note that the spec actually disallows the 0 case too but we are
a little lenient here so the full 24bit twos-complement range can be handled
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 7ae36ceba9)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: DFVULN-694
*Reporter: Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 43a0715e30)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
This avoids an unsigned integer underflow and passing that large value to ff_read_riff_info()
(cherry picked from commit 2678bce860)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Reject INFO list chunks that are too small to contain the expected
4-byte list type field before calling ff_read_riff_info().
The parser subtracts 4 from the list size when handing the remaining
payload to ff_read_riff_info(). If the chunk is smaller than 4 bytes,
that underflows the expected structure and should be treated as invalid
input.
Fixes: DFVULN-607
*Vulnerability reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
*Patch validated by Zheng Yu at depthfirst*
(cherry picked from commit f1c3f1cae1)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: poc_matroska.mkv
This issue requires manually increasing the malloc limit
(-max_alloc 4294967296)
Found-by: Guanni Qu <qguanni@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit f47ca0a5e6)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Add a per-block bounds check at the start of each XOR block so the
read is rejected before src crosses decomp_len, and propagate the
error from decode_frame().
Fixes: out of array read
Found-by: Seung Min Shin
(cherry picked from commit 2a991a3475)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Use a separate scratch buffer (s->mv_scratch) for the type-0 pixel
copy so s->delta and mc are not disturbed for the lifetime of
decode_move(). The new buffer is freed in decode_close().
Found-by: Seung Min Shin
Patch based on suggsted fix by Seung Min Shin
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 2f60af465a)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Reject AU header sections with a signaled length of zero in
rtp_parse_mp4_au().
The AU-headers-length field specifies the length in bits of the AU header
section that immediately follows. A zero-length section is not useful input
for this parser and can lead to invalid downstream state, so reject it
up front together with oversized values.
*Vulnerability reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
*Patch validated by Zheng Yu at depthfirst*
Fixes: OOB read
(cherry picked from commit 8010aa2193)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Negative -map processing iterates previously parsed stream map entries
and dereferences input_files[m->file_index]->ctx->streams[m->stream_index]
without validating that stream_index is in range.
A malformed earlier map can leave m->stream_index negative, which causes
an out-of-bounds read when a later negative map walks existing entries.
Check that stream_index is non-negative and below nb_streams before
calling stream_specifier_match().
*Vulnerability reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
*Patch validated by Zheng Yu at depthfirst*
Fixes: DFVULN-695
(cherry picked from commit 25a98586cc)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Reject truncated compressed SWF input before attempting to read the
8-byte header in rtmp_calc_swfhash().
Compressed SWF data identified by the "CWS" signature must be at least
8 bytes long to contain the fixed header. Bail out early when the input
is shorter to avoid operating on malformed data.
*Vulnerability reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
*Patch validated by Zheng Yu at depthfirst*
Fixes: DFVULN-612
(cherry picked from commit 52b78cd3fe)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Guard against empty string before reading the last byte in control_url.
When parsing relative a=control: paths, if no base control URL was set,
the code would access control_url[strlen(control_url)-1] which on an
empty string causes a size_t underflow and out-of-bounds read.
Now compute the length first and check for len == 0 before array access.
*Vulnerability reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
*Patch validated by Zheng Yu at depthfirst*
Fixes: DFVULN-611
(cherry picked from commit 1a00ea51cb)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
latm_parse_packet() accumulated attacker-controlled AU length bytes in
a signed int and later checked data->pos + cur_len against data->len.
That addition could overflow, allowing malformed packets to bypass the
bounds check and drive memcpy() far past the end of the LATM buffer.
Reject length-byte accumulation that would exceed the remaining packet
size, and compare cur_len against the remaining buffer space using
subtraction so the bounds check cannot overflow.
Fixes: DFVULN-610
*Vulnerability reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
*Patch validated by Zheng Yu at depthfirst*
(cherry picked from commit 664d44a825)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
this rejects packets whose claimed decompressed frame would require a deflate ratio beyond the format's theoretical 1032:1 limit
Fixes: Timeout
Fixes: 474457186/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_PDV_fuzzer-5366108782919680
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit b801f1fe6d)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: out of array access
Found-by: Seung Min Shin
Patch based on suggested fix by Seung Min Shin
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 242ff799c7)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
av_index_search_timestamp() returns a negative value when a seek target
cannot be resolved from the stream index. Bail out before using that
result as an index into sti->index_entries to avoid out-of-bounds reads.
Fixes: Buffer underflow
Fixes: DFVULN-608
*Vulnerability reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
*Patch validated by Zheng Yu at depthfirst*
(cherry picked from commit 5408059eb7)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 605/pc.py
Based-on patch by depthfirst
*Reporter: Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
(cherry picked from commit 91d29be49a)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Clarify what is checked and that it avoids explicit generic overflow checks
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 9572ab7f45)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
We do want to limit an attackers ability to change once parsed structures.
So once extradata (or another array) is finished and possibly has been used we do not
want to allow an attacker to change it.
This reduces the attack surface
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 7c67748537)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
in mov_read_dops, `size` bytes is allocated for
`st->codecpar->extradata`, but ff_alloc_extradata doesn't memset, so the
contents of that buffer are just old heap data. If `avio_read` reads
fewer bytes than were requested, uninitialized data can still be left in
the extradata buffer, which is operated on by AV_WL16A and AV_WL32A.
I think the best solution here is to just check the read size and ensure
it's filling the extradata buffer in it's entirety, or erroring out if
there isn't enough data left.
(cherry picked from commit 53cd2c9f2a)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
rtsp_read_announce() treated any non-zero Content-Length as valid,
including negative values parsed via strtol(). This could send invalid
sizes into allocation, body reads and trailing NUL writes.
Accept only strictly positive SDP body lengths and reject invalid
Content-Length values with AVERROR_INVALIDDATA.
Found-by: Seung Min Shin (was reported to us on 10th April)
CC: 신승민 <guncraft2000@naver.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit eec78bdac1)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes ticket #22890.
The ff_hls_senc_parse_audio_setup_info function passes setup_data to
parsers like avpriv_ac3_parse_header and init_get_bits8 which require
the buffer to be padded with AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE bytes at the end.
(cherry picked from commit 71d5fa8d4d)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Switch to av_calloc and check the allocation.
Fix#22867
(cherry picked from commit 69072fe8d8)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
We reject inputs that are significantly smaller than the smallest frame.
This check raises the minimum input needed before time consuming computations are performed
it thus improves the computation per input byte and reduces the potential DoS impact
Fixes: Timeout
Fixes: 472769364/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_SVQ1_DEC_fuzzer-5519737145851904
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit d538a71ad5)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: BMO#2029296
Found-by: Mozilla Security Team, Paul Adenot for the write variant
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 6c114bd6fa)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
tape_length * 8 overflows 32-bit int for large input widths. Then
av_malloc_array() allocates a tiny buffer while the subsequent
loop writes tape_length*8 BilinearMap entries, causing
heap-buffer-overflow.
Validate the value in float before converting to int and left
shifting, to avoid both float-to-int and signed left shift
overflow UB. Also split av_malloc_array() arguments to avoid
the multiplication overflow.
Fixes: #21511
Signed-off-by: Zhao Zhili <zhilizhao@tencent.com>
(cherry picked from commit b62ae766c1)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Multiple demuxers call avio_read() without checking its return
value. When input is truncated, destination buffers remain
uninitialized but are still used for offset calculations, memcmp,
and metadata handling. This results in undefined behavior
(detectable with Valgrind/MSan).
Fix this by checking the return value of avio_read() in:
- dss.c: dss_read_seek() — check before using header buffer
- dtshddec.c: FILEINFO chunk — check before using value buffer
- mlvdec.c: check_file_header() — check before memcmp on version
Fixes: #21520
(cherry picked from commit 65eed0732c)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
James Almer
Vann Harl
Michael Niedermayer
depthfirst-dev[bot]
Marius Momeu
Flavio Milan
Kacper Michajłow
ASTRA
Ted Meyer
AdityaTeltia
Marvin Scholz
Paul Adenot
Zhao Zhili
Sankalpa Sarkar
Priyanshu Thapliyal