If ripgrep was called in a way where the entire contents of a file
aren't read (like --files-with-matches, among other methods), and if the
file was read through an external process, then ripgrep would never reap
that process.
We fix this by introducing an explicit 'close' method, which we now call
when using decompression or preprocessor searches.
The implementation of 'close' is a little hokey. In particular, when we
close stdout, this usually results in a broken pipe, and, consequently,
a non-zero code returned once the child process is reaped. This is
"situation normal," so we invent a (hopefully portable) heuristic for
detecting it.
Fixes#1766, Closes#1767
This fixes a bug only present on Windows that would permit someone to
execute an arbitrary program if they crafted an appropriate directory
tree. Namely, if someone put an executable named 'xz.exe' in the root of
a directory tree and one ran 'rg -z foo' from the root of that tree,
then the 'xz.exe' executable in that tree would execute if there are any
'xz' files anywhere in the tree.
The root cause of this problem is that 'CreateProcess' on Windows will
implicitly look in the current working directory for an executable when
it is given a relative path to a program. Rust's standard library allows
this behavior to occur, so we work around it here. We work around it by
explicitly resolving programs like 'xz' via 'PATH'. That way, we only
ever pass an absolute path to 'CreateProcess', which avoids the implicit
behavior of checking the current working directory.
This fix doesn't apply to non-Windows systems as it is believed to only
impact Windows. In theory, the bug could apply on Unix if '.' is in
one's PATH, but at that point, you reap what you sow.
While the extent to which this is a security problem isn't clear, I
think users generally expect to be able to download or clone
repositories from the Internet and run ripgrep on them without fear of
anything too awful happening. Being able to execute an arbitrary program
probably violates that expectation. Therefore, CVE-2021-3013[1] was
created for this issue.
We apply the same logic to the --pre command, since the --pre command is
likely in a user's config file and it would be surprising for something
that the user is searching to modify which preprocessor command is used.
The --pre and -z/--search-zip flags are the only two ways that ripgrep
will invoke external programs, so this should cover any possible
exploitable cases of this bug.
[1] - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3013
This message will emit the binary detection mechanism being used for
each file.
This does not noticeably increases the number of log messages, as the
'trace' level is already used for emitting messages for every file
searched.
This trace message was added in the course of investigating #1838.
The top-level listing was just getting a bit too long for my taste. So
put all of the code in one directory and shrink the large top-level mess
to a small top-level mess.
NOTE: This commit only contains renames. The subsequent commit will
actually make ripgrep build again. We do it this way with the naive hope
that this will make it easier for git history to track the renames.
Sigh.
