When the hlsenc at BYTERANGE mode, it should not show the warning message:
"Duplicated segment filename detected:"
Reported-by: Marco <marco@worldcast.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Liu <lq@chinaffmpeg.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kucera <daniel.kucera@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas George <george@nsup.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kucera <daniel.kucera@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas George <george@nsup.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
If the videos starts with B frame, then the minimum composition time
as computed by stts + ctts will be non-zero. Hence we need to shift
the DTS, so that the first pts is zero. This was the intention of that
code-block. However it was subtracting by the wrong amount.
For example, for one of the videos in the bug nonFormatted.mp4 we have
stts:
sample_count duration
960 1001
ctts:
sample_count duration
1 3003
2 0
1 3003
....
The resulting composition times are : 3003, 1001, 2002, 6006, ...
The minimum composition time or PTS is 1001, which should be used to
offset DTS. However the code block was wrongly using ctts[0] which is
3003. Hence the PTS was negative. This change computes the minimum pts
encountered while fixing the index, and then subtracts it from all the
timestamps after the edit list fixes are applied.
Samples files available from:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=721451https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=723537
fate-suite/h264/twofields_packet.mp4 is a similar file starting with 2
B frames. Before this change the PTS of first two B-frames was -6006
and -3003, and I am guessing one of them got dropped when being decoded
and remuxed to the framecrc before, and now it is not being dropped.
Signed-off-by: Sasi Inguva <isasi@google.com>
This reduces the attack surface of local file-system
information leaking.
It prevents the existing exploit leading to an information leak. As
well as similar hypothetical attacks.
Leaks of information from files and symlinks ending in common multimedia extensions
are still possible. But files with sensitive information like private keys and passwords
generally do not use common multimedia filename extensions.
It does not stop leaks via remote addresses in the LAN.
The existing exploit depends on a specific decoder as well.
It does appear though that the exploit should be possible with any decoder.
The problem is that as long as sensitive information gets into the decoder,
the output of the decoder becomes sensitive as well.
The only obvious solution is to prevent access to sensitive information. Or to
disable hls or possibly some of its feature. More complex solutions like
checking the path to limit access to only subdirectories of the hls path may
work as an alternative. But such solutions are fragile and tricky to implement
portably and would not stop every possible attack nor would they work with all
valid hls files.
Developers have expressed their dislike / objected to disabling hls by default as well
as disabling hls with local files. There also where objections against restricting
remote url file extensions. This here is a less robust but also lower
inconvenience solution.
It can be applied stand alone or together with other solutions.
limiting the check to local files was suggested by nevcairiel
This recommits the security fix without the author name joke which was
originally requested by Nicolas.
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
This reduces the attack surface of local file-system
information leaking.
It prevents the existing exploit leading to an information leak. As
well as similar hypothetical attacks.
Leaks of information from files and symlinks ending in common multimedia extensions
are still possible. But files with sensitive information like private keys and passwords
generally do not use common multimedia filename extensions.
It does not stop leaks via remote addresses in the LAN.
The existing exploit depends on a specific decoder as well.
It does appear though that the exploit should be possible with any decoder.
The problem is that as long as sensitive information gets into the decoder,
the output of the decoder becomes sensitive as well.
The only obvious solution is to prevent access to sensitive information. Or to
disable hls or possibly some of its feature. More complex solutions like
checking the path to limit access to only subdirectories of the hls path may
work as an alternative. But such solutions are fragile and tricky to implement
portably and would not stop every possible attack nor would they work with all
valid hls files.
Developers have expressed their dislike / objected to disabling hls by default as well
as disabling hls with local files. There also where objections against restricting
remote url file extensions. This here is a less robust but also lower
inconvenience solution.
It can be applied stand alone or together with other solutions.
limiting the check to local files was suggested by nevcairiel
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Atempt to read and propagate only full ADTS frames and not other data,
like id3v1 or APETags at the end of the file.
Fixes ticket #6437.
Reviewed-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
The loglevel is choosen so that the main filename and any images of
multi image sequences are shown only at debug level to avoid
clutter.
This makes exploits in playlists more visible. As they would show
accesses to private/sensitive files
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
WebM supports a subset of elements from the Chapters master.
See https://www.webmproject.org/docs/container/#chapters
Addresses ticket #6425
Reviewed-by: James Zern <jzern@google.com>
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
This prevents part of one exploit leading to an information leak
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
instead of deciding whether to encrypt based on the encryption scheme,
decide according to whether cenc was initialized or not.
mov_create_timecode_track calls ff_mov_write_packet with a track that
doesn't have cenc initialized.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
This adapts and merges commit f4bf236338
from libav, originally skipped in 13a211e632
as it was not necessary back then.
Is's applied now in preparation for the following patches, where the
aac_adtstoasc bitstream filter will start to correctly propagate the new
extradata through packet side data.
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
Don't just look at zero sized packets, and also check for AAC extradata
updates, in preparation for the following patches.
Reviewed-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
If the source is using a custom IO, setting this flag causes heavy leaks
since the segments will not have their avio context closed.
Regression since f5da453b06.
Using AVOnce as a stack variable makes no sense as the state is lost
when the function exits.
This fixes repeated calls to av(filter/device)_register_all
* commit '1920382aa9f21d7ed1a3c2214990da8d2b067a92':
dashenc: add option to provide UTC timing source
Also use E instead of AV_OPT_FLAG_ENCODING_PARAM to be consistent with
the other AVOption.
Merged-by: Clément Bœsch <u@pkh.me>
* commit '95f1004bdfdf2d26c330c1d4b7c4ac9352d60b18':
dashenc: add mandatory id to AdaptationSet and Period in manifest
Merged-by: Clément Bœsch <u@pkh.me>
Some samples have their metadata track time_scale incorrectly set to 0
and the check introduced by a398f054fd
prevents playback of those samples. Setting the time_scale to 1 fixes
playback.
