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avformat/mov: validate APV access unit length before passing to decoder
libavformat/mov.c read the APV AU length field directly from the
sample without sanity-checking against the remaining sample size or
a documented maximum. The patch validates that au_size is bounded by
the remaining sample bytes and that the AU envelope (4 bytes plus
au_size) fits inside the declared sample size.
Validate the access unit length at the demuxer boundary so that the
decoder is not handed an attacker-controllable buffer size. Returns
AVERROR_INVALIDDATA on the bound failure with an explicit log line.
Found-by: Claude (Anthropic). Human-verified and reported by
Omkhar Arasaratnam <omkhar@linkedin.com>.
Signed-off-by: Omkhar Arasaratnam <omkhar@linkedin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 387ad6d102)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Michael Niedermayer
parent
d86d43a5e7
commit
2d0bdf26af
@@ -11272,6 +11272,12 @@ static int mov_read_packet(AVFormatContext *s, AVPacket *pkt)
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#endif
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else if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_APV && sample->size > 4) {
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const uint32_t au_size = avio_rb32(sc->pb);
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if (au_size > sample->size - 4) {
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av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR,
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"APV au_size %u exceeds sample body %d\n",
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au_size, sample->size - 4);
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return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
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}
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ret = av_get_packet(sc->pb, pkt, au_size);
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} else
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ret = av_get_packet(sc->pb, pkt, sample->size);
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