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oauth2-proxy/oauthproxy.go

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package main
import (
"context"
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b64 "encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
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"errors"
"fmt"
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"html/template"
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"net"
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"net/http"
"net/url"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
"time"
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"github.com/coreos/go-oidc"
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"github.com/justinas/alice"
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ipapi "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/apis/ip"
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middlewareapi "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/apis/middleware"
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"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/apis/options"
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sessionsapi "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/apis/sessions"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/authentication/basic"
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"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/cookies"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/encryption"
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"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/ip"
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"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/logger"
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"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/middleware"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/sessions"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pkg/upstream"
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"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/providers"
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)
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const (
httpScheme = "http"
httpsScheme = "https"
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applicationJSON = "application/json"
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)
var (
// ErrNeedsLogin means the user should be redirected to the login page
ErrNeedsLogin = errors.New("redirect to login page")
// Used to check final redirects are not susceptible to open redirects.
// Matches //, /\ and both of these with whitespace in between (eg / / or / \).
invalidRedirectRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`[/\\](?:[\s\v]*|\.{1,2})[/\\]`)
)
// OAuthProxy is the main authentication proxy
type OAuthProxy struct {
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CookieSeed string
CookieName string
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CSRFCookieName string
CookieDomains []string
CookiePath string
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CookieSecure bool
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CookieHTTPOnly bool
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CookieExpire time.Duration
CookieRefresh time.Duration
CookieSameSite string
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Validator func(string) bool
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RobotsPath string
SignInPath string
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SignOutPath string
OAuthStartPath string
OAuthCallbackPath string
AuthOnlyPath string
UserInfoPath string
redirectURL *url.URL // the url to receive requests at
whitelistDomains []string
provider providers.Provider
providerNameOverride string
sessionStore sessionsapi.SessionStore
ProxyPrefix string
SignInMessage string
basicAuthValidator basic.Validator
displayHtpasswdForm bool
serveMux http.Handler
SetXAuthRequest bool
PassBasicAuth bool
SetBasicAuth bool
SkipProviderButton bool
PassUserHeaders bool
BasicAuthPassword string
PassAccessToken bool
SetAuthorization bool
PassAuthorization bool
PreferEmailToUser bool
skipAuthRegex []string
skipAuthPreflight bool
skipAuthStripHeaders bool
skipJwtBearerTokens bool
mainJwtBearerVerifier *oidc.IDTokenVerifier
extraJwtBearerVerifiers []*oidc.IDTokenVerifier
compiledRegex []*regexp.Regexp
templates *template.Template
realClientIPParser ipapi.RealClientIPParser
Implements --trusted-ip option (#552) * Implements --ip-whitelist option * Included IPWhitelist option to allow one-or-more selected CIDR ranges to bypass OAuth2 authentication. * Adds IPWhitelist, a fast lookup table for multiple CIDR ranges. * Renamed IPWhitelist ipCIDRSet * Fixed unessesary pointer usage in ipCIDRSet * Update CHANGELOG.md * Update CHANGELOG.md * Updated to not use err.Error() in printf statements * Imrpoved language for --ip-whitelist descriptions. * Improve IP whitelist options error messages * Clarify options single-host normalization * Wrote a book about ipCIDRSet * Added comment to IsWhitelistedIP in oauthproxy.go * Rewrite oauthproxy test case as table driven * oops * Support whitelisting by low-level remote address * Added more test-cases, improved descriptions * Move ip_cidr_set.go to pkg/ip/net_set.go * Add more whitelist test use cases. * Oops * Use subtests for TestIPWhitelist * Add minimal tests for ip.NetSet * Use switch statment * Renamed ip-whitelist to whitelist-ip * Update documentation with a warning. * Update pkg/apis/options/options.go * Update CHANGELOG.md Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix fmt * Move ParseIPNet into abstraction * Add warning in case of --reverse-proxy * Update pkg/validation/options_test.go * Rename --whitelist-ip to --trusted-ip * Update oauthproxy.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
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trustedIPs *ip.NetSet
Banner string
Footer string
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sessionChain alice.Chain
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}
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// NewOAuthProxy creates a new instance of OAuthProxy from the options provided
func NewOAuthProxy(opts *options.Options, validator func(string) bool) (*OAuthProxy, error) {
sessionStore, err := sessions.NewSessionStore(&opts.Session, &opts.Cookie)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error initialising session store: %v", err)
}
templates := loadTemplates(opts.CustomTemplatesDir)
proxyErrorHandler := upstream.NewProxyErrorHandler(templates.Lookup("error.html"), opts.ProxyPrefix)
upstreamProxy, err := upstream.NewProxy(opts.UpstreamServers, opts.GetSignatureData(), proxyErrorHandler)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error initialising upstream proxy: %v", err)
}
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for _, u := range opts.GetCompiledRegex() {
logger.Printf("compiled skip-auth-regex => %q", u)
}
if opts.SkipJwtBearerTokens {
logger.Printf("Skipping JWT tokens from configured OIDC issuer: %q", opts.OIDCIssuerURL)
for _, issuer := range opts.ExtraJwtIssuers {
logger.Printf("Skipping JWT tokens from extra JWT issuer: %q", issuer)
}
}
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redirectURL := opts.GetRedirectURL()
if redirectURL.Path == "" {
redirectURL.Path = fmt.Sprintf("%s/callback", opts.ProxyPrefix)
}
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logger.Printf("OAuthProxy configured for %s Client ID: %s", opts.GetProvider().Data().ProviderName, opts.ClientID)
refresh := "disabled"
if opts.Cookie.Refresh != time.Duration(0) {
refresh = fmt.Sprintf("after %s", opts.Cookie.Refresh)
}
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logger.Printf("Cookie settings: name:%s secure(https):%v httponly:%v expiry:%s domains:%s path:%s samesite:%s refresh:%s", opts.Cookie.Name, opts.Cookie.Secure, opts.Cookie.HTTPOnly, opts.Cookie.Expire, strings.Join(opts.Cookie.Domains, ","), opts.Cookie.Path, opts.Cookie.SameSite, refresh)
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Implements --trusted-ip option (#552) * Implements --ip-whitelist option * Included IPWhitelist option to allow one-or-more selected CIDR ranges to bypass OAuth2 authentication. * Adds IPWhitelist, a fast lookup table for multiple CIDR ranges. * Renamed IPWhitelist ipCIDRSet * Fixed unessesary pointer usage in ipCIDRSet * Update CHANGELOG.md * Update CHANGELOG.md * Updated to not use err.Error() in printf statements * Imrpoved language for --ip-whitelist descriptions. * Improve IP whitelist options error messages * Clarify options single-host normalization * Wrote a book about ipCIDRSet * Added comment to IsWhitelistedIP in oauthproxy.go * Rewrite oauthproxy test case as table driven * oops * Support whitelisting by low-level remote address * Added more test-cases, improved descriptions * Move ip_cidr_set.go to pkg/ip/net_set.go * Add more whitelist test use cases. * Oops * Use subtests for TestIPWhitelist * Add minimal tests for ip.NetSet * Use switch statment * Renamed ip-whitelist to whitelist-ip * Update documentation with a warning. * Update pkg/apis/options/options.go * Update CHANGELOG.md Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix fmt * Move ParseIPNet into abstraction * Add warning in case of --reverse-proxy * Update pkg/validation/options_test.go * Rename --whitelist-ip to --trusted-ip * Update oauthproxy.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
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trustedIPs := ip.NewNetSet()
for _, ipStr := range opts.TrustedIPs {
if ipNet := ip.ParseIPNet(ipStr); ipNet != nil {
trustedIPs.AddIPNet(*ipNet)
} else {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not parse IP network (%s)", ipStr)
}
}
var basicAuthValidator basic.Validator
if opts.HtpasswdFile != "" {
logger.Printf("using htpasswd file: %s", opts.HtpasswdFile)
var err error
basicAuthValidator, err = basic.NewHTPasswdValidator(opts.HtpasswdFile)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not load htpasswdfile: %v", err)
}
}
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sessionChain := buildSessionChain(opts, sessionStore, basicAuthValidator)
return &OAuthProxy{
CookieName: opts.Cookie.Name,
CSRFCookieName: fmt.Sprintf("%v_%v", opts.Cookie.Name, "csrf"),
CookieSeed: opts.Cookie.Secret,
CookieDomains: opts.Cookie.Domains,
CookiePath: opts.Cookie.Path,
CookieSecure: opts.Cookie.Secure,
CookieHTTPOnly: opts.Cookie.HTTPOnly,
CookieExpire: opts.Cookie.Expire,
CookieRefresh: opts.Cookie.Refresh,
CookieSameSite: opts.Cookie.SameSite,
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Validator: validator,
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RobotsPath: "/robots.txt",
SignInPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/sign_in", opts.ProxyPrefix),
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SignOutPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/sign_out", opts.ProxyPrefix),
OAuthStartPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/start", opts.ProxyPrefix),
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OAuthCallbackPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/callback", opts.ProxyPrefix),
AuthOnlyPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/auth", opts.ProxyPrefix),
UserInfoPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/userinfo", opts.ProxyPrefix),
ProxyPrefix: opts.ProxyPrefix,
provider: opts.GetProvider(),
providerNameOverride: opts.ProviderName,
sessionStore: sessionStore,
serveMux: upstreamProxy,
redirectURL: redirectURL,
whitelistDomains: opts.WhitelistDomains,
skipAuthRegex: opts.SkipAuthRegex,
skipAuthPreflight: opts.SkipAuthPreflight,
skipAuthStripHeaders: opts.SkipAuthStripHeaders,
skipJwtBearerTokens: opts.SkipJwtBearerTokens,
mainJwtBearerVerifier: opts.GetOIDCVerifier(),
extraJwtBearerVerifiers: opts.GetJWTBearerVerifiers(),
compiledRegex: opts.GetCompiledRegex(),
realClientIPParser: opts.GetRealClientIPParser(),
SetXAuthRequest: opts.SetXAuthRequest,
PassBasicAuth: opts.PassBasicAuth,
SetBasicAuth: opts.SetBasicAuth,
PassUserHeaders: opts.PassUserHeaders,
BasicAuthPassword: opts.BasicAuthPassword,
PassAccessToken: opts.PassAccessToken,
SetAuthorization: opts.SetAuthorization,
PassAuthorization: opts.PassAuthorization,
PreferEmailToUser: opts.PreferEmailToUser,
SkipProviderButton: opts.SkipProviderButton,
templates: templates,
Implements --trusted-ip option (#552) * Implements --ip-whitelist option * Included IPWhitelist option to allow one-or-more selected CIDR ranges to bypass OAuth2 authentication. * Adds IPWhitelist, a fast lookup table for multiple CIDR ranges. * Renamed IPWhitelist ipCIDRSet * Fixed unessesary pointer usage in ipCIDRSet * Update CHANGELOG.md * Update CHANGELOG.md * Updated to not use err.Error() in printf statements * Imrpoved language for --ip-whitelist descriptions. * Improve IP whitelist options error messages * Clarify options single-host normalization * Wrote a book about ipCIDRSet * Added comment to IsWhitelistedIP in oauthproxy.go * Rewrite oauthproxy test case as table driven * oops * Support whitelisting by low-level remote address * Added more test-cases, improved descriptions * Move ip_cidr_set.go to pkg/ip/net_set.go * Add more whitelist test use cases. * Oops * Use subtests for TestIPWhitelist * Add minimal tests for ip.NetSet * Use switch statment * Renamed ip-whitelist to whitelist-ip * Update documentation with a warning. * Update pkg/apis/options/options.go * Update CHANGELOG.md Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix fmt * Move ParseIPNet into abstraction * Add warning in case of --reverse-proxy * Update pkg/validation/options_test.go * Rename --whitelist-ip to --trusted-ip * Update oauthproxy.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
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trustedIPs: trustedIPs,
Banner: opts.Banner,
Footer: opts.Footer,
basicAuthValidator: basicAuthValidator,
displayHtpasswdForm: basicAuthValidator != nil,
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sessionChain: sessionChain,
}, nil
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}
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func buildSessionChain(opts *options.Options, sessionStore sessionsapi.SessionStore, validator basic.Validator) alice.Chain {
chain := alice.New(middleware.NewScope())
if opts.SkipJwtBearerTokens {
sessionLoaders := []middlewareapi.TokenToSessionLoader{}
if opts.GetOIDCVerifier() != nil {
sessionLoaders = append(sessionLoaders, middlewareapi.TokenToSessionLoader{
Verifier: opts.GetOIDCVerifier(),
TokenToSession: opts.GetProvider().CreateSessionStateFromBearerToken,
})
}
for _, verifier := range opts.GetJWTBearerVerifiers() {
sessionLoaders = append(sessionLoaders, middlewareapi.TokenToSessionLoader{
Verifier: verifier,
})
}
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewJwtSessionLoader(sessionLoaders))
}
if validator != nil {
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewBasicAuthSessionLoader(validator))
}
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewStoredSessionLoader(&middleware.StoredSessionLoaderOptions{
SessionStore: sessionStore,
RefreshPeriod: opts.Cookie.Refresh,
RefreshSessionIfNeeded: opts.GetProvider().RefreshSessionIfNeeded,
ValidateSessionState: opts.GetProvider().ValidateSessionState,
}))
return chain
}
// GetRedirectURI returns the redirectURL that the upstream OAuth Provider will
// redirect clients to once authenticated
func (p *OAuthProxy) GetRedirectURI(host string) string {
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// default to the request Host if not set
if p.redirectURL.Host != "" {
return p.redirectURL.String()
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}
u := *p.redirectURL
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if u.Scheme == "" {
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if p.CookieSecure {
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u.Scheme = httpsScheme
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} else {
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u.Scheme = httpScheme
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}
}
u.Host = host
return u.String()
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) redeemCode(ctx context.Context, host, code string) (s *sessionsapi.SessionState, err error) {
if code == "" {
return nil, errors.New("missing code")
}
redirectURI := p.GetRedirectURI(host)
s, err = p.provider.Redeem(ctx, redirectURI, code)
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if err != nil {
return
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}
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if s.Email == "" {
s.Email, err = p.provider.GetEmailAddress(ctx, s)
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}
if s.PreferredUsername == "" {
s.PreferredUsername, err = p.provider.GetPreferredUsername(ctx, s)
if err != nil && err.Error() == "not implemented" {
err = nil
}
}
if s.User == "" {
s.User, err = p.provider.GetUserName(ctx, s)
if err != nil && err.Error() == "not implemented" {
err = nil
}
}
return
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}
// MakeCSRFCookie creates a cookie for CSRF
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func (p *OAuthProxy) MakeCSRFCookie(req *http.Request, value string, expiration time.Duration, now time.Time) *http.Cookie {
return p.makeCookie(req, p.CSRFCookieName, value, expiration, now)
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) makeCookie(req *http.Request, name string, value string, expiration time.Duration, now time.Time) *http.Cookie {
cookieDomain := cookies.GetCookieDomain(req, p.CookieDomains)
if cookieDomain != "" {
domain := cookies.GetRequestHost(req)
if h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(domain); err == nil {
domain = h
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(domain, cookieDomain) {
logger.Printf("Warning: request host is %q but using configured cookie domain of %q", domain, cookieDomain)
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}
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}
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return &http.Cookie{
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Name: name,
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Value: value,
Path: p.CookiePath,
Domain: cookieDomain,
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HttpOnly: p.CookieHTTPOnly,
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Secure: p.CookieSecure,
Expires: now.Add(expiration),
SameSite: cookies.ParseSameSite(p.CookieSameSite),
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}
}
// ClearCSRFCookie creates a cookie to unset the CSRF cookie stored in the user's
// session
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func (p *OAuthProxy) ClearCSRFCookie(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
http.SetCookie(rw, p.MakeCSRFCookie(req, "", time.Hour*-1, time.Now()))
}
// SetCSRFCookie adds a CSRF cookie to the response
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func (p *OAuthProxy) SetCSRFCookie(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, val string) {
http.SetCookie(rw, p.MakeCSRFCookie(req, val, p.CookieExpire, time.Now()))
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}
// ClearSessionCookie creates a cookie to unset the user's authentication cookie
// stored in the user's session
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func (p *OAuthProxy) ClearSessionCookie(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) error {
return p.sessionStore.Clear(rw, req)
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}
// LoadCookiedSession reads the user's authentication details from the request
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func (p *OAuthProxy) LoadCookiedSession(req *http.Request) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
return p.sessionStore.Load(req)
}
// SaveSession creates a new session cookie value and sets this on the response
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func (p *OAuthProxy) SaveSession(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) error {
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return p.sessionStore.Save(rw, req, s)
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}
// RobotsTxt disallows scraping pages from the OAuthProxy
func (p *OAuthProxy) RobotsTxt(rw http.ResponseWriter) {
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprintf(rw, "User-agent: *\nDisallow: /")
}
// ErrorPage writes an error response
func (p *OAuthProxy) ErrorPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, code int, title string, message string) {
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rw.WriteHeader(code)
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t := struct {
Title string
Message string
ProxyPrefix string
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}{
Title: fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", code, title),
Message: message,
ProxyPrefix: p.ProxyPrefix,
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}
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p.templates.ExecuteTemplate(rw, "error.html", t)
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}
// SignInPage writes the sing in template to the response
func (p *OAuthProxy) SignInPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, code int) {
prepareNoCache(rw)
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p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
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rw.WriteHeader(code)
redirectURL, err := p.GetRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error obtaining redirect: %s", err.Error())
p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", err.Error())
return
}
if redirectURL == p.SignInPath {
redirectURL = "/"
}
t := struct {
ProviderName string
SignInMessage template.HTML
CustomLogin bool
Redirect string
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Version string
ProxyPrefix string
Footer template.HTML
}{
ProviderName: p.provider.Data().ProviderName,
SignInMessage: template.HTML(p.SignInMessage),
CustomLogin: p.displayHtpasswdForm,
Redirect: redirectURL,
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Version: VERSION,
ProxyPrefix: p.ProxyPrefix,
Footer: template.HTML(p.Footer),
}
if p.providerNameOverride != "" {
t.ProviderName = p.providerNameOverride
}
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p.templates.ExecuteTemplate(rw, "sign_in.html", t)
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}
// ManualSignIn handles basic auth logins to the proxy
func (p *OAuthProxy) ManualSignIn(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (string, bool) {
if req.Method != "POST" || p.basicAuthValidator == nil {
return "", false
}
user := req.FormValue("username")
passwd := req.FormValue("password")
if user == "" {
return "", false
}
// check auth
if p.basicAuthValidator.Validate(user, passwd) {
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logger.PrintAuthf(user, req, logger.AuthSuccess, "Authenticated via HtpasswdFile")
return user, true
}
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logger.PrintAuthf(user, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via HtpasswdFile")
return "", false
}
// GetRedirect reads the query parameter to get the URL to redirect clients to
// once authenticated with the OAuthProxy
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func (p *OAuthProxy) GetRedirect(req *http.Request) (redirect string, err error) {
err = req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
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return
}
redirect = req.Header.Get("X-Auth-Request-Redirect")
if req.Form.Get("rd") != "" {
redirect = req.Form.Get("rd")
}
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if !p.IsValidRedirect(redirect) {
redirect = req.URL.Path
if strings.HasPrefix(redirect, p.ProxyPrefix) {
redirect = "/"
}
}
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return
}
// splitHostPort separates host and port. If the port is not valid, it returns
// the entire input as host, and it doesn't check the validity of the host.
// Unlike net.SplitHostPort, but per RFC 3986, it requires ports to be numeric.
// *** taken from net/url, modified validOptionalPort() to accept ":*"
func splitHostPort(hostport string) (host, port string) {
host = hostport
colon := strings.LastIndexByte(host, ':')
if colon != -1 && validOptionalPort(host[colon:]) {
host, port = host[:colon], host[colon+1:]
}
if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
host = host[1 : len(host)-1]
}
return
}
// validOptionalPort reports whether port is either an empty string
// or matches /^:\d*$/
// *** taken from net/url, modified to accept ":*"
func validOptionalPort(port string) bool {
if port == "" || port == ":*" {
return true
}
if port[0] != ':' {
return false
}
for _, b := range port[1:] {
if b < '0' || b > '9' {
return false
}
}
return true
}
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// IsValidRedirect checks whether the redirect URL is whitelisted
func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {
switch {
case redirect == "":
// The user didn't specify a redirect, should fallback to `/`
return false
case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//") && !invalidRedirectRegex.MatchString(redirect):
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return true
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case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "https://"):
redirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Rejecting invalid redirect %q: scheme unsupported or missing", redirect)
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return false
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}
redirectHostname := redirectURL.Hostname()
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for _, domain := range p.whitelistDomains {
domainHostname, domainPort := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, "."))
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if domainHostname == "" {
continue
}
if (redirectHostname == domainHostname) || (strings.HasPrefix(domain, ".") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) {
// the domain names match, now validate the ports
// if the whitelisted domain's port is '*', allow all ports
// if the whitelisted domain contains a specific port, only allow that port
// if the whitelisted domain doesn't contain a port at all, only allow empty redirect ports ie http and https
redirectPort := redirectURL.Port()
if (domainPort == "*") ||
(domainPort == redirectPort) ||
(domainPort == "" && redirectPort == "") {
return true
}
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}
}
logger.Printf("Rejecting invalid redirect %q: domain / port not in whitelist", redirect)
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return false
default:
logger.Printf("Rejecting invalid redirect %q: not an absolute or relative URL", redirect)
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return false
}
}
// IsWhitelistedRequest is used to check if auth should be skipped for this request
func (p *OAuthProxy) IsWhitelistedRequest(req *http.Request) bool {
isPreflightRequestAllowed := p.skipAuthPreflight && req.Method == "OPTIONS"
Implements --trusted-ip option (#552) * Implements --ip-whitelist option * Included IPWhitelist option to allow one-or-more selected CIDR ranges to bypass OAuth2 authentication. * Adds IPWhitelist, a fast lookup table for multiple CIDR ranges. * Renamed IPWhitelist ipCIDRSet * Fixed unessesary pointer usage in ipCIDRSet * Update CHANGELOG.md * Update CHANGELOG.md * Updated to not use err.Error() in printf statements * Imrpoved language for --ip-whitelist descriptions. * Improve IP whitelist options error messages * Clarify options single-host normalization * Wrote a book about ipCIDRSet * Added comment to IsWhitelistedIP in oauthproxy.go * Rewrite oauthproxy test case as table driven * oops * Support whitelisting by low-level remote address * Added more test-cases, improved descriptions * Move ip_cidr_set.go to pkg/ip/net_set.go * Add more whitelist test use cases. * Oops * Use subtests for TestIPWhitelist * Add minimal tests for ip.NetSet * Use switch statment * Renamed ip-whitelist to whitelist-ip * Update documentation with a warning. * Update pkg/apis/options/options.go * Update CHANGELOG.md Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix fmt * Move ParseIPNet into abstraction * Add warning in case of --reverse-proxy * Update pkg/validation/options_test.go * Rename --whitelist-ip to --trusted-ip * Update oauthproxy.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2020-07-11 12:10:58 +02:00
return isPreflightRequestAllowed || p.IsWhitelistedPath(req.URL.Path) || p.IsTrustedIP(req)
}
// IsWhitelistedPath is used to check if the request path is allowed without auth
func (p *OAuthProxy) IsWhitelistedPath(path string) bool {
for _, u := range p.compiledRegex {
if u.MatchString(path) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// See https://developers.google.com/web/fundamentals/performance/optimizing-content-efficiency/http-caching?hl=en
var noCacheHeaders = map[string]string{
"Expires": time.Unix(0, 0).Format(time.RFC1123),
"Cache-Control": "no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, max-age=0",
"X-Accel-Expires": "0", // https://www.nginx.com/resources/wiki/start/topics/examples/x-accel/
}
// prepareNoCache prepares headers for preventing browser caching.
func prepareNoCache(w http.ResponseWriter) {
// Set NoCache headers
for k, v := range noCacheHeaders {
w.Header().Set(k, v)
}
}
Implements --trusted-ip option (#552) * Implements --ip-whitelist option * Included IPWhitelist option to allow one-or-more selected CIDR ranges to bypass OAuth2 authentication. * Adds IPWhitelist, a fast lookup table for multiple CIDR ranges. * Renamed IPWhitelist ipCIDRSet * Fixed unessesary pointer usage in ipCIDRSet * Update CHANGELOG.md * Update CHANGELOG.md * Updated to not use err.Error() in printf statements * Imrpoved language for --ip-whitelist descriptions. * Improve IP whitelist options error messages * Clarify options single-host normalization * Wrote a book about ipCIDRSet * Added comment to IsWhitelistedIP in oauthproxy.go * Rewrite oauthproxy test case as table driven * oops * Support whitelisting by low-level remote address * Added more test-cases, improved descriptions * Move ip_cidr_set.go to pkg/ip/net_set.go * Add more whitelist test use cases. * Oops * Use subtests for TestIPWhitelist * Add minimal tests for ip.NetSet * Use switch statment * Renamed ip-whitelist to whitelist-ip * Update documentation with a warning. * Update pkg/apis/options/options.go * Update CHANGELOG.md Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix fmt * Move ParseIPNet into abstraction * Add warning in case of --reverse-proxy * Update pkg/validation/options_test.go * Rename --whitelist-ip to --trusted-ip * Update oauthproxy.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2020-07-11 12:10:58 +02:00
// IsTrustedIP is used to check if a request comes from a trusted client IP address.
func (p *OAuthProxy) IsTrustedIP(req *http.Request) bool {
if p.trustedIPs == nil {
return false
}
remoteAddr, err := ip.GetClientIP(p.realClientIPParser, req)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error obtaining real IP for trusted IP list: %v", err)
// Possibly spoofed X-Real-IP header
return false
}
if remoteAddr == nil {
return false
}
return p.trustedIPs.Has(remoteAddr)
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
if req.URL.Path != p.AuthOnlyPath && strings.HasPrefix(req.URL.Path, p.ProxyPrefix) {
prepareNoCache(rw)
}
switch path := req.URL.Path; {
case path == p.RobotsPath:
p.RobotsTxt(rw)
case p.IsWhitelistedRequest(req):
p.SkipAuthProxy(rw, req)
case path == p.SignInPath:
p.SignIn(rw, req)
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case path == p.SignOutPath:
p.SignOut(rw, req)
case path == p.OAuthStartPath:
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
case path == p.OAuthCallbackPath:
p.OAuthCallback(rw, req)
case path == p.AuthOnlyPath:
p.AuthenticateOnly(rw, req)
case path == p.UserInfoPath:
p.UserInfo(rw, req)
default:
p.Proxy(rw, req)
}
}
// SignIn serves a page prompting users to sign in
func (p *OAuthProxy) SignIn(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
redirect, err := p.GetRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error obtaining redirect: %s", err.Error())
p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", err.Error())
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return
}
user, ok := p.ManualSignIn(rw, req)
if ok {
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session := &sessionsapi.SessionState{User: user}
p.SaveSession(rw, req, session)
http.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, http.StatusFound)
} else {
if p.SkipProviderButton {
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
} else {
p.SignInPage(rw, req, http.StatusOK)
}
}
}
//UserInfo endpoint outputs session email and preferred username in JSON format
func (p *OAuthProxy) UserInfo(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
if err != nil {
http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusUnauthorized), http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
userInfo := struct {
Email string `json:"email"`
PreferredUsername string `json:"preferredUsername,omitempty"`
}{
Email: session.Email,
PreferredUsername: session.PreferredUsername,
}
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
json.NewEncoder(rw).Encode(userInfo)
}
// SignOut sends a response to clear the authentication cookie
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func (p *OAuthProxy) SignOut(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
redirect, err := p.GetRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error obtaining redirect: %s", err.Error())
p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", err.Error())
return
}
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p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
http.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, http.StatusFound)
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}
// OAuthStart starts the OAuth2 authentication flow
func (p *OAuthProxy) OAuthStart(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
prepareNoCache(rw)
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nonce, err := encryption.Nonce()
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if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error obtaining nonce: %s", err.Error())
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p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", err.Error())
return
}
p.SetCSRFCookie(rw, req, nonce)
redirect, err := p.GetRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error obtaining redirect: %s", err.Error())
p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", err.Error())
return
}
redirectURI := p.GetRedirectURI(req.Host)
http.Redirect(rw, req, p.provider.GetLoginURL(redirectURI, fmt.Sprintf("%v:%v", nonce, redirect)), http.StatusFound)
}
// OAuthCallback is the OAuth2 authentication flow callback that finishes the
// OAuth2 authentication flow
func (p *OAuthProxy) OAuthCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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remoteAddr := ip.GetClientString(p.realClientIPParser, req, true)
// finish the oauth cycle
err := req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
2019-02-10 19:01:13 +02:00
logger.Printf("Error while parsing OAuth2 callback: %s" + err.Error())
p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", err.Error())
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return
}
errorString := req.Form.Get("error")
if errorString != "" {
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logger.Printf("Error while parsing OAuth2 callback: %s ", errorString)
p.ErrorPage(rw, 403, "Permission Denied", errorString)
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return
}
session, err := p.redeemCode(req.Context(), req.Host, req.Form.Get("code"))
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error redeeming code during OAuth2 callback: %s ", err.Error())
p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", "Internal Error")
return
}
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s := strings.SplitN(req.Form.Get("state"), ":", 2)
if len(s) != 2 {
2019-04-23 18:36:18 +02:00
logger.Printf("Error while parsing OAuth2 state: invalid length")
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p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", "Invalid State")
return
}
nonce := s[0]
redirect := s[1]
c, err := req.Cookie(p.CSRFCookieName)
if err != nil {
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logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: unable too obtain CSRF cookie")
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p.ErrorPage(rw, 403, "Permission Denied", err.Error())
return
}
p.ClearCSRFCookie(rw, req)
if c.Value != nonce {
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logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: csrf token mismatch, potential attack")
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p.ErrorPage(rw, 403, "Permission Denied", "csrf failed")
return
}
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if !p.IsValidRedirect(redirect) {
redirect = "/"
}
// set cookie, or deny
if p.Validator(session.Email) && p.provider.ValidateGroup(session.Email) {
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logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthSuccess, "Authenticated via OAuth2: %s", session)
err := p.SaveSession(rw, req, session)
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if err != nil {
logger.Printf("%s %s", remoteAddr, err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, 500, "Internal Error", "Internal Error")
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return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, http.StatusFound)
} else {
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: unauthorized")
p.ErrorPage(rw, 403, "Permission Denied", "Invalid Account")
}
}
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// AuthenticateOnly checks whether the user is currently logged in
func (p *OAuthProxy) AuthenticateOnly(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
if err != nil {
http.Error(rw, "unauthorized request", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// we are authenticated
p.addHeadersForProxying(rw, req, session)
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
}
// SkipAuthProxy proxies whitelisted requests and skips authentication
func (p *OAuthProxy) SkipAuthProxy(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
if p.skipAuthStripHeaders {
p.stripAuthHeaders(req)
}
p.serveMux.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
}
// Proxy proxies the user request if the user is authenticated else it prompts
// them to authenticate
func (p *OAuthProxy) Proxy(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
switch err {
case nil:
// we are authenticated
p.addHeadersForProxying(rw, req, session)
p.serveMux.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
case ErrNeedsLogin:
// we need to send the user to a login screen
if isAjax(req) {
// no point redirecting an AJAX request
p.ErrorJSON(rw, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
if p.SkipProviderButton {
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
} else {
p.SignInPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden)
}
default:
// unknown error
logger.Printf("Unexpected internal error: %s", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, http.StatusInternalServerError,
"Internal Error", "Internal Error")
}
}
// getAuthenticatedSession checks whether a user is authenticated and returns a session object and nil error if so
// Returns nil, ErrNeedsLogin if user needs to login.
// Set-Cookie headers may be set on the response as a side-effect of calling this method.
func (p *OAuthProxy) getAuthenticatedSession(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
var session *sessionsapi.SessionState
2020-07-18 01:42:51 +02:00
getSession := p.sessionChain.Then(http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session = middleware.GetRequestScope(req).Session
}))
getSession.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
if session == nil {
2020-07-18 01:42:51 +02:00
return nil, ErrNeedsLogin
}
if session != nil && session.Email != "" && !p.Validator(session.Email) {
logger.Printf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via session: removing session %s", session)
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// Invalid session, clear it
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p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
return nil, ErrNeedsLogin
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}
return session, nil
}
// addHeadersForProxying adds the appropriate headers the request / response for proxying
func (p *OAuthProxy) addHeadersForProxying(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, session *sessionsapi.SessionState) {
2014-11-09 21:51:10 +02:00
if p.PassBasicAuth {
if p.PreferEmailToUser && session.Email != "" {
req.SetBasicAuth(session.Email, p.BasicAuthPassword)
req.Header["X-Forwarded-User"] = []string{session.Email}
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Email")
} else {
req.SetBasicAuth(session.User, p.BasicAuthPassword)
req.Header["X-Forwarded-User"] = []string{session.User}
if session.Email != "" {
req.Header["X-Forwarded-Email"] = []string{session.Email}
} else {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Email")
}
}
if session.PreferredUsername != "" {
req.Header["X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username"] = []string{session.PreferredUsername}
} else {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username")
}
2012-12-11 04:59:23 +03:00
}
if p.PassUserHeaders {
if p.PreferEmailToUser && session.Email != "" {
req.Header["X-Forwarded-User"] = []string{session.Email}
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Email")
} else {
req.Header["X-Forwarded-User"] = []string{session.User}
if session.Email != "" {
req.Header["X-Forwarded-Email"] = []string{session.Email}
} else {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Email")
}
}
if session.PreferredUsername != "" {
req.Header["X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username"] = []string{session.PreferredUsername}
} else {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username")
}
}
if p.SetXAuthRequest {
rw.Header().Set("X-Auth-Request-User", session.User)
if session.Email != "" {
rw.Header().Set("X-Auth-Request-Email", session.Email)
} else {
rw.Header().Del("X-Auth-Request-Email")
}
if session.PreferredUsername != "" {
rw.Header().Set("X-Auth-Request-Preferred-Username", session.PreferredUsername)
} else {
rw.Header().Del("X-Auth-Request-Preferred-Username")
}
if p.PassAccessToken {
if session.AccessToken != "" {
rw.Header().Set("X-Auth-Request-Access-Token", session.AccessToken)
} else {
rw.Header().Del("X-Auth-Request-Access-Token")
}
}
}
if p.PassAccessToken {
if session.AccessToken != "" {
req.Header["X-Forwarded-Access-Token"] = []string{session.AccessToken}
} else {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Access-Token")
}
}
if p.PassAuthorization {
if session.IDToken != "" {
req.Header["Authorization"] = []string{fmt.Sprintf("Bearer %s", session.IDToken)}
} else {
req.Header.Del("Authorization")
}
2018-01-27 12:14:19 +02:00
}
if p.SetBasicAuth {
switch {
case p.PreferEmailToUser && session.Email != "":
authVal := b64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(session.Email + ":" + p.BasicAuthPassword))
rw.Header().Set("Authorization", "Basic "+authVal)
case session.User != "":
authVal := b64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(session.User + ":" + p.BasicAuthPassword))
rw.Header().Set("Authorization", "Basic "+authVal)
default:
rw.Header().Del("Authorization")
}
}
if p.SetAuthorization {
if session.IDToken != "" {
rw.Header().Set("Authorization", fmt.Sprintf("Bearer %s", session.IDToken))
} else {
rw.Header().Del("Authorization")
}
2018-01-27 12:14:19 +02:00
}
if session.Email == "" {
rw.Header().Set("GAP-Auth", session.User)
} else {
rw.Header().Set("GAP-Auth", session.Email)
}
2012-12-11 04:59:23 +03:00
}
// stripAuthHeaders removes Auth headers for whitelisted routes from skipAuthRegex
func (p *OAuthProxy) stripAuthHeaders(req *http.Request) {
if p.PassBasicAuth {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-User")
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Email")
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username")
req.Header.Del("Authorization")
}
if p.PassUserHeaders {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-User")
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Email")
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username")
}
if p.PassAccessToken {
req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Access-Token")
}
if p.PassAuthorization {
req.Header.Del("Authorization")
}
}
// isAjax checks if a request is an ajax request
func isAjax(req *http.Request) bool {
acceptValues := req.Header.Values("Accept")
const ajaxReq = applicationJSON
for _, v := range acceptValues {
if v == ajaxReq {
return true
}
}
return false
}
2019-08-13 12:42:23 +02:00
// ErrorJSON returns the error code with an application/json mime type
func (p *OAuthProxy) ErrorJSON(rw http.ResponseWriter, code int) {
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", applicationJSON)
rw.WriteHeader(code)
}