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oauth2-proxy/oauthproxy.go

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package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
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"errors"
"fmt"
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"html/template"
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"net"
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"net/http"
"net/url"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
"time"
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"github.com/justinas/alice"
ipapi "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/apis/ip"
middlewareapi "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/apis/middleware"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/apis/options"
sessionsapi "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/apis/sessions"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/authentication/basic"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/cookies"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/encryption"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/ip"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/logger"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/middleware"
requestutil "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/requests/util"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/sessions"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/upstream"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/providers"
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)
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const (
schemeHTTPS = "https"
applicationJSON = "application/json"
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)
var (
// ErrNeedsLogin means the user should be redirected to the login page
ErrNeedsLogin = errors.New("redirect to login page")
// ErrAccessDenied means the user should receive a 401 Unauthorized response
ErrAccessDenied = errors.New("access denied")
// Used to check final redirects are not susceptible to open redirects.
// Matches //, /\ and both of these with whitespace in between (eg / / or / \).
invalidRedirectRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`[/\\](?:[\s\v]*|\.{1,2})[/\\]`)
)
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// allowedRoute manages method + path based allowlists
type allowedRoute struct {
method string
pathRegex *regexp.Regexp
}
// OAuthProxy is the main authentication proxy
type OAuthProxy struct {
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CookieSeed string
CookieName string
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CSRFCookieName string
CookieDomains []string
CookiePath string
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CookieSecure bool
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CookieHTTPOnly bool
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CookieExpire time.Duration
CookieRefresh time.Duration
CookieSameSite string
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Validator func(string) bool
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RobotsPath string
SignInPath string
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SignOutPath string
OAuthStartPath string
OAuthCallbackPath string
AuthOnlyPath string
UserInfoPath string
allowedRoutes []allowedRoute
redirectURL *url.URL // the url to receive requests at
whitelistDomains []string
provider providers.Provider
providerNameOverride string
sessionStore sessionsapi.SessionStore
ProxyPrefix string
SignInMessage string
basicAuthValidator basic.Validator
displayHtpasswdForm bool
serveMux http.Handler
SetXAuthRequest bool
PassBasicAuth bool
SetBasicAuth bool
SkipProviderButton bool
PassUserHeaders bool
BasicAuthPassword string
PassAccessToken bool
SetAuthorization bool
PassAuthorization bool
PreferEmailToUser bool
skipAuthPreflight bool
skipJwtBearerTokens bool
templates *template.Template
realClientIPParser ipapi.RealClientIPParser
trustedIPs *ip.NetSet
Banner string
Footer string
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sessionChain alice.Chain
headersChain alice.Chain
preAuthChain alice.Chain
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}
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// NewOAuthProxy creates a new instance of OAuthProxy from the options provided
func NewOAuthProxy(opts *options.Options, validator func(string) bool) (*OAuthProxy, error) {
sessionStore, err := sessions.NewSessionStore(&opts.Session, &opts.Cookie)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error initialising session store: %v", err)
}
templates := loadTemplates(opts.CustomTemplatesDir)
proxyErrorHandler := upstream.NewProxyErrorHandler(templates.Lookup("error.html"), opts.ProxyPrefix)
upstreamProxy, err := upstream.NewProxy(opts.UpstreamServers, opts.GetSignatureData(), proxyErrorHandler)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error initialising upstream proxy: %v", err)
}
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if opts.SkipJwtBearerTokens {
logger.Printf("Skipping JWT tokens from configured OIDC issuer: %q", opts.OIDCIssuerURL)
for _, issuer := range opts.ExtraJwtIssuers {
logger.Printf("Skipping JWT tokens from extra JWT issuer: %q", issuer)
}
}
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redirectURL := opts.GetRedirectURL()
if redirectURL.Path == "" {
redirectURL.Path = fmt.Sprintf("%s/callback", opts.ProxyPrefix)
}
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logger.Printf("OAuthProxy configured for %s Client ID: %s", opts.GetProvider().Data().ProviderName, opts.ClientID)
refresh := "disabled"
if opts.Cookie.Refresh != time.Duration(0) {
refresh = fmt.Sprintf("after %s", opts.Cookie.Refresh)
}
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logger.Printf("Cookie settings: name:%s secure(https):%v httponly:%v expiry:%s domains:%s path:%s samesite:%s refresh:%s", opts.Cookie.Name, opts.Cookie.Secure, opts.Cookie.HTTPOnly, opts.Cookie.Expire, strings.Join(opts.Cookie.Domains, ","), opts.Cookie.Path, opts.Cookie.SameSite, refresh)
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Implements --trusted-ip option (#552) * Implements --ip-whitelist option * Included IPWhitelist option to allow one-or-more selected CIDR ranges to bypass OAuth2 authentication. * Adds IPWhitelist, a fast lookup table for multiple CIDR ranges. * Renamed IPWhitelist ipCIDRSet * Fixed unessesary pointer usage in ipCIDRSet * Update CHANGELOG.md * Update CHANGELOG.md * Updated to not use err.Error() in printf statements * Imrpoved language for --ip-whitelist descriptions. * Improve IP whitelist options error messages * Clarify options single-host normalization * Wrote a book about ipCIDRSet * Added comment to IsWhitelistedIP in oauthproxy.go * Rewrite oauthproxy test case as table driven * oops * Support whitelisting by low-level remote address * Added more test-cases, improved descriptions * Move ip_cidr_set.go to pkg/ip/net_set.go * Add more whitelist test use cases. * Oops * Use subtests for TestIPWhitelist * Add minimal tests for ip.NetSet * Use switch statment * Renamed ip-whitelist to whitelist-ip * Update documentation with a warning. * Update pkg/apis/options/options.go * Update CHANGELOG.md Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix fmt * Move ParseIPNet into abstraction * Add warning in case of --reverse-proxy * Update pkg/validation/options_test.go * Rename --whitelist-ip to --trusted-ip * Update oauthproxy.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
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trustedIPs := ip.NewNetSet()
for _, ipStr := range opts.TrustedIPs {
if ipNet := ip.ParseIPNet(ipStr); ipNet != nil {
trustedIPs.AddIPNet(*ipNet)
} else {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not parse IP network (%s)", ipStr)
}
}
var basicAuthValidator basic.Validator
if opts.HtpasswdFile != "" {
logger.Printf("using htpasswd file: %s", opts.HtpasswdFile)
var err error
basicAuthValidator, err = basic.NewHTPasswdValidator(opts.HtpasswdFile)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not load htpasswdfile: %v", err)
}
}
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allowedRoutes, err := buildRoutesAllowlist(opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
preAuthChain, err := buildPreAuthChain(opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not build pre-auth chain: %v", err)
}
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sessionChain := buildSessionChain(opts, sessionStore, basicAuthValidator)
headersChain, err := buildHeadersChain(opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not build headers chain: %v", err)
}
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return &OAuthProxy{
CookieName: opts.Cookie.Name,
CSRFCookieName: fmt.Sprintf("%v_%v", opts.Cookie.Name, "csrf"),
CookieSeed: opts.Cookie.Secret,
CookieDomains: opts.Cookie.Domains,
CookiePath: opts.Cookie.Path,
CookieSecure: opts.Cookie.Secure,
CookieHTTPOnly: opts.Cookie.HTTPOnly,
CookieExpire: opts.Cookie.Expire,
CookieRefresh: opts.Cookie.Refresh,
CookieSameSite: opts.Cookie.SameSite,
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Validator: validator,
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RobotsPath: "/robots.txt",
SignInPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/sign_in", opts.ProxyPrefix),
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SignOutPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/sign_out", opts.ProxyPrefix),
OAuthStartPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/start", opts.ProxyPrefix),
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OAuthCallbackPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/callback", opts.ProxyPrefix),
AuthOnlyPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/auth", opts.ProxyPrefix),
UserInfoPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/userinfo", opts.ProxyPrefix),
ProxyPrefix: opts.ProxyPrefix,
provider: opts.GetProvider(),
providerNameOverride: opts.ProviderName,
sessionStore: sessionStore,
serveMux: upstreamProxy,
redirectURL: redirectURL,
allowedRoutes: allowedRoutes,
whitelistDomains: opts.WhitelistDomains,
skipAuthPreflight: opts.SkipAuthPreflight,
skipJwtBearerTokens: opts.SkipJwtBearerTokens,
realClientIPParser: opts.GetRealClientIPParser(),
SkipProviderButton: opts.SkipProviderButton,
templates: templates,
trustedIPs: trustedIPs,
Banner: opts.Banner,
Footer: opts.Footer,
SignInMessage: buildSignInMessage(opts),
basicAuthValidator: basicAuthValidator,
displayHtpasswdForm: basicAuthValidator != nil && opts.DisplayHtpasswdForm,
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sessionChain: sessionChain,
headersChain: headersChain,
preAuthChain: preAuthChain,
}, nil
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}
// buildPreAuthChain constructs a chain that should process every request before
// the OAuth2 Proxy authentication logic kicks in.
// For example forcing HTTPS or health checks.
func buildPreAuthChain(opts *options.Options) (alice.Chain, error) {
chain := alice.New(middleware.NewScope(opts.ReverseProxy))
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if opts.ForceHTTPS {
_, httpsPort, err := net.SplitHostPort(opts.HTTPSAddress)
if err != nil {
return alice.Chain{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid HTTPS address %q: %v", opts.HTTPAddress, err)
}
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewRedirectToHTTPS(httpsPort))
}
healthCheckPaths := []string{opts.PingPath}
healthCheckUserAgents := []string{opts.PingUserAgent}
if opts.GCPHealthChecks {
healthCheckPaths = append(healthCheckPaths, "/liveness_check", "/readiness_check")
healthCheckUserAgents = append(healthCheckUserAgents, "GoogleHC/1.0")
}
// To silence logging of health checks, register the health check handler before
// the logging handler
if opts.Logging.SilencePing {
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewHealthCheck(healthCheckPaths, healthCheckUserAgents), LoggingHandler)
} else {
chain = chain.Append(LoggingHandler, middleware.NewHealthCheck(healthCheckPaths, healthCheckUserAgents))
}
return chain, nil
}
func buildSessionChain(opts *options.Options, sessionStore sessionsapi.SessionStore, validator basic.Validator) alice.Chain {
chain := alice.New()
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if opts.SkipJwtBearerTokens {
sessionLoaders := []middlewareapi.TokenToSessionFunc{
opts.GetProvider().CreateSessionFromToken,
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}
for _, verifier := range opts.GetJWTBearerVerifiers() {
sessionLoaders = append(sessionLoaders,
middlewareapi.CreateTokenToSessionFunc(verifier.Verify))
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}
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewJwtSessionLoader(sessionLoaders))
}
if validator != nil {
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewBasicAuthSessionLoader(validator))
}
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewStoredSessionLoader(&middleware.StoredSessionLoaderOptions{
SessionStore: sessionStore,
RefreshPeriod: opts.Cookie.Refresh,
RefreshSessionIfNeeded: opts.GetProvider().RefreshSessionIfNeeded,
ValidateSessionState: opts.GetProvider().ValidateSession,
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}))
return chain
}
func buildHeadersChain(opts *options.Options) (alice.Chain, error) {
requestInjector, err := middleware.NewRequestHeaderInjector(opts.InjectRequestHeaders)
if err != nil {
return alice.Chain{}, fmt.Errorf("error constructing request header injector: %v", err)
}
responseInjector, err := middleware.NewResponseHeaderInjector(opts.InjectResponseHeaders)
if err != nil {
return alice.Chain{}, fmt.Errorf("error constructing request header injector: %v", err)
}
return alice.New(requestInjector, responseInjector), nil
}
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func buildSignInMessage(opts *options.Options) string {
var msg string
if len(opts.Banner) >= 1 {
if opts.Banner == "-" {
msg = ""
} else {
msg = opts.Banner
}
} else if len(opts.EmailDomains) != 0 && opts.AuthenticatedEmailsFile == "" {
if len(opts.EmailDomains) > 1 {
msg = fmt.Sprintf("Authenticate using one of the following domains: %v", strings.Join(opts.EmailDomains, ", "))
} else if opts.EmailDomains[0] != "*" {
msg = fmt.Sprintf("Authenticate using %v", opts.EmailDomains[0])
}
}
return msg
}
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// buildRoutesAllowlist builds an []allowedRoute list from either the legacy
// SkipAuthRegex option (paths only support) or newer SkipAuthRoutes option
// (method=path support)
func buildRoutesAllowlist(opts *options.Options) ([]allowedRoute, error) {
routes := make([]allowedRoute, 0, len(opts.SkipAuthRegex)+len(opts.SkipAuthRoutes))
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for _, path := range opts.SkipAuthRegex {
compiledRegex, err := regexp.Compile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
logger.Printf("Skipping auth - Method: ALL | Path: %s", path)
routes = append(routes, allowedRoute{
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method: "",
pathRegex: compiledRegex,
})
}
for _, methodPath := range opts.SkipAuthRoutes {
var (
method string
path string
)
parts := strings.SplitN(methodPath, "=", 2)
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if len(parts) == 1 {
method = ""
path = parts[0]
} else {
method = strings.ToUpper(parts[0])
path = parts[1]
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}
compiledRegex, err := regexp.Compile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
logger.Printf("Skipping auth - Method: %s | Path: %s", method, path)
routes = append(routes, allowedRoute{
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method: method,
pathRegex: compiledRegex,
})
}
return routes, nil
}
// MakeCSRFCookie creates a cookie for CSRF
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func (p *OAuthProxy) MakeCSRFCookie(req *http.Request, value string, expiration time.Duration, now time.Time) *http.Cookie {
return p.makeCookie(req, p.CSRFCookieName, value, expiration, now)
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) makeCookie(req *http.Request, name string, value string, expiration time.Duration, now time.Time) *http.Cookie {
cookieDomain := cookies.GetCookieDomain(req, p.CookieDomains)
if cookieDomain != "" {
domain := requestutil.GetRequestHost(req)
if h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(domain); err == nil {
domain = h
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(domain, cookieDomain) {
logger.Errorf("Warning: request host is %q but using configured cookie domain of %q", domain, cookieDomain)
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}
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}
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return &http.Cookie{
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Name: name,
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Value: value,
Path: p.CookiePath,
Domain: cookieDomain,
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HttpOnly: p.CookieHTTPOnly,
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Secure: p.CookieSecure,
Expires: now.Add(expiration),
SameSite: cookies.ParseSameSite(p.CookieSameSite),
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}
}
// ClearCSRFCookie creates a cookie to unset the CSRF cookie stored in the user's
// session
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func (p *OAuthProxy) ClearCSRFCookie(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
http.SetCookie(rw, p.MakeCSRFCookie(req, "", time.Hour*-1, time.Now()))
}
// SetCSRFCookie adds a CSRF cookie to the response
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func (p *OAuthProxy) SetCSRFCookie(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, val string) {
http.SetCookie(rw, p.MakeCSRFCookie(req, val, p.CookieExpire, time.Now()))
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}
// ClearSessionCookie creates a cookie to unset the user's authentication cookie
// stored in the user's session
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func (p *OAuthProxy) ClearSessionCookie(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) error {
return p.sessionStore.Clear(rw, req)
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}
// LoadCookiedSession reads the user's authentication details from the request
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func (p *OAuthProxy) LoadCookiedSession(req *http.Request) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
return p.sessionStore.Load(req)
}
// SaveSession creates a new session cookie value and sets this on the response
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func (p *OAuthProxy) SaveSession(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) error {
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return p.sessionStore.Save(rw, req, s)
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}
// IsValidRedirect checks whether the redirect URL is whitelisted
func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {
switch {
case redirect == "":
// The user didn't specify a redirect, should fallback to `/`
return false
case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//") && !invalidRedirectRegex.MatchString(redirect):
return true
case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "https://"):
redirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Rejecting invalid redirect %q: scheme unsupported or missing", redirect)
return false
}
redirectHostname := redirectURL.Hostname()
for _, allowedDomain := range p.whitelistDomains {
allowedHost, allowedPort := splitHostPort(allowedDomain)
if allowedHost == "" {
continue
}
if redirectHostname == strings.TrimPrefix(allowedHost, ".") ||
(strings.HasPrefix(allowedHost, ".") &&
strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, allowedHost)) {
// the domain names match, now validate the ports
// if the whitelisted domain's port is '*', allow all ports
// if the whitelisted domain contains a specific port, only allow that port
// if the whitelisted domain doesn't contain a port at all, only allow empty redirect ports ie http and https
redirectPort := redirectURL.Port()
if allowedPort == "*" ||
allowedPort == redirectPort ||
(allowedPort == "" && redirectPort == "") {
return true
}
}
}
logger.Printf("Rejecting invalid redirect %q: domain / port not in whitelist", redirect)
return false
default:
logger.Printf("Rejecting invalid redirect %q: not an absolute or relative URL", redirect)
return false
}
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
p.preAuthChain.Then(http.HandlerFunc(p.serveHTTP)).ServeHTTP(rw, req)
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) serveHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
if req.URL.Path != p.AuthOnlyPath && strings.HasPrefix(req.URL.Path, p.ProxyPrefix) {
prepareNoCache(rw)
}
switch path := req.URL.Path; {
case path == p.RobotsPath:
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p.RobotsTxt(rw, req)
case p.IsAllowedRequest(req):
p.SkipAuthProxy(rw, req)
case path == p.SignInPath:
p.SignIn(rw, req)
case path == p.SignOutPath:
p.SignOut(rw, req)
case path == p.OAuthStartPath:
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
case path == p.OAuthCallbackPath:
p.OAuthCallback(rw, req)
case path == p.AuthOnlyPath:
p.AuthOnly(rw, req)
case path == p.UserInfoPath:
p.UserInfo(rw, req)
default:
p.Proxy(rw, req)
}
}
// RobotsTxt disallows scraping pages from the OAuthProxy
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func (p *OAuthProxy) RobotsTxt(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
_, err := fmt.Fprintf(rw, "User-agent: *\nDisallow: /")
if err != nil {
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logger.Printf("Error writing robots.txt: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", err.Error())
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return
}
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rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
// ErrorPage writes an error response
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func (p *OAuthProxy) ErrorPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, code int, title string, message string) {
redirectURL, err := p.getAppRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining redirect: %v", err)
}
if redirectURL == p.SignInPath || redirectURL == "" {
redirectURL = "/"
}
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rw.WriteHeader(code)
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// We allow unescaped template.HTML since it is user configured options
/* #nosec G203 */
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t := struct {
Title string
Message string
ProxyPrefix string
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StatusCode int
Redirect string
Footer template.HTML
Version string
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}{
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Title: title,
Message: message,
ProxyPrefix: p.ProxyPrefix,
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StatusCode: code,
Redirect: redirectURL,
Footer: template.HTML(p.Footer),
Version: VERSION,
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}
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if err := p.templates.ExecuteTemplate(rw, "error.html", t); err != nil {
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logger.Printf("Error rendering error.html template: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Internal Server Error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
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}
// IsAllowedRequest is used to check if auth should be skipped for this request
func (p *OAuthProxy) IsAllowedRequest(req *http.Request) bool {
isPreflightRequestAllowed := p.skipAuthPreflight && req.Method == "OPTIONS"
return isPreflightRequestAllowed || p.isAllowedRoute(req) || p.isTrustedIP(req)
}
// IsAllowedRoute is used to check if the request method & path is allowed without auth
func (p *OAuthProxy) isAllowedRoute(req *http.Request) bool {
for _, route := range p.allowedRoutes {
if (route.method == "" || req.Method == route.method) && route.pathRegex.MatchString(req.URL.Path) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// isTrustedIP is used to check if a request comes from a trusted client IP address.
func (p *OAuthProxy) isTrustedIP(req *http.Request) bool {
if p.trustedIPs == nil {
return false
}
remoteAddr, err := ip.GetClientIP(p.realClientIPParser, req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining real IP for trusted IP list: %v", err)
// Possibly spoofed X-Real-IP header
return false
}
if remoteAddr == nil {
return false
}
return p.trustedIPs.Has(remoteAddr)
}
// SignInPage writes the sing in template to the response
func (p *OAuthProxy) SignInPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, code int) {
prepareNoCache(rw)
err := p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
if err != nil {
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logger.Printf("Error clearing session cookie: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", err.Error())
return
}
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rw.WriteHeader(code)
redirectURL, err := p.getAppRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining redirect: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", err.Error())
return
}
if redirectURL == p.SignInPath {
redirectURL = "/"
}
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// We allow unescaped template.HTML since it is user configured options
/* #nosec G203 */
t := struct {
ProviderName string
SignInMessage template.HTML
CustomLogin bool
Redirect string
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Version string
ProxyPrefix string
Footer template.HTML
}{
ProviderName: p.provider.Data().ProviderName,
SignInMessage: template.HTML(p.SignInMessage),
CustomLogin: p.displayHtpasswdForm,
Redirect: redirectURL,
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Version: VERSION,
ProxyPrefix: p.ProxyPrefix,
Footer: template.HTML(p.Footer),
}
if p.providerNameOverride != "" {
t.ProviderName = p.providerNameOverride
}
err = p.templates.ExecuteTemplate(rw, "sign_in.html", t)
if err != nil {
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logger.Printf("Error rendering sign_in.html template: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", err.Error())
}
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}
// ManualSignIn handles basic auth logins to the proxy
func (p *OAuthProxy) ManualSignIn(req *http.Request) (string, bool) {
if req.Method != "POST" || p.basicAuthValidator == nil {
return "", false
}
user := req.FormValue("username")
passwd := req.FormValue("password")
if user == "" {
return "", false
}
// check auth
if p.basicAuthValidator.Validate(user, passwd) {
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logger.PrintAuthf(user, req, logger.AuthSuccess, "Authenticated via HtpasswdFile")
return user, true
}
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logger.PrintAuthf(user, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via HtpasswdFile")
return "", false
}
// SignIn serves a page prompting users to sign in
func (p *OAuthProxy) SignIn(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
redirect, err := p.getAppRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining redirect: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", err.Error())
return
}
user, ok := p.ManualSignIn(req)
if ok {
session := &sessionsapi.SessionState{User: user}
err = p.SaveSession(rw, req, session)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error saving session: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", err.Error())
return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, http.StatusFound)
} else {
if p.SkipProviderButton {
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
} else {
p.SignInPage(rw, req, http.StatusOK)
}
}
}
//UserInfo endpoint outputs session email and preferred username in JSON format
func (p *OAuthProxy) UserInfo(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
if err != nil {
http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusUnauthorized), http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
userInfo := struct {
User string `json:"user"`
Email string `json:"email"`
Groups []string `json:"groups,omitempty"`
PreferredUsername string `json:"preferredUsername,omitempty"`
}{
User: session.User,
Email: session.Email,
Groups: session.Groups,
PreferredUsername: session.PreferredUsername,
}
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
err = json.NewEncoder(rw).Encode(userInfo)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error encoding user info: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", err.Error())
}
}
// SignOut sends a response to clear the authentication cookie
func (p *OAuthProxy) SignOut(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
redirect, err := p.getAppRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining redirect: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", err.Error())
return
}
err = p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error clearing session cookie: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", err.Error())
return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, http.StatusFound)
}
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// OAuthStart starts the OAuth2 authentication flow
func (p *OAuthProxy) OAuthStart(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
prepareNoCache(rw)
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nonce, err := encryption.Nonce()
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if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining nonce: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", err.Error())
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return
}
p.SetCSRFCookie(rw, req, nonce)
redirect, err := p.getAppRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining redirect: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", err.Error())
return
}
redirectURI := p.getOAuthRedirectURI(req)
http.Redirect(rw, req, p.provider.GetLoginURL(redirectURI, fmt.Sprintf("%v:%v", nonce, redirect)), http.StatusFound)
}
// OAuthCallback is the OAuth2 authentication flow callback that finishes the
// OAuth2 authentication flow
func (p *OAuthProxy) OAuthCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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remoteAddr := ip.GetClientString(p.realClientIPParser, req, true)
// finish the oauth cycle
err := req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error while parsing OAuth2 callback: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", err.Error())
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return
}
errorString := req.Form.Get("error")
if errorString != "" {
logger.Errorf("Error while parsing OAuth2 callback: %s", errorString)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, "Permission Denied", errorString)
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return
}
session, err := p.redeemCode(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error redeeming code during OAuth2 callback: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", "Internal Error")
return
}
err = p.enrichSessionState(req.Context(), session)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error creating session during OAuth2 callback: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", "Internal Error")
return
}
state := strings.SplitN(req.Form.Get("state"), ":", 2)
if len(state) != 2 {
logger.Error("Error while parsing OAuth2 state: invalid length")
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", "Invalid State")
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return
}
nonce := state[0]
redirect := state[1]
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c, err := req.Cookie(p.CSRFCookieName)
if err != nil {
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logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: unable to obtain CSRF cookie")
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, "Permission Denied", err.Error())
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return
}
p.ClearCSRFCookie(rw, req)
if c.Value != nonce {
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logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: CSRF token mismatch, potential attack")
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, "Permission Denied", "CSRF Failed")
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return
}
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if !p.IsValidRedirect(redirect) {
redirect = "/"
}
// set cookie, or deny
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authorized, err := p.provider.Authorize(req.Context(), session)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error with authorization: %v", err)
}
if p.Validator(session.Email) && authorized {
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logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthSuccess, "Authenticated via OAuth2: %s", session)
err := p.SaveSession(rw, req, session)
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if err != nil {
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logger.Errorf("Error saving session state for %s: %v", remoteAddr, err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Server Error", err.Error())
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return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, http.StatusFound)
} else {
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: unauthorized")
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, "Permission Denied", "Invalid Account")
}
}
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func (p *OAuthProxy) redeemCode(req *http.Request) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
code := req.Form.Get("code")
if code == "" {
return nil, providers.ErrMissingCode
}
redirectURI := p.getOAuthRedirectURI(req)
s, err := p.provider.Redeem(req.Context(), redirectURI, code)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return s, nil
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) enrichSessionState(ctx context.Context, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) error {
var err error
if s.Email == "" {
s.Email, err = p.provider.GetEmailAddress(ctx, s)
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, providers.ErrNotImplemented) {
return err
}
}
return p.provider.EnrichSession(ctx, s)
}
// AuthOnly checks whether the user is currently logged in (both authentication
// and optional authorization).
func (p *OAuthProxy) AuthOnly(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
if err != nil {
http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusUnauthorized), http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Unauthorized cases need to return 403 to prevent infinite redirects with
// subrequest architectures
if !authOnlyAuthorize(req, session) {
http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusForbidden), http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
// we are authenticated
p.addHeadersForProxying(rw, session)
p.headersChain.Then(http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
})).ServeHTTP(rw, req)
}
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// SkipAuthProxy proxies allowlisted requests and skips authentication
func (p *OAuthProxy) SkipAuthProxy(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
p.headersChain.Then(p.serveMux).ServeHTTP(rw, req)
}
// Proxy proxies the user request if the user is authenticated else it prompts
// them to authenticate
func (p *OAuthProxy) Proxy(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
switch err {
case nil:
// we are authenticated
p.addHeadersForProxying(rw, session)
p.headersChain.Then(p.serveMux).ServeHTTP(rw, req)
case ErrNeedsLogin:
// we need to send the user to a login screen
if isAjax(req) {
// no point redirecting an AJAX request
p.errorJSON(rw, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
if p.SkipProviderButton {
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
} else {
p.SignInPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden)
}
case ErrAccessDenied:
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Permission Denied", "Unauthorized")
default:
// unknown error
logger.Errorf("Unexpected internal error: %v", err)
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p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError,
"Internal Error", "Internal Error")
}
}
// See https://developers.google.com/web/fundamentals/performance/optimizing-content-efficiency/http-caching?hl=en
var noCacheHeaders = map[string]string{
"Expires": time.Unix(0, 0).Format(time.RFC1123),
"Cache-Control": "no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, max-age=0",
"X-Accel-Expires": "0", // https://www.nginx.com/resources/wiki/start/topics/examples/x-accel/
}
// prepareNoCache prepares headers for preventing browser caching.
func prepareNoCache(w http.ResponseWriter) {
// Set NoCache headers
for k, v := range noCacheHeaders {
w.Header().Set(k, v)
}
}
// getOAuthRedirectURI returns the redirectURL that the upstream OAuth Provider will
// redirect clients to once authenticated.
// This is usually the OAuthProxy callback URL.
func (p *OAuthProxy) getOAuthRedirectURI(req *http.Request) string {
// if `p.redirectURL` already has a host, return it
if p.redirectURL.Host != "" {
return p.redirectURL.String()
}
// Otherwise figure out the scheme + host from the request
rd := *p.redirectURL
rd.Host = requestutil.GetRequestHost(req)
rd.Scheme = requestutil.GetRequestProto(req)
// If CookieSecure is true, return `https` no matter what
// Not all reverse proxies set X-Forwarded-Proto
if p.CookieSecure {
rd.Scheme = schemeHTTPS
}
return rd.String()
}
// getAppRedirect determines the full URL or URI path to redirect clients to
// once authenticated with the OAuthProxy
// Strategy priority (first legal result is used):
// - `rd` querysting parameter
// - `X-Auth-Request-Redirect` header
// - `X-Forwarded-(Proto|Host|Uri)` headers (when ReverseProxy mode is enabled)
// - `X-Forwarded-(Proto|Host)` if `Uri` has the ProxyPath (i.e. /oauth2/*)
// - `X-Forwarded-Uri` direct URI path (when ReverseProxy mode is enabled)
// - `req.URL.RequestURI` if not under the ProxyPath (i.e. /oauth2/*)
// - `/`
func (p *OAuthProxy) getAppRedirect(req *http.Request) (string, error) {
err := req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// These redirect getter functions are strategies ordered by priority
// for figuring out the redirect URL.
type redirectGetter func(req *http.Request) string
for _, rdGetter := range []redirectGetter{
p.getRdQuerystringRedirect,
p.getXAuthRequestRedirect,
p.getXForwardedHeadersRedirect,
p.getURIRedirect,
} {
redirect := rdGetter(req)
// Call `p.IsValidRedirect` again here a final time to be safe
if redirect != "" && p.IsValidRedirect(redirect) {
return redirect, nil
}
}
return "/", nil
}
func isForwardedRequest(req *http.Request) bool {
return requestutil.IsProxied(req) &&
req.Host != requestutil.GetRequestHost(req)
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) hasProxyPrefix(path string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(path, fmt.Sprintf("%s/", p.ProxyPrefix))
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) validateRedirect(redirect string, errorFormat string) string {
if p.IsValidRedirect(redirect) {
return redirect
}
if redirect != "" {
logger.Errorf(errorFormat, redirect)
}
return ""
}
// getRdQuerystringRedirect handles this getAppRedirect strategy:
// - `rd` querysting parameter
func (p *OAuthProxy) getRdQuerystringRedirect(req *http.Request) string {
return p.validateRedirect(
req.Form.Get("rd"),
"Invalid redirect provided in rd querystring parameter: %s",
)
}
// getXAuthRequestRedirect handles this getAppRedirect strategy:
// - `X-Auth-Request-Redirect` Header
func (p *OAuthProxy) getXAuthRequestRedirect(req *http.Request) string {
return p.validateRedirect(
req.Header.Get("X-Auth-Request-Redirect"),
"Invalid redirect provided in X-Auth-Request-Redirect header: %s",
)
}
// getXForwardedHeadersRedirect handles these getAppRedirect strategies:
// - `X-Forwarded-(Proto|Host|Uri)` headers (when ReverseProxy mode is enabled)
// - `X-Forwarded-(Proto|Host)` if `Uri` has the ProxyPath (i.e. /oauth2/*)
func (p *OAuthProxy) getXForwardedHeadersRedirect(req *http.Request) string {
if !isForwardedRequest(req) {
return ""
}
uri := requestutil.GetRequestURI(req)
if p.hasProxyPrefix(uri) {
uri = "/"
}
redirect := fmt.Sprintf(
"%s://%s%s",
requestutil.GetRequestProto(req),
requestutil.GetRequestHost(req),
uri,
)
return p.validateRedirect(redirect,
"Invalid redirect generated from X-Forwarded-* headers: %s")
}
// getURIRedirect handles these getAppRedirect strategies:
// - `X-Forwarded-Uri` direct URI path (when ReverseProxy mode is enabled)
// - `req.URL.RequestURI` if not under the ProxyPath (i.e. /oauth2/*)
// - `/`
func (p *OAuthProxy) getURIRedirect(req *http.Request) string {
redirect := p.validateRedirect(
requestutil.GetRequestURI(req),
"Invalid redirect generated from X-Forwarded-Uri header: %s",
)
if redirect == "" {
redirect = req.URL.RequestURI()
}
if p.hasProxyPrefix(redirect) {
return "/"
}
return redirect
}
// splitHostPort separates host and port. If the port is not valid, it returns
// the entire input as host, and it doesn't check the validity of the host.
// Unlike net.SplitHostPort, but per RFC 3986, it requires ports to be numeric.
// *** taken from net/url, modified validOptionalPort() to accept ":*"
func splitHostPort(hostport string) (host, port string) {
host = hostport
colon := strings.LastIndexByte(host, ':')
if colon != -1 && validOptionalPort(host[colon:]) {
host, port = host[:colon], host[colon+1:]
}
if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
host = host[1 : len(host)-1]
}
return
}
// validOptionalPort reports whether port is either an empty string
// or matches /^:\d*$/
// *** taken from net/url, modified to accept ":*"
func validOptionalPort(port string) bool {
if port == "" || port == ":*" {
return true
}
if port[0] != ':' {
return false
}
for _, b := range port[1:] {
if b < '0' || b > '9' {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// getAuthenticatedSession checks whether a user is authenticated and returns a session object and nil error if so
// Returns:
// - `nil, ErrNeedsLogin` if user needs to login.
// - `nil, ErrAccessDenied` if the authenticated user is not authorized
// Set-Cookie headers may be set on the response as a side-effect of calling this method.
func (p *OAuthProxy) getAuthenticatedSession(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
var session *sessionsapi.SessionState
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getSession := p.sessionChain.Then(http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session = middlewareapi.GetRequestScope(req).Session
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}))
getSession.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
if session == nil {
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return nil, ErrNeedsLogin
}
invalidEmail := session.Email != "" && !p.Validator(session.Email)
authorized, err := p.provider.Authorize(req.Context(), session)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error with authorization: %v", err)
}
if invalidEmail || !authorized {
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authorization via session: removing session %s", session)
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// Invalid session, clear it
err := p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error clearing session cookie: %v", err)
}
return nil, ErrAccessDenied
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}
return session, nil
}
// authOnlyAuthorize handles special authorization logic that is only done
// on the AuthOnly endpoint for use with Nginx subrequest architectures.
//
// TODO (@NickMeves): This method is a placeholder to be extended but currently
// fails the linter. Remove the nolint when functionality expands.
//
//nolint:S1008
func authOnlyAuthorize(req *http.Request, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) bool {
// Allow secondary group restrictions based on the `allowed_groups`
// querystring parameter
if !checkAllowedGroups(req, s) {
return false
}
return true
}
func checkAllowedGroups(req *http.Request, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) bool {
allowedGroups := extractAllowedGroups(req)
if len(allowedGroups) == 0 {
return true
}
for _, group := range s.Groups {
if _, ok := allowedGroups[group]; ok {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func extractAllowedGroups(req *http.Request) map[string]struct{} {
groups := map[string]struct{}{}
query := req.URL.Query()
for _, allowedGroups := range query["allowed_groups"] {
for _, group := range strings.Split(allowedGroups, ",") {
if group != "" {
groups[group] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
return groups
}
// addHeadersForProxying adds the appropriate headers the request / response for proxying
func (p *OAuthProxy) addHeadersForProxying(rw http.ResponseWriter, session *sessionsapi.SessionState) {
if session.Email == "" {
rw.Header().Set("GAP-Auth", session.User)
} else {
rw.Header().Set("GAP-Auth", session.Email)
}
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}
// isAjax checks if a request is an ajax request
func isAjax(req *http.Request) bool {
acceptValues := req.Header.Values("Accept")
const ajaxReq = applicationJSON
// Iterate over multiple Accept headers, i.e.
// Accept: application/json
// Accept: text/plain
for _, mimeTypes := range acceptValues {
// Iterate over multiple mimetypes in a single header, i.e.
// Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
for _, mimeType := range strings.Split(mimeTypes, ",") {
mimeType = strings.TrimSpace(mimeType)
if mimeType == ajaxReq {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
// errorJSON returns the error code with an application/json mime type
func (p *OAuthProxy) errorJSON(rw http.ResponseWriter, code int) {
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", applicationJSON)
rw.WriteHeader(code)
}