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mirror of https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy.git synced 2024-11-28 09:08:44 +02:00
oauth2-proxy/oauthproxy.go
Nick Meves 7eeaea0b3f
Support nonce checks in OIDC Provider (#967)
* Set and verify a nonce with OIDC

* Create a CSRF object to manage nonces & cookies

* Add missing generic cookie unit tests

* Add config flag to control OIDC SkipNonce

* Send hashed nonces in authentication requests

* Encrypt the CSRF cookie

* Add clarity to naming & add more helper methods

* Make CSRF an interface and keep underlying nonces private

* Add ReverseProxy scope to cookie tests

* Align to new 1.16 SameSite cookie default

* Perform SecretBytes conversion on CSRF cookie crypto

* Make state encoding signatures consistent

* Mock time in CSRF struct via Clock

* Improve InsecureSkipNonce docstring
2021-04-21 10:33:27 +01:00

1225 lines
38 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"os/signal"
"regexp"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/justinas/alice"
ipapi "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/apis/ip"
middlewareapi "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/apis/middleware"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/apis/options"
sessionsapi "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/apis/sessions"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/app/pagewriter"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/authentication/basic"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/cookies"
proxyhttp "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/http"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/ip"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/logger"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/middleware"
requestutil "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/requests/util"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/sessions"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/upstream"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/providers"
)
const (
schemeHTTP = "http"
schemeHTTPS = "https"
applicationJSON = "application/json"
)
var (
// ErrNeedsLogin means the user should be redirected to the login page
ErrNeedsLogin = errors.New("redirect to login page")
// ErrAccessDenied means the user should receive a 401 Unauthorized response
ErrAccessDenied = errors.New("access denied")
// Used to check final redirects are not susceptible to open redirects.
// Matches //, /\ and both of these with whitespace in between (eg / / or / \).
invalidRedirectRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`[/\\](?:[\s\v]*|\.{1,2})[/\\]`)
)
// allowedRoute manages method + path based allowlists
type allowedRoute struct {
method string
pathRegex *regexp.Regexp
}
// OAuthProxy is the main authentication proxy
type OAuthProxy struct {
CookieOptions *options.Cookie
Validator func(string) bool
RobotsPath string
SignInPath string
SignOutPath string
OAuthStartPath string
OAuthCallbackPath string
AuthOnlyPath string
UserInfoPath string
allowedRoutes []allowedRoute
redirectURL *url.URL // the url to receive requests at
whitelistDomains []string
provider providers.Provider
sessionStore sessionsapi.SessionStore
ProxyPrefix string
basicAuthValidator basic.Validator
serveMux http.Handler
SkipProviderButton bool
skipAuthPreflight bool
skipJwtBearerTokens bool
realClientIPParser ipapi.RealClientIPParser
trustedIPs *ip.NetSet
sessionChain alice.Chain
headersChain alice.Chain
preAuthChain alice.Chain
pageWriter pagewriter.Writer
server proxyhttp.Server
}
// NewOAuthProxy creates a new instance of OAuthProxy from the options provided
func NewOAuthProxy(opts *options.Options, validator func(string) bool) (*OAuthProxy, error) {
sessionStore, err := sessions.NewSessionStore(&opts.Session, &opts.Cookie)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error initialising session store: %v", err)
}
var basicAuthValidator basic.Validator
if opts.HtpasswdFile != "" {
logger.Printf("using htpasswd file: %s", opts.HtpasswdFile)
var err error
basicAuthValidator, err = basic.NewHTPasswdValidator(opts.HtpasswdFile)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not load htpasswdfile: %v", err)
}
}
pageWriter, err := pagewriter.NewWriter(pagewriter.Opts{
TemplatesPath: opts.Templates.Path,
CustomLogo: opts.Templates.CustomLogo,
ProxyPrefix: opts.ProxyPrefix,
Footer: opts.Templates.Footer,
Version: VERSION,
Debug: opts.Templates.Debug,
ProviderName: buildProviderName(opts.GetProvider(), opts.Providers[0].Name),
SignInMessage: buildSignInMessage(opts),
DisplayLoginForm: basicAuthValidator != nil && opts.Templates.DisplayLoginForm,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error initialising page writer: %v", err)
}
upstreamProxy, err := upstream.NewProxy(opts.UpstreamServers, opts.GetSignatureData(), pageWriter.ProxyErrorHandler)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error initialising upstream proxy: %v", err)
}
if opts.SkipJwtBearerTokens {
logger.Printf("Skipping JWT tokens from configured OIDC issuer: %q", opts.Providers[0].OIDCConfig.IssuerURL)
for _, issuer := range opts.ExtraJwtIssuers {
logger.Printf("Skipping JWT tokens from extra JWT issuer: %q", issuer)
}
}
redirectURL := opts.GetRedirectURL()
if redirectURL.Path == "" {
redirectURL.Path = fmt.Sprintf("%s/callback", opts.ProxyPrefix)
}
logger.Printf("OAuthProxy configured for %s Client ID: %s", opts.GetProvider().Data().ProviderName, opts.Providers[0].ClientID)
refresh := "disabled"
if opts.Cookie.Refresh != time.Duration(0) {
refresh = fmt.Sprintf("after %s", opts.Cookie.Refresh)
}
logger.Printf("Cookie settings: name:%s secure(https):%v httponly:%v expiry:%s domains:%s path:%s samesite:%s refresh:%s", opts.Cookie.Name, opts.Cookie.Secure, opts.Cookie.HTTPOnly, opts.Cookie.Expire, strings.Join(opts.Cookie.Domains, ","), opts.Cookie.Path, opts.Cookie.SameSite, refresh)
trustedIPs := ip.NewNetSet()
for _, ipStr := range opts.TrustedIPs {
if ipNet := ip.ParseIPNet(ipStr); ipNet != nil {
trustedIPs.AddIPNet(*ipNet)
} else {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not parse IP network (%s)", ipStr)
}
}
allowedRoutes, err := buildRoutesAllowlist(opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
preAuthChain, err := buildPreAuthChain(opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not build pre-auth chain: %v", err)
}
sessionChain := buildSessionChain(opts, sessionStore, basicAuthValidator)
headersChain, err := buildHeadersChain(opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not build headers chain: %v", err)
}
p := &OAuthProxy{
CookieOptions: &opts.Cookie,
Validator: validator,
RobotsPath: "/robots.txt",
SignInPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/sign_in", opts.ProxyPrefix),
SignOutPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/sign_out", opts.ProxyPrefix),
OAuthStartPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/start", opts.ProxyPrefix),
OAuthCallbackPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/callback", opts.ProxyPrefix),
AuthOnlyPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/auth", opts.ProxyPrefix),
UserInfoPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/userinfo", opts.ProxyPrefix),
ProxyPrefix: opts.ProxyPrefix,
provider: opts.GetProvider(),
sessionStore: sessionStore,
serveMux: upstreamProxy,
redirectURL: redirectURL,
allowedRoutes: allowedRoutes,
whitelistDomains: opts.WhitelistDomains,
skipAuthPreflight: opts.SkipAuthPreflight,
skipJwtBearerTokens: opts.SkipJwtBearerTokens,
realClientIPParser: opts.GetRealClientIPParser(),
SkipProviderButton: opts.SkipProviderButton,
trustedIPs: trustedIPs,
basicAuthValidator: basicAuthValidator,
sessionChain: sessionChain,
headersChain: headersChain,
preAuthChain: preAuthChain,
pageWriter: pageWriter,
}
if err := p.setupServer(opts); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error setting up server: %v", err)
}
return p, nil
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) Start() error {
if p.server == nil {
// We have to call setupServer before Start is called.
// If this doesn't happen it's a programming error.
panic("server has not been initialised")
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
// Observe signals in background goroutine.
go func() {
sigint := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
signal.Notify(sigint, os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
<-sigint
cancel() // cancel the context
}()
return p.server.Start(ctx)
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) setupServer(opts *options.Options) error {
serverOpts := proxyhttp.Opts{
Handler: p,
BindAddress: opts.Server.BindAddress,
SecureBindAddress: opts.Server.SecureBindAddress,
TLS: opts.Server.TLS,
}
appServer, err := proxyhttp.NewServer(serverOpts)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not build app server: %v", err)
}
metricsServer, err := proxyhttp.NewServer(proxyhttp.Opts{
Handler: middleware.DefaultMetricsHandler,
BindAddress: opts.MetricsServer.BindAddress,
SecureBindAddress: opts.MetricsServer.SecureBindAddress,
TLS: opts.MetricsServer.TLS,
})
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not build metrics server: %v", err)
}
p.server = proxyhttp.NewServerGroup(appServer, metricsServer)
return nil
}
// buildPreAuthChain constructs a chain that should process every request before
// the OAuth2 Proxy authentication logic kicks in.
// For example forcing HTTPS or health checks.
func buildPreAuthChain(opts *options.Options) (alice.Chain, error) {
chain := alice.New(middleware.NewScope(opts.ReverseProxy, opts.Logging.RequestIDHeader))
if opts.ForceHTTPS {
_, httpsPort, err := net.SplitHostPort(opts.Server.SecureBindAddress)
if err != nil {
return alice.Chain{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid HTTPS address %q: %v", opts.Server.SecureBindAddress, err)
}
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewRedirectToHTTPS(httpsPort))
}
healthCheckPaths := []string{opts.PingPath}
healthCheckUserAgents := []string{opts.PingUserAgent}
if opts.GCPHealthChecks {
logger.Printf("WARNING: GCP HealthChecks are now deprecated: Reconfigure apps to use the ping path for liveness and readiness checks, set the ping user agent to \"GoogleHC/1.0\" to preserve existing behaviour")
healthCheckPaths = append(healthCheckPaths, "/liveness_check", "/readiness_check")
healthCheckUserAgents = append(healthCheckUserAgents, "GoogleHC/1.0")
}
// To silence logging of health checks, register the health check handler before
// the logging handler
if opts.Logging.SilencePing {
chain = chain.Append(
middleware.NewHealthCheck(healthCheckPaths, healthCheckUserAgents),
middleware.NewRequestLogger(),
)
} else {
chain = chain.Append(
middleware.NewRequestLogger(),
middleware.NewHealthCheck(healthCheckPaths, healthCheckUserAgents),
)
}
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewRequestMetricsWithDefaultRegistry())
return chain, nil
}
func buildSessionChain(opts *options.Options, sessionStore sessionsapi.SessionStore, validator basic.Validator) alice.Chain {
chain := alice.New()
if opts.SkipJwtBearerTokens {
sessionLoaders := []middlewareapi.TokenToSessionFunc{
opts.GetProvider().CreateSessionFromToken,
}
for _, verifier := range opts.GetJWTBearerVerifiers() {
sessionLoaders = append(sessionLoaders,
middlewareapi.CreateTokenToSessionFunc(verifier.Verify))
}
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewJwtSessionLoader(sessionLoaders))
}
if validator != nil {
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewBasicAuthSessionLoader(validator, opts.HtpasswdUserGroups, opts.LegacyPreferEmailToUser))
}
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewStoredSessionLoader(&middleware.StoredSessionLoaderOptions{
SessionStore: sessionStore,
RefreshPeriod: opts.Cookie.Refresh,
RefreshSessionIfNeeded: opts.GetProvider().RefreshSessionIfNeeded,
ValidateSessionState: opts.GetProvider().ValidateSession,
}))
return chain
}
func buildHeadersChain(opts *options.Options) (alice.Chain, error) {
requestInjector, err := middleware.NewRequestHeaderInjector(opts.InjectRequestHeaders)
if err != nil {
return alice.Chain{}, fmt.Errorf("error constructing request header injector: %v", err)
}
responseInjector, err := middleware.NewResponseHeaderInjector(opts.InjectResponseHeaders)
if err != nil {
return alice.Chain{}, fmt.Errorf("error constructing request header injector: %v", err)
}
return alice.New(requestInjector, responseInjector), nil
}
func buildSignInMessage(opts *options.Options) string {
var msg string
if len(opts.Templates.Banner) >= 1 {
if opts.Templates.Banner == "-" {
msg = ""
} else {
msg = opts.Templates.Banner
}
} else if len(opts.EmailDomains) != 0 && opts.AuthenticatedEmailsFile == "" {
if len(opts.EmailDomains) > 1 {
msg = fmt.Sprintf("Authenticate using one of the following domains: %v", strings.Join(opts.EmailDomains, ", "))
} else if opts.EmailDomains[0] != "*" {
msg = fmt.Sprintf("Authenticate using %v", opts.EmailDomains[0])
}
}
return msg
}
func buildProviderName(p providers.Provider, override string) string {
if override != "" {
return override
}
return p.Data().ProviderName
}
// buildRoutesAllowlist builds an []allowedRoute list from either the legacy
// SkipAuthRegex option (paths only support) or newer SkipAuthRoutes option
// (method=path support)
func buildRoutesAllowlist(opts *options.Options) ([]allowedRoute, error) {
routes := make([]allowedRoute, 0, len(opts.SkipAuthRegex)+len(opts.SkipAuthRoutes))
for _, path := range opts.SkipAuthRegex {
compiledRegex, err := regexp.Compile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
logger.Printf("Skipping auth - Method: ALL | Path: %s", path)
routes = append(routes, allowedRoute{
method: "",
pathRegex: compiledRegex,
})
}
for _, methodPath := range opts.SkipAuthRoutes {
var (
method string
path string
)
parts := strings.SplitN(methodPath, "=", 2)
if len(parts) == 1 {
method = ""
path = parts[0]
} else {
method = strings.ToUpper(parts[0])
path = parts[1]
}
compiledRegex, err := regexp.Compile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
logger.Printf("Skipping auth - Method: %s | Path: %s", method, path)
routes = append(routes, allowedRoute{
method: method,
pathRegex: compiledRegex,
})
}
return routes, nil
}
// ClearSessionCookie creates a cookie to unset the user's authentication cookie
// stored in the user's session
func (p *OAuthProxy) ClearSessionCookie(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) error {
return p.sessionStore.Clear(rw, req)
}
// LoadCookiedSession reads the user's authentication details from the request
func (p *OAuthProxy) LoadCookiedSession(req *http.Request) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
return p.sessionStore.Load(req)
}
// SaveSession creates a new session cookie value and sets this on the response
func (p *OAuthProxy) SaveSession(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) error {
return p.sessionStore.Save(rw, req, s)
}
// IsValidRedirect checks whether the redirect URL is whitelisted
func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {
switch {
case redirect == "":
// The user didn't specify a redirect, should fallback to `/`
return false
case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//") && !invalidRedirectRegex.MatchString(redirect):
return true
case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "https://"):
redirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Rejecting invalid redirect %q: scheme unsupported or missing", redirect)
return false
}
redirectHostname := redirectURL.Hostname()
for _, allowedDomain := range p.whitelistDomains {
allowedHost, allowedPort := splitHostPort(allowedDomain)
if allowedHost == "" {
continue
}
if redirectHostname == strings.TrimPrefix(allowedHost, ".") ||
(strings.HasPrefix(allowedHost, ".") &&
strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, allowedHost)) {
// the domain names match, now validate the ports
// if the whitelisted domain's port is '*', allow all ports
// if the whitelisted domain contains a specific port, only allow that port
// if the whitelisted domain doesn't contain a port at all, only allow empty redirect ports ie http and https
redirectPort := redirectURL.Port()
if allowedPort == "*" ||
allowedPort == redirectPort ||
(allowedPort == "" && redirectPort == "") {
return true
}
}
}
logger.Printf("Rejecting invalid redirect %q: domain / port not in whitelist", redirect)
return false
default:
logger.Printf("Rejecting invalid redirect %q: not an absolute or relative URL", redirect)
return false
}
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
p.preAuthChain.Then(http.HandlerFunc(p.serveHTTP)).ServeHTTP(rw, req)
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) serveHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
if req.URL.Path != p.AuthOnlyPath && strings.HasPrefix(req.URL.Path, p.ProxyPrefix) {
prepareNoCache(rw)
}
switch path := req.URL.Path; {
case path == p.RobotsPath:
p.RobotsTxt(rw, req)
case p.IsAllowedRequest(req):
p.SkipAuthProxy(rw, req)
case path == p.SignInPath:
p.SignIn(rw, req)
case path == p.SignOutPath:
p.SignOut(rw, req)
case path == p.OAuthStartPath:
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
case path == p.OAuthCallbackPath:
p.OAuthCallback(rw, req)
case path == p.AuthOnlyPath:
p.AuthOnly(rw, req)
case path == p.UserInfoPath:
p.UserInfo(rw, req)
default:
p.Proxy(rw, req)
}
}
// RobotsTxt disallows scraping pages from the OAuthProxy
func (p *OAuthProxy) RobotsTxt(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
p.pageWriter.WriteRobotsTxt(rw, req)
}
// ErrorPage writes an error response
func (p *OAuthProxy) ErrorPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, code int, appError string, messages ...interface{}) {
redirectURL, err := p.getAppRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining redirect: %v", err)
}
if redirectURL == p.SignInPath || redirectURL == "" {
redirectURL = "/"
}
scope := middlewareapi.GetRequestScope(req)
p.pageWriter.WriteErrorPage(rw, pagewriter.ErrorPageOpts{
Status: code,
RedirectURL: redirectURL,
RequestID: scope.RequestID,
AppError: appError,
Messages: messages,
})
}
// IsAllowedRequest is used to check if auth should be skipped for this request
func (p *OAuthProxy) IsAllowedRequest(req *http.Request) bool {
isPreflightRequestAllowed := p.skipAuthPreflight && req.Method == "OPTIONS"
return isPreflightRequestAllowed || p.isAllowedRoute(req) || p.isTrustedIP(req)
}
// IsAllowedRoute is used to check if the request method & path is allowed without auth
func (p *OAuthProxy) isAllowedRoute(req *http.Request) bool {
for _, route := range p.allowedRoutes {
if (route.method == "" || req.Method == route.method) && route.pathRegex.MatchString(req.URL.Path) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// isTrustedIP is used to check if a request comes from a trusted client IP address.
func (p *OAuthProxy) isTrustedIP(req *http.Request) bool {
if p.trustedIPs == nil {
return false
}
remoteAddr, err := ip.GetClientIP(p.realClientIPParser, req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining real IP for trusted IP list: %v", err)
// Possibly spoofed X-Real-IP header
return false
}
if remoteAddr == nil {
return false
}
return p.trustedIPs.Has(remoteAddr)
}
// SignInPage writes the sing in template to the response
func (p *OAuthProxy) SignInPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, code int) {
prepareNoCache(rw)
err := p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error clearing session cookie: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
rw.WriteHeader(code)
redirectURL, err := p.getAppRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining redirect: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
if redirectURL == p.SignInPath {
redirectURL = "/"
}
p.pageWriter.WriteSignInPage(rw, req, redirectURL)
}
// ManualSignIn handles basic auth logins to the proxy
func (p *OAuthProxy) ManualSignIn(req *http.Request) (string, bool) {
if req.Method != "POST" || p.basicAuthValidator == nil {
return "", false
}
user := req.FormValue("username")
passwd := req.FormValue("password")
if user == "" {
return "", false
}
// check auth
if p.basicAuthValidator.Validate(user, passwd) {
logger.PrintAuthf(user, req, logger.AuthSuccess, "Authenticated via HtpasswdFile")
return user, true
}
logger.PrintAuthf(user, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via HtpasswdFile")
return "", false
}
// SignIn serves a page prompting users to sign in
func (p *OAuthProxy) SignIn(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
redirect, err := p.getAppRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining redirect: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
user, ok := p.ManualSignIn(req)
if ok {
session := &sessionsapi.SessionState{User: user}
err = p.SaveSession(rw, req, session)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error saving session: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, http.StatusFound)
} else {
if p.SkipProviderButton {
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
} else {
p.SignInPage(rw, req, http.StatusOK)
}
}
}
// UserInfo endpoint outputs session email and preferred username in JSON format
func (p *OAuthProxy) UserInfo(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
if err != nil {
http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusUnauthorized), http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
userInfo := struct {
User string `json:"user"`
Email string `json:"email"`
Groups []string `json:"groups,omitempty"`
PreferredUsername string `json:"preferredUsername,omitempty"`
}{
User: session.User,
Email: session.Email,
Groups: session.Groups,
PreferredUsername: session.PreferredUsername,
}
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
err = json.NewEncoder(rw).Encode(userInfo)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error encoding user info: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
}
}
// SignOut sends a response to clear the authentication cookie
func (p *OAuthProxy) SignOut(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
redirect, err := p.getAppRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining redirect: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
err = p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error clearing session cookie: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, http.StatusFound)
}
// OAuthStart starts the OAuth2 authentication flow
func (p *OAuthProxy) OAuthStart(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
prepareNoCache(rw)
csrf, err := cookies.NewCSRF(p.CookieOptions)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error creating CSRF nonce: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
appRedirect, err := p.getAppRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining application redirect: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
callbackRedirect := p.getOAuthRedirectURI(req)
loginURL := p.provider.GetLoginURL(
callbackRedirect,
encodeState(csrf.HashOAuthState(), appRedirect),
csrf.HashOIDCNonce(),
)
if _, err := csrf.SetCookie(rw, req); err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error setting CSRF cookie: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, loginURL, http.StatusFound)
}
// OAuthCallback is the OAuth2 authentication flow callback that finishes the
// OAuth2 authentication flow
func (p *OAuthProxy) OAuthCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
remoteAddr := ip.GetClientString(p.realClientIPParser, req, true)
// finish the oauth cycle
err := req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error while parsing OAuth2 callback: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
errorString := req.Form.Get("error")
if errorString != "" {
logger.Errorf("Error while parsing OAuth2 callback: %s", errorString)
message := fmt.Sprintf("Login Failed: The upstream identity provider returned an error: %s", errorString)
// Set the debug message and override the non debug message to be the same for this case
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, message, message)
return
}
session, err := p.redeemCode(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error redeeming code during OAuth2 callback: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
err = p.enrichSessionState(req.Context(), session)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error creating session during OAuth2 callback: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
csrf, err := cookies.LoadCSRFCookie(req, p.CookieOptions)
if err != nil {
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: unable to obtain CSRF cookie")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, err.Error(), "Login Failed: Unable to find a valid CSRF token. Please try again.")
return
}
csrf.ClearCookie(rw, req)
nonce, appRedirect, err := decodeState(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error while parsing OAuth2 state: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
if !csrf.CheckOAuthState(nonce) {
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: CSRF token mismatch, potential attack")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, "CSRF token mismatch, potential attack", "Login Failed: Unable to find a valid CSRF token. Please try again.")
return
}
csrf.SetSessionNonce(session)
p.provider.ValidateSession(req.Context(), session)
if !p.IsValidRedirect(appRedirect) {
appRedirect = "/"
}
// set cookie, or deny
authorized, err := p.provider.Authorize(req.Context(), session)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error with authorization: %v", err)
}
if p.Validator(session.Email) && authorized {
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthSuccess, "Authenticated via OAuth2: %s", session)
err := p.SaveSession(rw, req, session)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error saving session state for %s: %v", remoteAddr, err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, appRedirect, http.StatusFound)
} else {
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: unauthorized")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, "Invalid session: unauthorized")
}
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) redeemCode(req *http.Request) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
code := req.Form.Get("code")
if code == "" {
return nil, providers.ErrMissingCode
}
redirectURI := p.getOAuthRedirectURI(req)
s, err := p.provider.Redeem(req.Context(), redirectURI, code)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return s, nil
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) enrichSessionState(ctx context.Context, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) error {
var err error
if s.Email == "" {
// TODO(@NickMeves): Remove once all provider are updated to implement EnrichSession
// nolint:staticcheck
s.Email, err = p.provider.GetEmailAddress(ctx, s)
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, providers.ErrNotImplemented) {
return err
}
}
return p.provider.EnrichSession(ctx, s)
}
// AuthOnly checks whether the user is currently logged in (both authentication
// and optional authorization).
func (p *OAuthProxy) AuthOnly(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
if err != nil {
http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusUnauthorized), http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Unauthorized cases need to return 403 to prevent infinite redirects with
// subrequest architectures
if !authOnlyAuthorize(req, session) {
http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusForbidden), http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
// we are authenticated
p.addHeadersForProxying(rw, session)
p.headersChain.Then(http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
})).ServeHTTP(rw, req)
}
// SkipAuthProxy proxies allowlisted requests and skips authentication
func (p *OAuthProxy) SkipAuthProxy(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
p.headersChain.Then(p.serveMux).ServeHTTP(rw, req)
}
// Proxy proxies the user request if the user is authenticated else it prompts
// them to authenticate
func (p *OAuthProxy) Proxy(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
switch err {
case nil:
// we are authenticated
p.addHeadersForProxying(rw, session)
p.headersChain.Then(p.serveMux).ServeHTTP(rw, req)
case ErrNeedsLogin:
// we need to send the user to a login screen
if isAjax(req) {
// no point redirecting an AJAX request
p.errorJSON(rw, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
if p.SkipProviderButton {
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
} else {
p.SignInPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden)
}
case ErrAccessDenied:
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, "The session failed authorization checks")
default:
// unknown error
logger.Errorf("Unexpected internal error: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
}
}
// See https://developers.google.com/web/fundamentals/performance/optimizing-content-efficiency/http-caching?hl=en
var noCacheHeaders = map[string]string{
"Expires": time.Unix(0, 0).Format(time.RFC1123),
"Cache-Control": "no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, max-age=0",
"X-Accel-Expires": "0", // https://www.nginx.com/resources/wiki/start/topics/examples/x-accel/
}
// prepareNoCache prepares headers for preventing browser caching.
func prepareNoCache(w http.ResponseWriter) {
// Set NoCache headers
for k, v := range noCacheHeaders {
w.Header().Set(k, v)
}
}
// getOAuthRedirectURI returns the redirectURL that the upstream OAuth Provider will
// redirect clients to once authenticated.
// This is usually the OAuthProxy callback URL.
func (p *OAuthProxy) getOAuthRedirectURI(req *http.Request) string {
// if `p.redirectURL` already has a host, return it
if p.redirectURL.Host != "" {
return p.redirectURL.String()
}
// Otherwise figure out the scheme + host from the request
rd := *p.redirectURL
rd.Host = requestutil.GetRequestHost(req)
rd.Scheme = requestutil.GetRequestProto(req)
// If there's no scheme in the request, we should still include one
if rd.Scheme == "" {
rd.Scheme = schemeHTTP
}
// If CookieSecure is true, return `https` no matter what
// Not all reverse proxies set X-Forwarded-Proto
if p.CookieOptions.Secure {
rd.Scheme = schemeHTTPS
}
return rd.String()
}
// getAppRedirect determines the full URL or URI path to redirect clients to
// once authenticated with the OAuthProxy
// Strategy priority (first legal result is used):
// - `rd` querysting parameter
// - `X-Auth-Request-Redirect` header
// - `X-Forwarded-(Proto|Host|Uri)` headers (when ReverseProxy mode is enabled)
// - `X-Forwarded-(Proto|Host)` if `Uri` has the ProxyPath (i.e. /oauth2/*)
// - `X-Forwarded-Uri` direct URI path (when ReverseProxy mode is enabled)
// - `req.URL.RequestURI` if not under the ProxyPath (i.e. /oauth2/*)
// - `/`
func (p *OAuthProxy) getAppRedirect(req *http.Request) (string, error) {
err := req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// These redirect getter functions are strategies ordered by priority
// for figuring out the redirect URL.
type redirectGetter func(req *http.Request) string
for _, rdGetter := range []redirectGetter{
p.getRdQuerystringRedirect,
p.getXAuthRequestRedirect,
p.getXForwardedHeadersRedirect,
p.getURIRedirect,
} {
redirect := rdGetter(req)
// Call `p.IsValidRedirect` again here a final time to be safe
if redirect != "" && p.IsValidRedirect(redirect) {
return redirect, nil
}
}
return "/", nil
}
func isForwardedRequest(req *http.Request) bool {
return requestutil.IsProxied(req) &&
req.Host != requestutil.GetRequestHost(req)
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) hasProxyPrefix(path string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(path, fmt.Sprintf("%s/", p.ProxyPrefix))
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) validateRedirect(redirect string, errorFormat string) string {
if p.IsValidRedirect(redirect) {
return redirect
}
if redirect != "" {
logger.Errorf(errorFormat, redirect)
}
return ""
}
// getRdQuerystringRedirect handles this getAppRedirect strategy:
// - `rd` querysting parameter
func (p *OAuthProxy) getRdQuerystringRedirect(req *http.Request) string {
return p.validateRedirect(
req.Form.Get("rd"),
"Invalid redirect provided in rd querystring parameter: %s",
)
}
// getXAuthRequestRedirect handles this getAppRedirect strategy:
// - `X-Auth-Request-Redirect` Header
func (p *OAuthProxy) getXAuthRequestRedirect(req *http.Request) string {
return p.validateRedirect(
req.Header.Get("X-Auth-Request-Redirect"),
"Invalid redirect provided in X-Auth-Request-Redirect header: %s",
)
}
// getXForwardedHeadersRedirect handles these getAppRedirect strategies:
// - `X-Forwarded-(Proto|Host|Uri)` headers (when ReverseProxy mode is enabled)
// - `X-Forwarded-(Proto|Host)` if `Uri` has the ProxyPath (i.e. /oauth2/*)
func (p *OAuthProxy) getXForwardedHeadersRedirect(req *http.Request) string {
if !isForwardedRequest(req) {
return ""
}
uri := requestutil.GetRequestURI(req)
if p.hasProxyPrefix(uri) {
uri = "/"
}
redirect := fmt.Sprintf(
"%s://%s%s",
requestutil.GetRequestProto(req),
requestutil.GetRequestHost(req),
uri,
)
return p.validateRedirect(redirect,
"Invalid redirect generated from X-Forwarded-* headers: %s")
}
// getURIRedirect handles these getAppRedirect strategies:
// - `X-Forwarded-Uri` direct URI path (when ReverseProxy mode is enabled)
// - `req.URL.RequestURI` if not under the ProxyPath (i.e. /oauth2/*)
// - `/`
func (p *OAuthProxy) getURIRedirect(req *http.Request) string {
redirect := p.validateRedirect(
requestutil.GetRequestURI(req),
"Invalid redirect generated from X-Forwarded-Uri header: %s",
)
if redirect == "" {
redirect = req.URL.RequestURI()
}
if p.hasProxyPrefix(redirect) {
return "/"
}
return redirect
}
// splitHostPort separates host and port. If the port is not valid, it returns
// the entire input as host, and it doesn't check the validity of the host.
// Unlike net.SplitHostPort, but per RFC 3986, it requires ports to be numeric.
// *** taken from net/url, modified validOptionalPort() to accept ":*"
func splitHostPort(hostport string) (host, port string) {
host = hostport
colon := strings.LastIndexByte(host, ':')
if colon != -1 && validOptionalPort(host[colon:]) {
host, port = host[:colon], host[colon+1:]
}
if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
host = host[1 : len(host)-1]
}
return
}
// validOptionalPort reports whether port is either an empty string
// or matches /^:\d*$/
// *** taken from net/url, modified to accept ":*"
func validOptionalPort(port string) bool {
if port == "" || port == ":*" {
return true
}
if port[0] != ':' {
return false
}
for _, b := range port[1:] {
if b < '0' || b > '9' {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// getAuthenticatedSession checks whether a user is authenticated and returns a session object and nil error if so
// Returns:
// - `nil, ErrNeedsLogin` if user needs to login.
// - `nil, ErrAccessDenied` if the authenticated user is not authorized
// Set-Cookie headers may be set on the response as a side-effect of calling this method.
func (p *OAuthProxy) getAuthenticatedSession(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
var session *sessionsapi.SessionState
getSession := p.sessionChain.Then(http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session = middlewareapi.GetRequestScope(req).Session
}))
getSession.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
if session == nil {
return nil, ErrNeedsLogin
}
invalidEmail := session.Email != "" && !p.Validator(session.Email)
authorized, err := p.provider.Authorize(req.Context(), session)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error with authorization: %v", err)
}
if invalidEmail || !authorized {
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authorization via session: removing session %s", session)
// Invalid session, clear it
err := p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error clearing session cookie: %v", err)
}
return nil, ErrAccessDenied
}
return session, nil
}
// authOnlyAuthorize handles special authorization logic that is only done
// on the AuthOnly endpoint for use with Nginx subrequest architectures.
//
// TODO (@NickMeves): This method is a placeholder to be extended but currently
// fails the linter. Remove the nolint when functionality expands.
//
//nolint:gosimple
func authOnlyAuthorize(req *http.Request, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) bool {
// Allow secondary group restrictions based on the `allowed_groups`
// querystring parameter
if !checkAllowedGroups(req, s) {
return false
}
return true
}
func checkAllowedGroups(req *http.Request, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) bool {
allowedGroups := extractAllowedGroups(req)
if len(allowedGroups) == 0 {
return true
}
for _, group := range s.Groups {
if _, ok := allowedGroups[group]; ok {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func extractAllowedGroups(req *http.Request) map[string]struct{} {
groups := map[string]struct{}{}
query := req.URL.Query()
for _, allowedGroups := range query["allowed_groups"] {
for _, group := range strings.Split(allowedGroups, ",") {
if group != "" {
groups[group] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
return groups
}
// encodedState builds the OAuth state param out of our nonce and
// original application redirect
func encodeState(nonce string, redirect string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%v:%v", nonce, redirect)
}
// decodeState splits the reflected OAuth state response back into
// the nonce and original application redirect
func decodeState(req *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
state := strings.SplitN(req.Form.Get("state"), ":", 2)
if len(state) != 2 {
return "", "", errors.New("invalid length")
}
return state[0], state[1], nil
}
// addHeadersForProxying adds the appropriate headers the request / response for proxying
func (p *OAuthProxy) addHeadersForProxying(rw http.ResponseWriter, session *sessionsapi.SessionState) {
if session.Email == "" {
rw.Header().Set("GAP-Auth", session.User)
} else {
rw.Header().Set("GAP-Auth", session.Email)
}
}
// isAjax checks if a request is an ajax request
func isAjax(req *http.Request) bool {
acceptValues := req.Header.Values("Accept")
const ajaxReq = applicationJSON
// Iterate over multiple Accept headers, i.e.
// Accept: application/json
// Accept: text/plain
for _, mimeTypes := range acceptValues {
// Iterate over multiple mimetypes in a single header, i.e.
// Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
for _, mimeType := range strings.Split(mimeTypes, ",") {
mimeType = strings.TrimSpace(mimeType)
if mimeType == ajaxReq {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
// errorJSON returns the error code with an application/json mime type
func (p *OAuthProxy) errorJSON(rw http.ResponseWriter, code int) {
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", applicationJSON)
rw.WriteHeader(code)
}