const Entities = require('html-entities').AllHtmlEntities; const htmlentities = new Entities().encode; const htmlparser2 = require('@joplin/fork-htmlparser2'); // [\s\S] instead of . for multiline matching // https://stackoverflow.com/a/16119722/561309 const imageRegex = //gi; const anchorRegex = //gi; const selfClosingElements = [ 'area', 'base', 'basefont', 'br', 'col', 'command', 'embed', 'frame', 'hr', 'img', 'input', 'isindex', 'keygen', 'link', 'meta', 'param', 'source', 'track', 'wbr', ]; class HtmlUtils { attributesHtml(attr: any) { const output = []; for (const n in attr) { if (!attr.hasOwnProperty(n)) continue; output.push(`${n}="${htmlentities(attr[n])}"`); } return output.join(' '); } processImageTags(html: string, callback: Function) { if (!html) return ''; return html.replace(imageRegex, (_v, before, src, after) => { const action = callback({ src: src }); if (!action) return ``; if (action.type === 'replaceElement') { return action.html; } if (action.type === 'replaceSource') { return ``; } if (action.type === 'setAttributes') { const attrHtml = this.attributesHtml(action.attrs); return ``; } throw new Error(`Invalid action: ${action.type}`); }); } processAnchorTags(html: string, callback: Function) { if (!html) return ''; return html.replace(anchorRegex, (_v, before, href, after) => { const action = callback({ href: href }); if (!action) return ``; if (action.type === 'replaceElement') { return action.html; } if (action.type === 'replaceSource') { return ``; } if (action.type === 'setAttributes') { const attrHtml = this.attributesHtml(action.attrs); return ``; } throw new Error(`Invalid action: ${action.type}`); }); } isSelfClosingTag(tagName: string) { return selfClosingElements.includes(tagName.toLowerCase()); } public stripHtml(html: string) { const output: string[] = []; const tagStack: string[] = []; const currentTag = () => { if (!tagStack.length) return ''; return tagStack[tagStack.length - 1]; }; const disallowedTags = ['script', 'style', 'head', 'iframe', 'frameset', 'frame', 'object', 'base']; const parser = new htmlparser2.Parser({ onopentag: (name: string) => { tagStack.push(name.toLowerCase()); }, ontext: (decodedText: string) => { if (disallowedTags.includes(currentTag())) return; output.push(decodedText); }, onclosetag: (name: string) => { if (currentTag() === name.toLowerCase()) tagStack.pop(); }, }, { decodeEntities: true }); parser.write(html); parser.end(); // In general, we want to get back plain text from this function, so all // HTML entities are decoded. Howver, to prevent XSS attacks, we // re-encode all the "<" characters, which should break any attempt to // inject HTML tags. return output.join('') .replace(/\s+/g, ' ') .replace(/ { if (!tagStack.length) return ''; return tagStack[tagStack.length - 1]; }; // When we encounter a disallowed tag, all the other tags within it are // going to be skipped too. This is necessary to prevent certain XSS // attacks. See sanitize_11.md let disallowedTagDepth = 0; // The BASE tag allows changing the base URL from which files are // loaded, and that can break several plugins, such as Katex (which // needs to load CSS files using a relative URL). For that reason // it is disabled. More info: // https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/issues/3021 // // "link" can be used to escape the parser and inject JavaScript. // Adding "meta" too for the same reason as it shouldn't be used in // notes anyway. const disallowedTags = [ 'script', 'iframe', 'frameset', 'frame', 'object', 'base', 'embed', 'link', 'meta', 'noscript', 'button', 'form', 'input', 'select', 'textarea', 'option', 'optgroup', ]; const parser = new htmlparser2.Parser({ onopentag: (name: string, attrs: any) => { tagStack.push(name.toLowerCase()); if (disallowedTags.includes(currentTag())) { disallowedTagDepth++; return; } if (disallowedTagDepth) return; attrs = Object.assign({}, attrs); // Remove all the attributes that start with "on", which // normally should be JavaScript events. A better solution // would be to blacklist known events only but it seems the // list is not well defined [0] and we don't want any to slip // throught the cracks. A side effect of this change is a // regular harmless attribute that starts with "on" will also // be removed. // 0: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Events for (const name in attrs) { if (!attrs.hasOwnProperty(name)) continue; if (name.length <= 2) continue; if (name.toLowerCase().substr(0, 2) !== 'on') continue; delete attrs[name]; } if (options.addNoMdConvClass) { let classAttr = attrs['class'] || ''; if (!classAttr.includes('jop-noMdConv')) { classAttr += ' jop-noMdConv'; attrs['class'] = classAttr.trim(); } } // For some reason, entire parts of HTML notes don't show up in // the viewer when there's an anchor tag without an "href" // attribute. It doesn't always happen and it seems to depend on // what else is in the note but in any case adding the "href" // fixes it. https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/issues/5687 if (name.toLowerCase() === 'a' && !attrs['href']) { attrs['href'] = '#'; } let attrHtml = this.attributesHtml(attrs); if (attrHtml) attrHtml = ` ${attrHtml}`; const closingSign = this.isSelfClosingTag(name) ? '/>' : '>'; output.push(`<${name}${attrHtml}${closingSign}`); }, ontext: (decodedText: string) => { if (disallowedTagDepth) return; if (currentTag() === 'style') { // For CSS, we have to put the style as-is inside the tag because if we html-entities encode // it, it's not going to work. But it's ok because JavaScript won't run within the style tag. // Ideally CSS should be loaded from an external file. output.push(decodedText); } else { output.push(htmlentities(decodedText)); } }, onclosetag: (name: string) => { const current = currentTag(); if (current === name.toLowerCase()) tagStack.pop(); if (disallowedTags.includes(current)) { disallowedTagDepth--; return; } if (disallowedTagDepth) return; if (this.isSelfClosingTag(name)) return; output.push(``); }, }, { decodeEntities: true }); parser.write(html); parser.end(); return output.join(''); } } export default new HtmlUtils();