersForProxying(rw, req, session)
p.serveMux.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
case ErrNeedsLogin:
// we need to send the user to a login screen
if isAjax(req) {
// no point redirecting an AJAX request
p.ErrorJSON(rw, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
if p.SkipProviderButton {
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
} else {
p.SignInPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden)
}
default:
// unknown error
logger.Printf("Unexpected internal error: %s", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, http.StatusInternalServerError,
"Internal Error", "Internal Error")
}
}
// getAuthenticatedSession checks whether a user is authenticated and returns a session object and nil error if so
// Returns nil, ErrNeedsLogin if user needs to login.
// Set-Cookie headers may be set on the response as a side-effect of calling this method.
func (p *OAuthProxy) getAuthenticatedSession(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
var session *sessionsapi.SessionState
var err error
var saveSession, clearSession, revalidated bool
if p.skipJwtBearerTokens && req.Header.Get("Authorization") != "" {
session, err = p.GetJwtSession(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error retrieving session from token in Authorization header: %s", err)
}
if session != nil {
saveSession = false
}
}
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remoteAddr := ip.GetClientString(p.realClientIPParser, req, true)
if session == nil {
session, err = p.LoadCookiedSession(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error loading cookied session: %s", err)
}
if session != nil {
if session.Age() > p.CookieRefresh && p.CookieRefresh != time.Duration(0) {
logger.Printf("Refreshing %s old session cookie for %s (refresh after %s)", session.Age(), session, p.CookieRefresh)
saveSession = true
}
if ok, err := p.provider.RefreshSessionIfNeeded(req.Context(), session); err != nil {
logger.Printf("%s removing session. error refreshing access token %s %s", remoteAddr, err, session)
clearSession = true
session = nil
} else if ok {
saveSession = true
revalidated = true
}
}
}
if session != nil && session.IsExpired() {
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logger.Printf("Removing session: token expired %s", session)
session = nil
saveSession = false
clearSession = true
}
if saveSession && !revalidated && session != nil && session.AccessToken != "" {
if !p.provider.ValidateSessionState(req.Context(), session) {
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logger.Printf("Removing session: error validating %s", session)
saveSession = false
session = nil
clearSession = true
}
}
if session != nil && session.Email != "" && !p.Validator(session.Email) {
logger.Printf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via session: removing session %s", session)
session = nil
saveSession = false
clearSession = true
}
if saveSession && session != nil {
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err = p.SaveSession(rw, req, session)
if err != nil {
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthError, "Save session error %s", err)
return nil, err
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}
}
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if clearSession {
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p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
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}
if session == nil {
session, err = p.CheckBasicAuth(req)
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if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error during basic auth validation: %s", err)
}
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}
if session == nil {
return nil, ErrNeedsLogin
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}
return session, nil
}
// addHeadersForProxying adds the appropriate headers the request / response for proxying
func (p *OAuthProxy) addHeadersForProxying(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, session *sessionsapi.SessionState) {
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if p.PassBasicAuth {
if p.PreferEmailToUser && session.Email != "" {
req.SetBasicAuth(session.Email, p.BasicAuthPassword)
req.Header["X-Forwarded-User"] = []string{session.Email}
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Email")
} else {
req.SetBasicAuth(session.User, p.BasicAuthPassword)
req.Header["X-Forwarded-User"] = []string{session.User}
if session.Email != "" {
req.Header["X-Forwarded-Email"] = []string{session.Email}
} else {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Email")
}
}
if session.PreferredUsername != "" {
req.Header["X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username"] = []string{session.PreferredUsername}
} else {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username")
}
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}
if p.PassUserHeaders {
if p.PreferEmailToUser && session.Email != "" {
req.Header["X-Forwarded-User"] = []string{session.Email}
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Email")
} else {
req.Header["X-Forwarded-User"] = []string{session.User}
if session.Email != "" {
req.Header["X-Forwarded-Email"] = []string{session.Email}
} else {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Email")
}
}
if session.PreferredUsername != "" {
req.Header["X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username"] = []string{session.PreferredUsername}
} else {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username")
}
}
if p.SetXAuthRequest {
rw.Header().Set("X-Auth-Request-User", session.User)
if session.Email != "" {
rw.Header().Set("X-Auth-Request-Email", session.Email)
} else {
rw.Header().Del("X-Auth-Request-Email")
}
if session.PreferredUsername != "" {
rw.Header().Set("X-Auth-Request-Preferred-Username", session.PreferredUsername)
} else {
rw.Header().Del("X-Auth-Request-Preferred-Username")
}
if p.PassAccessToken {
if session.AccessToken != "" {
rw.Header().Set("X-Auth-Request-Access-Token", session.AccessToken)
} else {
rw.Header().Del("X-Auth-Request-Access-Token")
}
}
}
if p.PassAccessToken {
if session.AccessToken != "" {
req.Header["X-Forwarded-Access-Token"] = []string{session.AccessToken}
} else {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Access-Token")
}
}
if p.PassAuthorization {
if session.IDToken != "" {
req.Header["Authorization"] = []string{fmt.Sprintf("Bearer %s", session.IDToken)}
} else {
req.Header.Del("Authorization")
}
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}
if p.SetBasicAuth {
switch {
case p.PreferEmailToUser && session.Email != "":
authVal := b64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(session.Email + ":" + p.BasicAuthPassword))
rw.Header().Set("Authorization", "Basic "+authVal)
case session.User != "":
authVal := b64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(session.User + ":" + p.BasicAuthPassword))
rw.Header().Set("Authorization", "Basic "+authVal)
default:
rw.Header().Del("Authorization")
}
}
if p.SetAuthorization {
if session.IDToken != "" {
rw.Header().Set("Authorization", fmt.Sprintf("Bearer %s", session.IDToken))
} else {
rw.Header().Del("Authorization")
}
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}
if session.Email == "" {
rw.Header().Set("GAP-Auth", session.User)
} else {
rw.Header().Set("GAP-Auth", session.Email)
}
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}
// stripAuthHeaders removes Auth headers for whitelisted routes from skipAuthRegex
func (p *OAuthProxy) stripAuthHeaders(req *http.Request) {
if p.PassBasicAuth {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-User")
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Email")
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username")
req.Header.Del("Authorization")
}
if p.PassUserHeaders {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-User")
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Email")
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username")
}
if p.PassAccessToken {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Access-Token")
}
if p.PassAuthorization {
req.Header.Del("Authorization")
}
}
// CheckBasicAuth checks the requests Authorization header for basic auth
// credentials and authenticates these against the proxies HtpasswdFile
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func (p *OAuthProxy) CheckBasicAuth(req *http.Request) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
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if p.HtpasswdFile == nil {
return nil, nil
}
auth := req.Header.Get("Authorization")
if auth == "" {
return nil, nil
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}
s := strings.SplitN(auth, " ", 2)
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if len(s) != 2 || s[0] != "Basic" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid Authorization header %s", req.Header.Get("Authorization"))
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}
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b, err := b64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s[1])
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if err != nil {
return nil, err
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}
pair := strings.SplitN(string(b), ":", 2)
if len(pair) != 2 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid format %s", b)
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}
if p.HtpasswdFile.Validate(pair[0], pair[1]) {
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logger.PrintAuthf(pair[0], req, logger.AuthSuccess, "Authenticated via basic auth and HTpasswd File")
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return &sessionsapi.SessionState{User: pair[0]}, nil
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}
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logger.PrintAuthf(pair[0], req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via basic auth: not in Htpasswd File")
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return nil, nil
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}
// isAjax checks if a request is an ajax request
func isAjax(req *http.Request) bool {
acceptValues := req.Header.Values("Accept")
const ajaxReq = applicationJSON
for _, v := range acceptValues {
if v == ajaxReq {
return true
}
}
return false
}
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// ErrorJSON returns the error code with an application/json mime type
func (p *OAuthProxy) ErrorJSON(rw http.ResponseWriter, code int) {
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", applicationJSON)
rw.WriteHeader(code)
}
// GetJwtSession loads a session based on a JWT token in the authorization header.
// (see the config options skip-jwt-bearer-tokens and extra-jwt-issuers)
func (p *OAuthProxy) GetJwtSession(req *http.Request) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
rawBearerToken, err := p.findBearerToken(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// If we are using an oidc provider, go ahead and try that provider first with its Verifier
// and Bearer Token -> Session converter
if p.mainJwtBearerVerifier != nil {
bearerToken, err := p.mainJwtBearerVerifier.Verify(req.Context(), rawBearerToken)
if err == nil {
return p.provider.CreateSessionStateFromBearerToken(req.Context(), rawBearerToken, bearerToken)
}
}
// Otherwise, attempt to verify against the extra JWT issuers and use a more generic
// Bearer Token -> Session converter
for _, verifier := range p.extraJwtBearerVerifiers {
bearerToken, err := verifier.Verify(req.Context(), rawBearerToken)
if err != nil {
continue
}
return (*providers.ProviderData)(nil).CreateSessionStateFromBearerToken(req.Context(), rawBearerToken, bearerToken)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to verify jwt token %s", req.Header.Get("Authorization"))
}
// findBearerToken finds a valid JWT token from the Authorization header of a given request.
func (p *OAuthProxy) findBearerToken(req *http.Request) (string, error) {
auth := req.Header.Get("Authorization")
s := strings.SplitN(auth, " ", 2)
if len(s) != 2 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid authorization header %s", auth)
}
jwtRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`^eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*\.eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$`)
var rawBearerToken string
if s[0] == "Bearer" && jwtRegex.MatchString(s[1]) {
rawBearerToken = s[1]
} else if s[0] == "Basic" {
// Check if we have a Bearer token masquerading in Basic
b, err := b64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s[1])
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
pair := strings.SplitN(string(b), ":", 2)
if len(pair) != 2 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid format %s", b)
}
user, password := pair[0], pair[1]
// check user, user+password, or just password for a token
if jwtRegex.MatchString(user) {
// Support blank passwords or magic `x-oauth-basic` passwords - nothing else
if password == "" || password == "x-oauth-basic" {
rawBearerToken = user
}
} else if jwtRegex.MatchString(password) {
// support passwords and ignore user
rawBearerToken = password
}
}
if rawBearerToken == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("no valid bearer token found in authorization header")
}
return rawBearerToken, nil
}