* Remove all pointer-overflow suppressions from our UBSAN builds/tests.
* Add `ZSTD_ALLOW_POINTER_OVERFLOW_ATTR` macro to suppress
pointer-overflow at a per-function level. This is a superior approach
because it also applies to users who build zstd with UBSAN.
* Add `ZSTD_wrappedPtr{Diff,Add,Sub}()` that use these suppressions.
The end goal is to only tag these functions with
`ZSTD_ALLOW_POINTER_OVERFLOW`. But we can start by annoting functions
that rely on pointer overflow, and gradually transition to using
these.
* Add `ZSTD_maybeNullPtrAdd()` to simplify pointer addition when the
pointer may be `NULL`.
* Fix all the fuzzer issues that came up. I'm sure there will be a lot
more, but these are the ones that came up within a few minutes of
running the fuzzers, and while running GitHub CI.
```
for f in $(find . \( -path ./.git -o -path ./tests/fuzz/corpora \) -prune -o -type f);
do
sed -i 's/Facebook, Inc\./Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates./' $f;
done
```
Delete unaligned memory access code from the legacy codebase by removing all the
non-memcpy functions. We don't care about speed at all for this codebase, only
simplicity.
Fix an instance of `NULL + 0` in `ZSTD_decompressStream()`. Also, improve our
`stream_decompress` fuzzer to pass `NULL` in/out buffers to
`ZSTD_decompressStream()`, and fix 2 issues that were immediately surfaced.
Fixes#3351
Instead of using packed attribute hack, just use aligned attribute. It
improves code generation on armv6 and armv7, and slightly improves code
generation on aarch64. GCC generates identical code to regular aligned
access on ARMv6 for all versions between 4.5 and trunk, except GCC 5
which is buggy and generates the same (bad) code as packed access:
https://gcc.godbolt.org/z/hq37rz7sb
* Switch to yearless copyright per FB policy
* Fix up SPDX-License-Identifier lines in `contrib/linux-kernel` sources
* Add zstd copyright/license header to the `contrib/linux-kernel` sources
* Update the `tests/test-license.py` to check for yearless copyright
* Improvements to `tests/test-license.py`
* Check `contrib/linux-kernel` in `tests/test-license.py`
When the output buffer is `NULL` with size 0, but the frame content size
is non-zero, we will write to the NULL pointer because our bounds check
underflowed.
This was exposed by a recent PR that allowed an empty frame into the
single-pass shortcut in streaming mode.
* Fix the bug.
* Fix another NULL dereference in zstd-v1.
* Overflow checks in 32-bit mode.
* Add a dedicated test.
* Expose the bug in the dedicated simple_decompress fuzzer.
* Switch all mallocs in fuzzers to return NULL for size=0.
* Fix a new timeout in a fuzzer.
Neither clang nor gcc show a decompression speed regression on x86-64.
On x86-32 clang is slightly positive and gcc loses 2.5% of speed.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz.
* All copyright lines now have -2020 instead of -present
* All copyright lines include "Facebook, Inc"
* All licenses are now standardized
The copyright in `threading.{h,c}` is not changed because it comes from
zstdmt.
The copyright and license of `divsufsort.{h,c}` is not changed.
* Allow zero sized buffers in `stream_decompress`. Ensure that we never have two
zero sized buffers in a row so we guarantee forwards progress.
* Make case 4 in `stream_round_trip` do a zero sized buffers call followed by
a full call to guarantee forwards progress.
* Fix `limitCopy()` in legacy decoders.
* Fix memcpy in `zstdmt_compress.c`.
Catches the bug fixed in PR #1939
Note : all error codes are changed by this new version,
but it's expected to be the last change for existing codes.
Codes are now grouped by category, and receive a manually attributed value.
The objective is to guarantee that
error code values will not change in the future
when introducing new codes.
Intentionnal empty spaces and ranges are defined
in order to keep room for potential new codes.
The following warning appears during build at sevaral places.
../lib/legacy/zstd_v04.c:819:40: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
case 7: bitD->bitContainer += (size_t)(((const BYTE*)(bitD->start))[6]) << (sizeof(size_t)*8 - 16);
../lib/legacy/zstd_v05.c:821:40: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
case 7: bitD->bitContainer += (size_t)(((const BYTE*)(bitD->start))[6]) << (sizeof(size_t)*8 - 16);
../lib/legacy/zstd_v06.c:913:40: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
case 7: bitD->bitContainer += (size_t)(((const BYTE*)(srcBuffer))[6]) << (sizeof(bitD->bitContainer)*8 - 16);
../lib/legacy/zstd_v07.c:583:40: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
case 7: bitD->bitContainer += (size_t)(((const BYTE*)(srcBuffer))[6]) <<
(sizeof(bitD->bitContainer)*8 - 16);
Signed-off-by: Jos Collin <jcollin@redhat.com>
- Add ZSTD_findDecompressedSize
- Traverses multiple frames to find total output size
- Add ZSTD_getFrameContentSize
- Gets the decompressed size of a single frame by reading header
- Deprecate ZSTD_getDecompressedSize
execSequence relied on pointer overflow to handle cases where
`sequence.matchLength < 8`. Instead of passing an `size_t` to
wildcopy, pass a `ptrdiff_t`.
Allows an adversary to write up to 3 bytes beyond the end of the buffer.
Occurs if the match overlaps the `extDict` and `currentPrefix`, and the
match length in the `currentPrefix` is less than `MINMATCH`, and
`op-(16-MINMATCH) >= oMatchEnd > op-16`.
