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Don't raise rate limit exception on hit(), only on check()
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@ -33,5 +33,4 @@ class Limiter:
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# disable limits for internal requests (e.g. from webmail)?
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if rate_limit_subnet==False and ipaddress.ip_address(clientip) in self.subnet:
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return
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if not self.limiter.hit(self.rate,"client-ip",clientip):
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raise RateLimitExceeded()
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self.limiter.hit(self.rate,"client-ip",clientip)
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@ -38,8 +38,14 @@ recommended to setup a generic value and later configure a mail alias for that
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address.
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The ``AUTH_RATELIMIT`` holds a security setting for fighting attackers that
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try to guess user passwords. The value is the limit of requests that a single
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IP address can perform against IMAP, POP and SMTP authentication endpoints.
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try to guess user passwords. The value is the limit of failed authentication attempts
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that a single IP address can perform against IMAP, POP and SMTP authentication endpoints.
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If ``AUTH_RATELIMIT_SUBNET`` is ``True`` (which is the default), the ``AUTH_RATELIMIT``
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rules does also apply to auth requests coming from ``SUBNET``, especially for the webmail.
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If you disable this, ensure that the rate limit on the webmail is enforced in a different
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way (e.g. roundcube plug-in), otherwise an attacker can simply bypass the limit using webmail.
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The ``TLS_FLAVOR`` sets how Mailu handles TLS connections. Setting this value to
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``notls`` will cause Mailu not to server any web content! More on :ref:`tls_flavor`.
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