Fixes: signed integer overflow: 9223372036854550860 + 530259564 cannot be represented in type 'long'
Fixes: 49093/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_dem_ASF_O_fuzzer-4697179192688640
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
avoids overflows with it
Fixes: signed integer overflow: 9223372036846866010 + 4294967047 cannot be represented in type 'long'
Fixes: 50993/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_dem_ASF_O_fuzzer-6538296768987136
Fixes: 50993/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_dem_ASF_O_fuzzer-657169555665715
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
The threshold of 5 is arbitrary, both smaller and larger should work fine
Fixes: Stack overflow
Fixes: 50603/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_dem_ASF_O_fuzzer-6049302564175872
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Do this by allocating AVStream together with the data that is
currently in AVStreamInternal; or rather: Put AVStream at the
beginning of a new structure called FFStream (which encompasses
more than just the internal fields and is a proper context in its own
right, hence the name) and remove AVStreamInternal altogether.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@outlook.com>
This is possible now that the next-API is gone.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
Both functions to read attached pictures coincide since
e83f27a21a (save for some log messages
in case av_dict_set failed).
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@outlook.com>
Fixes: index 26981 out of bounds for type 'ASFStreamData [128]'
Fixes: 27334/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_dem_ASF_O_fuzzer-6197611002068992
Alternatively the array could be increased in size or the cases not fitting be ignored
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: signed integer overflow: 2314885530818453566 + 7503032301549264928 cannot be represented in type 'long'
Fixes: 26639/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_dem_ASF_O_fuzzer-6024222100684800
Alternatively this could be ignored but then the end condition of the loop
would be hard to reach as avio_tell() is int64_t
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
A variable has been assigned a value twice consecutively; essentially
the same happens when one performs av_init_packet on an AVPacket after
a call to av_packet_unref.
Found via PVS-Studio (see ticket #8156).
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
The ASF specification of Metadata Objects' stream number is as follows:
"Specifies whether the entry applies to a specific digital media stream
or whether it applies to the whole file. A value of 0 in this field
indicates that it applies to the whole file; otherwise, the entry
applies only to the indicated stream number and must be between 1 and
127."
Yet the asf_o demuxer (the one originating from Libav) has always
treated such metadata as if it applied to a stream even though no stream
with a stream number may exist in a valid ASF file. This is fixed in
this commit; it affected e.g. the file
wma_with_metadata_library_object_tag_trimmed.wma from the FATE suite.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
The ASF file format has a limit of 127 streams and the "asf_o" demuxer
(the ASF demuxer from Libav) has an array of pointers for a structure
called ASFStream that is allocated on demand for every stream. Attached
pictures are not streams in the sense of the ASF specification, yet the
demuxer created an ASFStream for them; and in one codepath it also
forgot to check whether the array of ASFStreams is already full. The
result is a write beyond the end of the array and a segfault lateron.
Fixing this is easy: Don't create ASFStreams for attached picture
streams.
(Other results of the current state of affairs are unnecessary allocations
(of ASFStreams structures), the misparsing of valid files (there might not
be enough ASFStreams left for the valid streams if attached pictures take
up too many); furthermore, the ASFStreams created for attached pictures all
have the stream number 0, an invalid stream number (the valid range is
1-127). This means that invalid data (packets for a stream with stream
number 0) won't get rejected lateron.)
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Those are private fields, no reason to have them exposed in a public
header. Since there are some (semi-)public fields located after these,
even though this section is supposed to be private, keep some dummy
padding there until the next major bump to preserve ABI compatibility.
ff_id3v2_parse_apic/chapters/priv/priv_dict all had a parameter
extra_meta of type ID3v2ExtraMeta ** as if the functions wanted to make
*extra_meta point to something else. But they don't, so just use an
ID3v2ExtraMeta *.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
These changes store id3 chapter data in ID3v2ExtraMeta and introduce
ff_id3v2_parse_chapters to parse them into the format context if needed.
Encoders using ff_id3v2_read, which previously parsed chapters into the
format context automatically, were adjusted to call
ff_id3v2_parse_chapters.
Signed-off-by: wm4 <nfxjfg@googlemail.com>
* commit '0539d84d985e811e5989ef27c13f7e2dda0f9b89':
asfdec: Account for different Format Data sizes
See 76853a3e0c
Merged-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
The header was never installed and the function is only used in libavformat
Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <onemda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
This fixes infinite loops due to seeking back.
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Hájková <alexandra.khirnova@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Cadhalpun <Andreas.Cadhalpun@googlemail.com>
asf_read_payload can unset eof_reached, so check it also before calling
that function.
This fixes infinite loops.
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Hájková <alexandra.khirnova@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Cadhalpun <Andreas.Cadhalpun@googlemail.com>
This fixes infinite loops due to seeking back.
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Hájková <alexandra.khirnova@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Cadhalpun <Andreas.Cadhalpun@googlemail.com>
This fixes infinite loops.
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Hájková <alexandra.khirnova@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Cadhalpun <Andreas.Cadhalpun@googlemail.com>
The loop can be very long, even though the file is very short.
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Hájková <alexandra.khirnova@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Cadhalpun <Andreas.Cadhalpun@googlemail.com>
Both avio_skip and detect_unknown_subobject use int64_t for the size
parameter.
This fixes a segmentation fault due to infinite recursion.
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Hájková <alexandra.khirnova@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Cadhalpun <Andreas.Cadhalpun@googlemail.com>
Otherwise invalid values are used unchecked in the next run.
This can cause NULL pointer dereferencing.
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Hájková <alexandra.khirnova@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Cadhalpun <Andreas.Cadhalpun@googlemail.com>
* commit '8375dc1dd101d51baa430f34c0bcadfa37873896':
asfdec: handle the case when the stream index has an invalid value better
Merged-by: Hendrik Leppkes <h.leppkes@gmail.com>
* commit '00cc10aee380f882507bac994ac469d8358d12e8':
asfdec: do not skip padding if offset is above packet size - padding
Merged-by: Hendrik Leppkes <h.leppkes@gmail.com>
* commit 'c0a49077ea4ff3a0ad30b9e33f1bb06ba9112aaa':
asfdec: add more checks for size left in asf packet buffer
Merged-by: Hendrik Leppkes <h.leppkes@gmail.com>
* commit '77cf23668991bfd1fb69339f13e1511b4186b7b3':
asfdec: alloc enough space for storing name in asf_read_metadata_obj
Merged-by: Hendrik Leppkes <h.leppkes@gmail.com>
* commit '317cfaa5e09755ed0b34af512ec687963a67bdbf':
asfdec: prevent the memory leak in the asf_read_metada_obj
Merged-by: Hendrik Leppkes <h.leppkes@gmail.com>
* commit 'fdbc544d29176ba69d67dd879df4696f0a19052e':
asfdec: prevent the memory leak while reading metadata
Merged-by: Hendrik Leppkes <h.leppkes@gmail.com>
