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avformat/mov: validate APV access unit length before passing to decoder

libavformat/mov.c read the APV AU length field directly from the
sample without sanity-checking against the remaining sample size or
a documented maximum. The patch validates that au_size is bounded by
the remaining sample bytes and that the AU envelope (4 bytes plus
au_size) fits inside the declared sample size.

Validate the access unit length at the demuxer boundary so that the
decoder is not handed an attacker-controllable buffer size. Returns
AVERROR_INVALIDDATA on the bound failure with an explicit log line.

Found-by: Claude (Anthropic). Human-verified and reported by
Omkhar Arasaratnam <omkhar@linkedin.com>.
Signed-off-by: Omkhar Arasaratnam <omkhar@linkedin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 387ad6d102)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
This commit is contained in:
Omkhar Arasaratnam
2026-05-25 04:47:27 +02:00
committed by Michael Niedermayer
parent d86d43a5e7
commit 2d0bdf26af
+6
View File
@@ -11272,6 +11272,12 @@ static int mov_read_packet(AVFormatContext *s, AVPacket *pkt)
#endif
else if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_APV && sample->size > 4) {
const uint32_t au_size = avio_rb32(sc->pb);
if (au_size > sample->size - 4) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"APV au_size %u exceeds sample body %d\n",
au_size, sample->size - 4);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
ret = av_get_packet(sc->pb, pkt, au_size);
} else
ret = av_get_packet(sc->pb, pkt, sample->size);