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oauth2-proxy/oauthproxy.go

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package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
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"errors"
"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"os/signal"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
"syscall"
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"time"
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"github.com/gorilla/mux"
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"github.com/justinas/alice"
ipapi "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/apis/ip"
middlewareapi "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/apis/middleware"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/apis/options"
sessionsapi "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/apis/sessions"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/app/pagewriter"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/app/redirect"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/authentication/basic"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/cookies"
PKCE Support (#1541) * Add the allowed_email_domains and the allowed_groups on the auth_request endpoint + support standard wildcard char for validation with sub-domain and email-domain. Signed-off-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> * Fix provider data initialisation * PKCE Support Adds Code Challenge PKCE support (RFC-7636) and partial Authorization Server Metadata (RFC-8414) for detecting PKCE support. - Introduces new option `--force-code-challenge-method` to force a specific code challenge method (either `S256` or `plain`) for instances when the server has not implemented RFC-8414 in order to detect PKCE support on the discovery document. - In all other cases, if the PKCE support can be determined during discovery then the `code_challenge_methods_supported` is used and S256 is always preferred. - The force command line argument is helpful with some providers like Azure who supports PKCE but does not list it in their discovery document yet. - Initial thought was given to just always attempt PKCE since according to spec additional URL parameters should be dropped by servers which implemented OAuth 2, however other projects found cases in the wild where this causes 500 errors by buggy implementations. See: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/pull/7804#issuecomment-578323810 - Due to the fact that the `code_verifier` must be saved between the redirect and callback, sessions are now created when the redirect takes place with `Authenticated: false`. The session will be recreated and marked as `Authenticated` on callback. - Individual provider implementations can choose to include or ignore code_challenge and code_verifier function parameters passed to them Note: Technically speaking `plain` is not required to be implemented since oauth2-proxy will always be able to handle S256 and servers MUST implement S256 support. > If the client is capable of using "S256", it MUST use "S256", as "S256" > is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are permitted > to use "plain" only if they cannot support "S256" for some technical > reason and know via out-of-band configuration that the server supports > "plain". Ref: RFC-7636 Sec 4.2 oauth2-proxy will always use S256 unless the user explicitly forces `plain`. Fixes #1361 * Address PR comments by moving pkce generation * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Encrypt CodeVerifier in CSRF Token instead of Session - Update Dex for PKCE support - Expose HTTPBin for further use cases * Correct the tests * Move code challenges into extra params * Correct typo in code challenge method Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Correct the extra space in docs Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Address changelog and new line nits * Add generated docs Co-authored-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
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"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/encryption"
proxyhttp "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/http"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/util"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/ip"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/logger"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/middleware"
requestutil "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/requests/util"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/sessions"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/pkg/upstream"
"github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7/providers"
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)
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const (
schemeHTTP = "http"
schemeHTTPS = "https"
applicationJSON = "application/json"
robotsPath = "/robots.txt"
signInPath = "/sign_in"
signOutPath = "/sign_out"
oauthStartPath = "/start"
oauthCallbackPath = "/callback"
authOnlyPath = "/auth"
userInfoPath = "/userinfo"
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)
var (
// ErrNeedsLogin means the user should be redirected to the login page
ErrNeedsLogin = errors.New("redirect to login page")
// ErrAccessDenied means the user should receive a 401 Unauthorized response
ErrAccessDenied = errors.New("access denied")
)
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// allowedRoute manages method + path based allowlists
type allowedRoute struct {
method string
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negate bool
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pathRegex *regexp.Regexp
}
type apiRoute struct {
pathRegex *regexp.Regexp
}
// OAuthProxy is the main authentication proxy
type OAuthProxy struct {
CookieOptions *options.Cookie
Validator func(string) bool
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SignInPath string
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allowedRoutes []allowedRoute
apiRoutes []apiRoute
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redirectURL *url.URL // the url to receive requests at
whitelistDomains []string
provider providers.Provider
sessionStore sessionsapi.SessionStore
ProxyPrefix string
basicAuthValidator basic.Validator
basicAuthGroups []string
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SkipProviderButton bool
skipAuthPreflight bool
skipJwtBearerTokens bool
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forceJSONErrors bool
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realClientIPParser ipapi.RealClientIPParser
trustedIPs *ip.NetSet
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sessionChain alice.Chain
headersChain alice.Chain
preAuthChain alice.Chain
pageWriter pagewriter.Writer
server proxyhttp.Server
upstreamProxy http.Handler
serveMux *mux.Router
redirectValidator redirect.Validator
appDirector redirect.AppDirector
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}
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// NewOAuthProxy creates a new instance of OAuthProxy from the options provided
func NewOAuthProxy(opts *options.Options, validator func(string) bool) (*OAuthProxy, error) {
sessionStore, err := sessions.NewSessionStore(&opts.Session, &opts.Cookie)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error initialising session store: %v", err)
}
var basicAuthValidator basic.Validator
if opts.HtpasswdFile != "" {
logger.Printf("using htpasswd file: %s", opts.HtpasswdFile)
var err error
basicAuthValidator, err = basic.NewHTPasswdValidator(opts.HtpasswdFile)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not validate htpasswd: %v", err)
}
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}
provider, err := providers.NewProvider(opts.Providers[0])
if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("error initialising provider: %v", err)
}
pageWriter, err := pagewriter.NewWriter(pagewriter.Opts{
TemplatesPath: opts.Templates.Path,
CustomLogo: opts.Templates.CustomLogo,
ProxyPrefix: opts.ProxyPrefix,
Footer: opts.Templates.Footer,
Version: VERSION,
Debug: opts.Templates.Debug,
ProviderName: buildProviderName(provider, opts.Providers[0].Name),
SignInMessage: buildSignInMessage(opts),
DisplayLoginForm: basicAuthValidator != nil && opts.Templates.DisplayLoginForm,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error initialising page writer: %v", err)
}
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upstreamProxy, err := upstream.NewProxy(opts.UpstreamServers, opts.GetSignatureData(), pageWriter)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error initialising upstream proxy: %v", err)
}
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if opts.SkipJwtBearerTokens {
Multiple providers in alpha config (#947) * Initial commit of multiple provider logic: 1. Created new provider options. 2. Created legacy provider options and conversion options. 3. Added Providers to alpha Options. 4. Started Validation migration of multiple providers 5. Tests. * fixed lint issues * additional lint fixes * Nits and alterations based on CR: manliy splitting large providers validation function and adding comments to provider options * fixed typo * removed weird : file * small CR changes * Removed GoogleGroups validation due to new allowed-groups (including tests). Added line in CHANGELOG * Update pkg/apis/options/providers.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/apis/options/providers.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/apis/options/providers.go Co-authored-by: Nick Meves <nick.meves@greenhouse.io> * Initial commit of multiple provider logic: 1. Created new provider options. 2. Created legacy provider options and conversion options. 3. Added Providers to alpha Options. 4. Started Validation migration of multiple providers 5. Tests. * fixed lint issues * additional lint fixes * Nits and alterations based on CR: manliy splitting large providers validation function and adding comments to provider options * small CR changes * auto generates alpha_config.md * rebase (mainly service alpha options related conflicts) * removed : * Nits and alterations based on CR: manliy splitting large providers validation function and adding comments to provider options * small CR changes * Removed GoogleGroups validation due to new allowed-groups (including tests). Added line in CHANGELOG * "cntd. rebase" * ran make generate again * last conflicts * removed duplicate client id validation * 1. Removed provider prefixes 2. altered optionsWithNilProvider logic 3. altered default provider logic 4. moved change in CHANELOG to 7.0.0 * fixed TestGoogleGroupOptions test * ran make generate * moved CHANGLOG line to 7.1.1 * moved changelog comment to 7.1.2 (additional rebase) Co-authored-by: Yana Segal <yana.segal@nielsen.com> Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> Co-authored-by: Nick Meves <nick.meves@greenhouse.io>
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logger.Printf("Skipping JWT tokens from configured OIDC issuer: %q", opts.Providers[0].OIDCConfig.IssuerURL)
for _, issuer := range opts.ExtraJwtIssuers {
logger.Printf("Skipping JWT tokens from extra JWT issuer: %q", issuer)
}
}
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redirectURL := opts.GetRedirectURL()
if redirectURL.Path == "" {
redirectURL.Path = fmt.Sprintf("%s/callback", opts.ProxyPrefix)
}
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logger.Printf("OAuthProxy configured for %s Client ID: %s", provider.Data().ProviderName, opts.Providers[0].ClientID)
refresh := "disabled"
if opts.Cookie.Refresh != time.Duration(0) {
refresh = fmt.Sprintf("after %s", opts.Cookie.Refresh)
}
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logger.Printf("Cookie settings: name:%s secure(https):%v httponly:%v expiry:%s domains:%s path:%s samesite:%s refresh:%s", opts.Cookie.Name, opts.Cookie.Secure, opts.Cookie.HTTPOnly, opts.Cookie.Expire, strings.Join(opts.Cookie.Domains, ","), opts.Cookie.Path, opts.Cookie.SameSite, refresh)
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Implements --trusted-ip option (#552) * Implements --ip-whitelist option * Included IPWhitelist option to allow one-or-more selected CIDR ranges to bypass OAuth2 authentication. * Adds IPWhitelist, a fast lookup table for multiple CIDR ranges. * Renamed IPWhitelist ipCIDRSet * Fixed unessesary pointer usage in ipCIDRSet * Update CHANGELOG.md * Update CHANGELOG.md * Updated to not use err.Error() in printf statements * Imrpoved language for --ip-whitelist descriptions. * Improve IP whitelist options error messages * Clarify options single-host normalization * Wrote a book about ipCIDRSet * Added comment to IsWhitelistedIP in oauthproxy.go * Rewrite oauthproxy test case as table driven * oops * Support whitelisting by low-level remote address * Added more test-cases, improved descriptions * Move ip_cidr_set.go to pkg/ip/net_set.go * Add more whitelist test use cases. * Oops * Use subtests for TestIPWhitelist * Add minimal tests for ip.NetSet * Use switch statment * Renamed ip-whitelist to whitelist-ip * Update documentation with a warning. * Update pkg/apis/options/options.go * Update CHANGELOG.md Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Update pkg/ip/net_set_test.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix fmt * Move ParseIPNet into abstraction * Add warning in case of --reverse-proxy * Update pkg/validation/options_test.go * Rename --whitelist-ip to --trusted-ip * Update oauthproxy.go Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * fix Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
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trustedIPs := ip.NewNetSet()
for _, ipStr := range opts.TrustedIPs {
if ipNet := ip.ParseIPNet(ipStr); ipNet != nil {
trustedIPs.AddIPNet(*ipNet)
} else {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not parse IP network (%s)", ipStr)
}
}
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allowedRoutes, err := buildRoutesAllowlist(opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
apiRoutes, err := buildAPIRoutes(opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
preAuthChain, err := buildPreAuthChain(opts, sessionStore)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not build pre-auth chain: %v", err)
}
sessionChain := buildSessionChain(opts, provider, sessionStore, basicAuthValidator)
headersChain, err := buildHeadersChain(opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not build headers chain: %v", err)
}
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redirectValidator := redirect.NewValidator(opts.WhitelistDomains)
appDirector := redirect.NewAppDirector(redirect.AppDirectorOpts{
ProxyPrefix: opts.ProxyPrefix,
Validator: redirectValidator,
})
p := &OAuthProxy{
CookieOptions: &opts.Cookie,
Validator: validator,
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SignInPath: fmt.Sprintf("%s/sign_in", opts.ProxyPrefix),
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ProxyPrefix: opts.ProxyPrefix,
provider: provider,
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sessionStore: sessionStore,
redirectURL: redirectURL,
apiRoutes: apiRoutes,
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allowedRoutes: allowedRoutes,
whitelistDomains: opts.WhitelistDomains,
skipAuthPreflight: opts.SkipAuthPreflight,
skipJwtBearerTokens: opts.SkipJwtBearerTokens,
realClientIPParser: opts.GetRealClientIPParser(),
SkipProviderButton: opts.SkipProviderButton,
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forceJSONErrors: opts.ForceJSONErrors,
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trustedIPs: trustedIPs,
basicAuthValidator: basicAuthValidator,
basicAuthGroups: opts.HtpasswdUserGroups,
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sessionChain: sessionChain,
headersChain: headersChain,
preAuthChain: preAuthChain,
pageWriter: pageWriter,
upstreamProxy: upstreamProxy,
redirectValidator: redirectValidator,
appDirector: appDirector,
}
p.buildServeMux(opts.ProxyPrefix)
if err := p.setupServer(opts); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error setting up server: %v", err)
}
return p, nil
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) Start() error {
if p.server == nil {
// We have to call setupServer before Start is called.
// If this doesn't happen it's a programming error.
panic("server has not been initialised")
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
// Observe signals in background goroutine.
go func() {
sigint := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
signal.Notify(sigint, os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
<-sigint
cancel() // cancel the context
}()
return p.server.Start(ctx)
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) setupServer(opts *options.Options) error {
serverOpts := proxyhttp.Opts{
Handler: p,
BindAddress: opts.Server.BindAddress,
SecureBindAddress: opts.Server.SecureBindAddress,
TLS: opts.Server.TLS,
}
appServer, err := proxyhttp.NewServer(serverOpts)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not build app server: %v", err)
}
metricsServer, err := proxyhttp.NewServer(proxyhttp.Opts{
Handler: middleware.DefaultMetricsHandler,
BindAddress: opts.MetricsServer.BindAddress,
SecureBindAddress: opts.MetricsServer.SecureBindAddress,
TLS: opts.MetricsServer.TLS,
})
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not build metrics server: %v", err)
}
p.server = proxyhttp.NewServerGroup(appServer, metricsServer)
return nil
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}
func (p *OAuthProxy) buildServeMux(proxyPrefix string) {
// Use the encoded path here so we can have the option to pass it on in the upstream mux.
// Otherwise something like /%2F/ would be redirected to / here already.
r := mux.NewRouter().UseEncodedPath()
// Everything served by the router must go through the preAuthChain first.
r.Use(p.preAuthChain.Then)
// Register the robots path writer
r.Path(robotsPath).HandlerFunc(p.pageWriter.WriteRobotsTxt)
// The authonly path should be registered separately to prevent it from getting no-cache headers.
// We do this to allow users to have a short cache (via nginx) of the response to reduce the
// likelihood of multiple reuests trying to referesh sessions simultaneously.
r.Path(proxyPrefix + authOnlyPath).Handler(p.sessionChain.ThenFunc(p.AuthOnly))
// This will register all of the paths under the proxy prefix, except the auth only path so that no cache headers
// are not applied.
p.buildProxySubrouter(r.PathPrefix(proxyPrefix).Subrouter())
// Register serveHTTP last so it catches anything that isn't already caught earlier.
// Anything that got to this point needs to have a session loaded.
r.PathPrefix("/").Handler(p.sessionChain.ThenFunc(p.Proxy))
p.serveMux = r
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) buildProxySubrouter(s *mux.Router) {
s.Use(prepareNoCacheMiddleware)
s.Path(signInPath).HandlerFunc(p.SignIn)
s.Path(signOutPath).HandlerFunc(p.SignOut)
s.Path(oauthStartPath).HandlerFunc(p.OAuthStart)
s.Path(oauthCallbackPath).HandlerFunc(p.OAuthCallback)
// The userinfo endpoint needs to load sessions before handling the request
s.Path(userInfoPath).Handler(p.sessionChain.ThenFunc(p.UserInfo))
}
// buildPreAuthChain constructs a chain that should process every request before
// the OAuth2 Proxy authentication logic kicks in.
// For example forcing HTTPS or health checks.
func buildPreAuthChain(opts *options.Options, sessionStore sessionsapi.SessionStore) (alice.Chain, error) {
chain := alice.New(middleware.NewScope(opts.ReverseProxy, opts.Logging.RequestIDHeader))
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if opts.ForceHTTPS {
_, httpsPort, err := net.SplitHostPort(opts.Server.SecureBindAddress)
if err != nil {
return alice.Chain{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid HTTPS address %q: %v", opts.Server.SecureBindAddress, err)
}
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewRedirectToHTTPS(httpsPort))
}
healthCheckPaths := []string{opts.PingPath}
healthCheckUserAgents := []string{opts.PingUserAgent}
if opts.GCPHealthChecks {
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logger.Printf("WARNING: GCP HealthChecks are now deprecated: Reconfigure apps to use the ping path for liveness and readiness checks, set the ping user agent to \"GoogleHC/1.0\" to preserve existing behaviour")
healthCheckPaths = append(healthCheckPaths, "/liveness_check", "/readiness_check")
healthCheckUserAgents = append(healthCheckUserAgents, "GoogleHC/1.0")
}
// To silence logging of health checks, register the health check handler before
// the logging handler
if opts.Logging.SilencePing {
chain = chain.Append(
middleware.NewHealthCheck(healthCheckPaths, healthCheckUserAgents),
middleware.NewReadynessCheck(opts.ReadyPath, sessionStore),
middleware.NewRequestLogger(),
)
} else {
chain = chain.Append(
middleware.NewRequestLogger(),
middleware.NewHealthCheck(healthCheckPaths, healthCheckUserAgents),
middleware.NewReadynessCheck(opts.ReadyPath, sessionStore),
)
}
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewRequestMetricsWithDefaultRegistry())
return chain, nil
}
func buildSessionChain(opts *options.Options, provider providers.Provider, sessionStore sessionsapi.SessionStore, validator basic.Validator) alice.Chain {
chain := alice.New()
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if opts.SkipJwtBearerTokens {
sessionLoaders := []middlewareapi.TokenToSessionFunc{
provider.CreateSessionFromToken,
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}
for _, verifier := range opts.GetJWTBearerVerifiers() {
sessionLoaders = append(sessionLoaders,
middlewareapi.CreateTokenToSessionFunc(verifier.Verify))
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}
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewJwtSessionLoader(sessionLoaders))
}
if validator != nil {
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewBasicAuthSessionLoader(validator, opts.HtpasswdUserGroups, opts.LegacyPreferEmailToUser))
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}
chain = chain.Append(middleware.NewStoredSessionLoader(&middleware.StoredSessionLoaderOptions{
SessionStore: sessionStore,
RefreshPeriod: opts.Cookie.Refresh,
RefreshSession: provider.RefreshSession,
ValidateSession: provider.ValidateSession,
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}))
return chain
}
func buildHeadersChain(opts *options.Options) (alice.Chain, error) {
requestInjector, err := middleware.NewRequestHeaderInjector(opts.InjectRequestHeaders)
if err != nil {
return alice.Chain{}, fmt.Errorf("error constructing request header injector: %v", err)
}
responseInjector, err := middleware.NewResponseHeaderInjector(opts.InjectResponseHeaders)
if err != nil {
return alice.Chain{}, fmt.Errorf("error constructing request header injector: %v", err)
}
return alice.New(requestInjector, responseInjector), nil
}
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func buildSignInMessage(opts *options.Options) string {
var msg string
if len(opts.Templates.Banner) >= 1 {
if opts.Templates.Banner == "-" {
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msg = ""
} else {
msg = opts.Templates.Banner
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}
} else if len(opts.EmailDomains) != 0 && opts.AuthenticatedEmailsFile == "" {
if len(opts.EmailDomains) > 1 {
msg = fmt.Sprintf("Authenticate using one of the following domains: %v", strings.Join(opts.EmailDomains, ", "))
} else if opts.EmailDomains[0] != "*" {
msg = fmt.Sprintf("Authenticate using %v", opts.EmailDomains[0])
}
}
return msg
}
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func buildProviderName(p providers.Provider, override string) string {
if override != "" {
return override
}
return p.Data().ProviderName
}
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// buildRoutesAllowlist builds an []allowedRoute list from either the legacy
// SkipAuthRegex option (paths only support) or newer SkipAuthRoutes option
// (method=path support)
func buildRoutesAllowlist(opts *options.Options) ([]allowedRoute, error) {
routes := make([]allowedRoute, 0, len(opts.SkipAuthRegex)+len(opts.SkipAuthRoutes))
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for _, path := range opts.SkipAuthRegex {
compiledRegex, err := regexp.Compile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
logger.Printf("Skipping auth - Method: ALL | Path: %s", path)
routes = append(routes, allowedRoute{
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method: "",
pathRegex: compiledRegex,
})
}
for _, methodPath := range opts.SkipAuthRoutes {
var (
method string
path string
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negate = strings.Contains(methodPath, "!=")
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)
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parts := regexp.MustCompile("!?=").Split(methodPath, 2)
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if len(parts) == 1 {
method = ""
path = parts[0]
} else {
method = strings.ToUpper(parts[0])
path = parts[1]
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}
compiledRegex, err := regexp.Compile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
logger.Printf("Skipping auth - Method: %s | Path: %s", method, path)
routes = append(routes, allowedRoute{
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method: method,
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negate: negate,
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pathRegex: compiledRegex,
})
}
return routes, nil
}
// buildAPIRoutes builds an []apiRoute from ApiRoutes option
func buildAPIRoutes(opts *options.Options) ([]apiRoute, error) {
routes := make([]apiRoute, 0, len(opts.APIRoutes))
for _, path := range opts.APIRoutes {
compiledRegex, err := regexp.Compile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
logger.Printf("API route - Path: %s", path)
routes = append(routes, apiRoute{
pathRegex: compiledRegex,
})
}
return routes, nil
}
// ClearSessionCookie creates a cookie to unset the user's authentication cookie
// stored in the user's session
2019-05-07 17:13:55 +02:00
func (p *OAuthProxy) ClearSessionCookie(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) error {
return p.sessionStore.Clear(rw, req)
2017-03-28 03:14:38 +02:00
}
// LoadCookiedSession reads the user's authentication details from the request
2019-05-07 17:13:55 +02:00
func (p *OAuthProxy) LoadCookiedSession(req *http.Request) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
return p.sessionStore.Load(req)
}
// SaveSession creates a new session cookie value and sets this on the response
2019-05-07 15:27:09 +02:00
func (p *OAuthProxy) SaveSession(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) error {
2019-05-07 17:13:55 +02:00
return p.sessionStore.Save(rw, req, s)
2012-12-26 18:35:02 +03:00
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
p.serveMux.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
}
// ErrorPage writes an error response
func (p *OAuthProxy) ErrorPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, code int, appError string, messages ...interface{}) {
redirectURL, err := p.appDirector.GetRedirect(req)
2021-02-06 19:20:30 +02:00
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining redirect: %v", err)
}
if redirectURL == p.SignInPath || redirectURL == "" {
redirectURL = "/"
}
scope := middlewareapi.GetRequestScope(req)
p.pageWriter.WriteErrorPage(rw, pagewriter.ErrorPageOpts{
Status: code,
RedirectURL: redirectURL,
RequestID: scope.RequestID,
AppError: appError,
Messages: messages,
})
2012-12-17 21:15:23 +03:00
}
// IsAllowedRequest is used to check if auth should be skipped for this request
func (p *OAuthProxy) IsAllowedRequest(req *http.Request) bool {
isPreflightRequestAllowed := p.skipAuthPreflight && req.Method == "OPTIONS"
return isPreflightRequestAllowed || p.isAllowedRoute(req) || p.isTrustedIP(req)
}
2022-08-19 12:46:25 +02:00
func isAllowedMethod(req *http.Request, route allowedRoute) bool {
return route.method == "" || req.Method == route.method
}
func isAllowedPath(req *http.Request, route allowedRoute) bool {
matches := route.pathRegex.MatchString(req.URL.Path)
if route.negate {
return !matches
}
return matches
}
// IsAllowedRoute is used to check if the request method & path is allowed without auth
func (p *OAuthProxy) isAllowedRoute(req *http.Request) bool {
for _, route := range p.allowedRoutes {
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if isAllowedMethod(req, route) && isAllowedPath(req, route) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) isAPIPath(req *http.Request) bool {
for _, route := range p.apiRoutes {
if route.pathRegex.MatchString(req.URL.Path) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// isTrustedIP is used to check if a request comes from a trusted client IP address.
func (p *OAuthProxy) isTrustedIP(req *http.Request) bool {
if p.trustedIPs == nil {
return false
}
remoteAddr, err := ip.GetClientIP(p.realClientIPParser, req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining real IP for trusted IP list: %v", err)
// Possibly spoofed X-Real-IP header
return false
}
if remoteAddr == nil {
return false
}
return p.trustedIPs.Has(remoteAddr)
}
// SignInPage writes the sign in template to the response
func (p *OAuthProxy) SignInPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, code int) {
prepareNoCache(rw)
err := p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
if err != nil {
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logger.Printf("Error clearing session cookie: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
2012-12-17 21:15:23 +03:00
rw.WriteHeader(code)
redirectURL, err := p.appDirector.GetRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining redirect: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
if redirectURL == p.SignInPath {
redirectURL = "/"
}
p.pageWriter.WriteSignInPage(rw, req, redirectURL, code)
2012-12-11 04:59:23 +03:00
}
// ManualSignIn handles basic auth logins to the proxy
func (p *OAuthProxy) ManualSignIn(req *http.Request) (string, bool, int) {
if req.Method != "POST" || p.basicAuthValidator == nil {
return "", false, http.StatusOK
}
user := req.FormValue("username")
passwd := req.FormValue("password")
if user == "" {
return "", false, http.StatusBadRequest
}
// check auth
if p.basicAuthValidator.Validate(user, passwd) {
2019-02-10 19:01:13 +02:00
logger.PrintAuthf(user, req, logger.AuthSuccess, "Authenticated via HtpasswdFile")
return user, true, http.StatusOK
}
2019-02-10 19:01:13 +02:00
logger.PrintAuthf(user, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via HtpasswdFile")
return "", false, http.StatusUnauthorized
}
// SignIn serves a page prompting users to sign in
func (p *OAuthProxy) SignIn(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
redirect, err := p.appDirector.GetRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining redirect: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
user, ok, statusCode := p.ManualSignIn(req)
if ok {
session := &sessionsapi.SessionState{User: user, Groups: p.basicAuthGroups}
err = p.SaveSession(rw, req, session)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error saving session: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, http.StatusFound)
} else {
if p.SkipProviderButton {
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
} else {
// TODO - should we pass on /oauth2/sign_in query params to /oauth2/start?
p.SignInPage(rw, req, statusCode)
}
}
}
// UserInfo endpoint outputs session email and preferred username in JSON format
func (p *OAuthProxy) UserInfo(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
if err != nil {
http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusUnauthorized), http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
if session == nil {
if _, err := rw.Write([]byte("{}")); err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error encoding empty user info: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
}
return
}
userInfo := struct {
User string `json:"user"`
Email string `json:"email"`
Groups []string `json:"groups,omitempty"`
PreferredUsername string `json:"preferredUsername,omitempty"`
}{
User: session.User,
Email: session.Email,
Groups: session.Groups,
PreferredUsername: session.PreferredUsername,
}
if err := json.NewEncoder(rw).Encode(userInfo); err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error encoding user info: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
}
}
// SignOut sends a response to clear the authentication cookie
func (p *OAuthProxy) SignOut(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
redirect, err := p.appDirector.GetRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining redirect: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
err = p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error clearing session cookie: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, redirect, http.StatusFound)
}
2017-03-21 18:39:26 +02:00
// OAuthStart starts the OAuth2 authentication flow
func (p *OAuthProxy) OAuthStart(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
// start the flow permitting login URL query parameters to be overridden from the request URL
p.doOAuthStart(rw, req, req.URL.Query())
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) doOAuthStart(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, overrides url.Values) {
extraParams := p.provider.Data().LoginURLParams(overrides)
prepareNoCache(rw)
var (
err error
codeChallenge, codeVerifier, codeChallengeMethod string
)
PKCE Support (#1541) * Add the allowed_email_domains and the allowed_groups on the auth_request endpoint + support standard wildcard char for validation with sub-domain and email-domain. Signed-off-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> * Fix provider data initialisation * PKCE Support Adds Code Challenge PKCE support (RFC-7636) and partial Authorization Server Metadata (RFC-8414) for detecting PKCE support. - Introduces new option `--force-code-challenge-method` to force a specific code challenge method (either `S256` or `plain`) for instances when the server has not implemented RFC-8414 in order to detect PKCE support on the discovery document. - In all other cases, if the PKCE support can be determined during discovery then the `code_challenge_methods_supported` is used and S256 is always preferred. - The force command line argument is helpful with some providers like Azure who supports PKCE but does not list it in their discovery document yet. - Initial thought was given to just always attempt PKCE since according to spec additional URL parameters should be dropped by servers which implemented OAuth 2, however other projects found cases in the wild where this causes 500 errors by buggy implementations. See: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/pull/7804#issuecomment-578323810 - Due to the fact that the `code_verifier` must be saved between the redirect and callback, sessions are now created when the redirect takes place with `Authenticated: false`. The session will be recreated and marked as `Authenticated` on callback. - Individual provider implementations can choose to include or ignore code_challenge and code_verifier function parameters passed to them Note: Technically speaking `plain` is not required to be implemented since oauth2-proxy will always be able to handle S256 and servers MUST implement S256 support. > If the client is capable of using "S256", it MUST use "S256", as "S256" > is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are permitted > to use "plain" only if they cannot support "S256" for some technical > reason and know via out-of-band configuration that the server supports > "plain". Ref: RFC-7636 Sec 4.2 oauth2-proxy will always use S256 unless the user explicitly forces `plain`. Fixes #1361 * Address PR comments by moving pkce generation * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Encrypt CodeVerifier in CSRF Token instead of Session - Update Dex for PKCE support - Expose HTTPBin for further use cases * Correct the tests * Move code challenges into extra params * Correct typo in code challenge method Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Correct the extra space in docs Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Address changelog and new line nits * Add generated docs Co-authored-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2022-03-13 12:08:33 +02:00
if p.provider.Data().CodeChallengeMethod != "" {
codeChallengeMethod = p.provider.Data().CodeChallengeMethod
codeVerifier, err = encryption.GenerateRandomASCIIString(96)
PKCE Support (#1541) * Add the allowed_email_domains and the allowed_groups on the auth_request endpoint + support standard wildcard char for validation with sub-domain and email-domain. Signed-off-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> * Fix provider data initialisation * PKCE Support Adds Code Challenge PKCE support (RFC-7636) and partial Authorization Server Metadata (RFC-8414) for detecting PKCE support. - Introduces new option `--force-code-challenge-method` to force a specific code challenge method (either `S256` or `plain`) for instances when the server has not implemented RFC-8414 in order to detect PKCE support on the discovery document. - In all other cases, if the PKCE support can be determined during discovery then the `code_challenge_methods_supported` is used and S256 is always preferred. - The force command line argument is helpful with some providers like Azure who supports PKCE but does not list it in their discovery document yet. - Initial thought was given to just always attempt PKCE since according to spec additional URL parameters should be dropped by servers which implemented OAuth 2, however other projects found cases in the wild where this causes 500 errors by buggy implementations. See: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/pull/7804#issuecomment-578323810 - Due to the fact that the `code_verifier` must be saved between the redirect and callback, sessions are now created when the redirect takes place with `Authenticated: false`. The session will be recreated and marked as `Authenticated` on callback. - Individual provider implementations can choose to include or ignore code_challenge and code_verifier function parameters passed to them Note: Technically speaking `plain` is not required to be implemented since oauth2-proxy will always be able to handle S256 and servers MUST implement S256 support. > If the client is capable of using "S256", it MUST use "S256", as "S256" > is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are permitted > to use "plain" only if they cannot support "S256" for some technical > reason and know via out-of-band configuration that the server supports > "plain". Ref: RFC-7636 Sec 4.2 oauth2-proxy will always use S256 unless the user explicitly forces `plain`. Fixes #1361 * Address PR comments by moving pkce generation * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Encrypt CodeVerifier in CSRF Token instead of Session - Update Dex for PKCE support - Expose HTTPBin for further use cases * Correct the tests * Move code challenges into extra params * Correct typo in code challenge method Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Correct the extra space in docs Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Address changelog and new line nits * Add generated docs Co-authored-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2022-03-13 12:08:33 +02:00
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Unable to build random ASCII string for code verifier: %v", err)
PKCE Support (#1541) * Add the allowed_email_domains and the allowed_groups on the auth_request endpoint + support standard wildcard char for validation with sub-domain and email-domain. Signed-off-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> * Fix provider data initialisation * PKCE Support Adds Code Challenge PKCE support (RFC-7636) and partial Authorization Server Metadata (RFC-8414) for detecting PKCE support. - Introduces new option `--force-code-challenge-method` to force a specific code challenge method (either `S256` or `plain`) for instances when the server has not implemented RFC-8414 in order to detect PKCE support on the discovery document. - In all other cases, if the PKCE support can be determined during discovery then the `code_challenge_methods_supported` is used and S256 is always preferred. - The force command line argument is helpful with some providers like Azure who supports PKCE but does not list it in their discovery document yet. - Initial thought was given to just always attempt PKCE since according to spec additional URL parameters should be dropped by servers which implemented OAuth 2, however other projects found cases in the wild where this causes 500 errors by buggy implementations. See: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/pull/7804#issuecomment-578323810 - Due to the fact that the `code_verifier` must be saved between the redirect and callback, sessions are now created when the redirect takes place with `Authenticated: false`. The session will be recreated and marked as `Authenticated` on callback. - Individual provider implementations can choose to include or ignore code_challenge and code_verifier function parameters passed to them Note: Technically speaking `plain` is not required to be implemented since oauth2-proxy will always be able to handle S256 and servers MUST implement S256 support. > If the client is capable of using "S256", it MUST use "S256", as "S256" > is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are permitted > to use "plain" only if they cannot support "S256" for some technical > reason and know via out-of-band configuration that the server supports > "plain". Ref: RFC-7636 Sec 4.2 oauth2-proxy will always use S256 unless the user explicitly forces `plain`. Fixes #1361 * Address PR comments by moving pkce generation * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Encrypt CodeVerifier in CSRF Token instead of Session - Update Dex for PKCE support - Expose HTTPBin for further use cases * Correct the tests * Move code challenges into extra params * Correct typo in code challenge method Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Correct the extra space in docs Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Address changelog and new line nits * Add generated docs Co-authored-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2022-03-13 12:08:33 +02:00
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
codeChallenge, err = encryption.GenerateCodeChallenge(p.provider.Data().CodeChallengeMethod, codeVerifier)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error creating code challenge: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
extraParams.Add("code_challenge", codeChallenge)
extraParams.Add("code_challenge_method", codeChallengeMethod)
}
csrf, err := cookies.NewCSRF(p.CookieOptions, codeVerifier)
2017-03-28 03:14:38 +02:00
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error creating CSRF nonce: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
2017-03-28 03:14:38 +02:00
return
}
appRedirect, err := p.appDirector.GetRedirect(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error obtaining application redirect: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
callbackRedirect := p.getOAuthRedirectURI(req)
loginURL := p.provider.GetLoginURL(
callbackRedirect,
encodeState(csrf.HashOAuthState(), appRedirect),
csrf.HashOIDCNonce(),
extraParams,
)
if _, err := csrf.SetCookie(rw, req); err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error setting CSRF cookie: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, loginURL, http.StatusFound)
}
// OAuthCallback is the OAuth2 authentication flow callback that finishes the
// OAuth2 authentication flow
func (p *OAuthProxy) OAuthCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
2020-05-23 16:17:41 +02:00
remoteAddr := ip.GetClientString(p.realClientIPParser, req, true)
// finish the oauth cycle
err := req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error while parsing OAuth2 callback: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
2012-12-11 04:59:23 +03:00
return
}
errorString := req.Form.Get("error")
if errorString != "" {
logger.Errorf("Error while parsing OAuth2 callback: %s", errorString)
message := fmt.Sprintf("Login Failed: The upstream identity provider returned an error: %s", errorString)
// Set the debug message and override the non debug message to be the same for this case
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, message, message)
2012-12-11 04:59:23 +03:00
return
}
PKCE Support (#1541) * Add the allowed_email_domains and the allowed_groups on the auth_request endpoint + support standard wildcard char for validation with sub-domain and email-domain. Signed-off-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> * Fix provider data initialisation * PKCE Support Adds Code Challenge PKCE support (RFC-7636) and partial Authorization Server Metadata (RFC-8414) for detecting PKCE support. - Introduces new option `--force-code-challenge-method` to force a specific code challenge method (either `S256` or `plain`) for instances when the server has not implemented RFC-8414 in order to detect PKCE support on the discovery document. - In all other cases, if the PKCE support can be determined during discovery then the `code_challenge_methods_supported` is used and S256 is always preferred. - The force command line argument is helpful with some providers like Azure who supports PKCE but does not list it in their discovery document yet. - Initial thought was given to just always attempt PKCE since according to spec additional URL parameters should be dropped by servers which implemented OAuth 2, however other projects found cases in the wild where this causes 500 errors by buggy implementations. See: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/pull/7804#issuecomment-578323810 - Due to the fact that the `code_verifier` must be saved between the redirect and callback, sessions are now created when the redirect takes place with `Authenticated: false`. The session will be recreated and marked as `Authenticated` on callback. - Individual provider implementations can choose to include or ignore code_challenge and code_verifier function parameters passed to them Note: Technically speaking `plain` is not required to be implemented since oauth2-proxy will always be able to handle S256 and servers MUST implement S256 support. > If the client is capable of using "S256", it MUST use "S256", as "S256" > is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are permitted > to use "plain" only if they cannot support "S256" for some technical > reason and know via out-of-band configuration that the server supports > "plain". Ref: RFC-7636 Sec 4.2 oauth2-proxy will always use S256 unless the user explicitly forces `plain`. Fixes #1361 * Address PR comments by moving pkce generation * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Encrypt CodeVerifier in CSRF Token instead of Session - Update Dex for PKCE support - Expose HTTPBin for further use cases * Correct the tests * Move code challenges into extra params * Correct typo in code challenge method Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Correct the extra space in docs Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Address changelog and new line nits * Add generated docs Co-authored-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2022-03-13 12:08:33 +02:00
csrf, err := cookies.LoadCSRFCookie(req, p.CookieOptions)
if err != nil {
PKCE Support (#1541) * Add the allowed_email_domains and the allowed_groups on the auth_request endpoint + support standard wildcard char for validation with sub-domain and email-domain. Signed-off-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> * Fix provider data initialisation * PKCE Support Adds Code Challenge PKCE support (RFC-7636) and partial Authorization Server Metadata (RFC-8414) for detecting PKCE support. - Introduces new option `--force-code-challenge-method` to force a specific code challenge method (either `S256` or `plain`) for instances when the server has not implemented RFC-8414 in order to detect PKCE support on the discovery document. - In all other cases, if the PKCE support can be determined during discovery then the `code_challenge_methods_supported` is used and S256 is always preferred. - The force command line argument is helpful with some providers like Azure who supports PKCE but does not list it in their discovery document yet. - Initial thought was given to just always attempt PKCE since according to spec additional URL parameters should be dropped by servers which implemented OAuth 2, however other projects found cases in the wild where this causes 500 errors by buggy implementations. See: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/pull/7804#issuecomment-578323810 - Due to the fact that the `code_verifier` must be saved between the redirect and callback, sessions are now created when the redirect takes place with `Authenticated: false`. The session will be recreated and marked as `Authenticated` on callback. - Individual provider implementations can choose to include or ignore code_challenge and code_verifier function parameters passed to them Note: Technically speaking `plain` is not required to be implemented since oauth2-proxy will always be able to handle S256 and servers MUST implement S256 support. > If the client is capable of using "S256", it MUST use "S256", as "S256" > is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are permitted > to use "plain" only if they cannot support "S256" for some technical > reason and know via out-of-band configuration that the server supports > "plain". Ref: RFC-7636 Sec 4.2 oauth2-proxy will always use S256 unless the user explicitly forces `plain`. Fixes #1361 * Address PR comments by moving pkce generation * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Encrypt CodeVerifier in CSRF Token instead of Session - Update Dex for PKCE support - Expose HTTPBin for further use cases * Correct the tests * Move code challenges into extra params * Correct typo in code challenge method Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Correct the extra space in docs Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Address changelog and new line nits * Add generated docs Co-authored-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2022-03-13 12:08:33 +02:00
logger.Println(req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: unable to obtain CSRF cookie")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, err.Error(), "Login Failed: Unable to find a valid CSRF token. Please try again.")
return
}
PKCE Support (#1541) * Add the allowed_email_domains and the allowed_groups on the auth_request endpoint + support standard wildcard char for validation with sub-domain and email-domain. Signed-off-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> * Fix provider data initialisation * PKCE Support Adds Code Challenge PKCE support (RFC-7636) and partial Authorization Server Metadata (RFC-8414) for detecting PKCE support. - Introduces new option `--force-code-challenge-method` to force a specific code challenge method (either `S256` or `plain`) for instances when the server has not implemented RFC-8414 in order to detect PKCE support on the discovery document. - In all other cases, if the PKCE support can be determined during discovery then the `code_challenge_methods_supported` is used and S256 is always preferred. - The force command line argument is helpful with some providers like Azure who supports PKCE but does not list it in their discovery document yet. - Initial thought was given to just always attempt PKCE since according to spec additional URL parameters should be dropped by servers which implemented OAuth 2, however other projects found cases in the wild where this causes 500 errors by buggy implementations. See: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/pull/7804#issuecomment-578323810 - Due to the fact that the `code_verifier` must be saved between the redirect and callback, sessions are now created when the redirect takes place with `Authenticated: false`. The session will be recreated and marked as `Authenticated` on callback. - Individual provider implementations can choose to include or ignore code_challenge and code_verifier function parameters passed to them Note: Technically speaking `plain` is not required to be implemented since oauth2-proxy will always be able to handle S256 and servers MUST implement S256 support. > If the client is capable of using "S256", it MUST use "S256", as "S256" > is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are permitted > to use "plain" only if they cannot support "S256" for some technical > reason and know via out-of-band configuration that the server supports > "plain". Ref: RFC-7636 Sec 4.2 oauth2-proxy will always use S256 unless the user explicitly forces `plain`. Fixes #1361 * Address PR comments by moving pkce generation * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Encrypt CodeVerifier in CSRF Token instead of Session - Update Dex for PKCE support - Expose HTTPBin for further use cases * Correct the tests * Move code challenges into extra params * Correct typo in code challenge method Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Correct the extra space in docs Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Address changelog and new line nits * Add generated docs Co-authored-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2022-03-13 12:08:33 +02:00
session, err := p.redeemCode(req, csrf.GetCodeVerifier())
if err != nil {
PKCE Support (#1541) * Add the allowed_email_domains and the allowed_groups on the auth_request endpoint + support standard wildcard char for validation with sub-domain and email-domain. Signed-off-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> * Fix provider data initialisation * PKCE Support Adds Code Challenge PKCE support (RFC-7636) and partial Authorization Server Metadata (RFC-8414) for detecting PKCE support. - Introduces new option `--force-code-challenge-method` to force a specific code challenge method (either `S256` or `plain`) for instances when the server has not implemented RFC-8414 in order to detect PKCE support on the discovery document. - In all other cases, if the PKCE support can be determined during discovery then the `code_challenge_methods_supported` is used and S256 is always preferred. - The force command line argument is helpful with some providers like Azure who supports PKCE but does not list it in their discovery document yet. - Initial thought was given to just always attempt PKCE since according to spec additional URL parameters should be dropped by servers which implemented OAuth 2, however other projects found cases in the wild where this causes 500 errors by buggy implementations. See: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/pull/7804#issuecomment-578323810 - Due to the fact that the `code_verifier` must be saved between the redirect and callback, sessions are now created when the redirect takes place with `Authenticated: false`. The session will be recreated and marked as `Authenticated` on callback. - Individual provider implementations can choose to include or ignore code_challenge and code_verifier function parameters passed to them Note: Technically speaking `plain` is not required to be implemented since oauth2-proxy will always be able to handle S256 and servers MUST implement S256 support. > If the client is capable of using "S256", it MUST use "S256", as "S256" > is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are permitted > to use "plain" only if they cannot support "S256" for some technical > reason and know via out-of-band configuration that the server supports > "plain". Ref: RFC-7636 Sec 4.2 oauth2-proxy will always use S256 unless the user explicitly forces `plain`. Fixes #1361 * Address PR comments by moving pkce generation * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Encrypt CodeVerifier in CSRF Token instead of Session - Update Dex for PKCE support - Expose HTTPBin for further use cases * Correct the tests * Move code challenges into extra params * Correct typo in code challenge method Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Correct the extra space in docs Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Address changelog and new line nits * Add generated docs Co-authored-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2022-03-13 12:08:33 +02:00
logger.Errorf("Error redeeming code during OAuth2 callback: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
PKCE Support (#1541) * Add the allowed_email_domains and the allowed_groups on the auth_request endpoint + support standard wildcard char for validation with sub-domain and email-domain. Signed-off-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> * Fix provider data initialisation * PKCE Support Adds Code Challenge PKCE support (RFC-7636) and partial Authorization Server Metadata (RFC-8414) for detecting PKCE support. - Introduces new option `--force-code-challenge-method` to force a specific code challenge method (either `S256` or `plain`) for instances when the server has not implemented RFC-8414 in order to detect PKCE support on the discovery document. - In all other cases, if the PKCE support can be determined during discovery then the `code_challenge_methods_supported` is used and S256 is always preferred. - The force command line argument is helpful with some providers like Azure who supports PKCE but does not list it in their discovery document yet. - Initial thought was given to just always attempt PKCE since according to spec additional URL parameters should be dropped by servers which implemented OAuth 2, however other projects found cases in the wild where this causes 500 errors by buggy implementations. See: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/pull/7804#issuecomment-578323810 - Due to the fact that the `code_verifier` must be saved between the redirect and callback, sessions are now created when the redirect takes place with `Authenticated: false`. The session will be recreated and marked as `Authenticated` on callback. - Individual provider implementations can choose to include or ignore code_challenge and code_verifier function parameters passed to them Note: Technically speaking `plain` is not required to be implemented since oauth2-proxy will always be able to handle S256 and servers MUST implement S256 support. > If the client is capable of using "S256", it MUST use "S256", as "S256" > is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are permitted > to use "plain" only if they cannot support "S256" for some technical > reason and know via out-of-band configuration that the server supports > "plain". Ref: RFC-7636 Sec 4.2 oauth2-proxy will always use S256 unless the user explicitly forces `plain`. Fixes #1361 * Address PR comments by moving pkce generation * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Encrypt CodeVerifier in CSRF Token instead of Session - Update Dex for PKCE support - Expose HTTPBin for further use cases * Correct the tests * Move code challenges into extra params * Correct typo in code challenge method Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Correct the extra space in docs Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Address changelog and new line nits * Add generated docs Co-authored-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2022-03-13 12:08:33 +02:00
err = p.enrichSessionState(req.Context(), session)
2017-03-28 03:14:38 +02:00
if err != nil {
PKCE Support (#1541) * Add the allowed_email_domains and the allowed_groups on the auth_request endpoint + support standard wildcard char for validation with sub-domain and email-domain. Signed-off-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> * Fix provider data initialisation * PKCE Support Adds Code Challenge PKCE support (RFC-7636) and partial Authorization Server Metadata (RFC-8414) for detecting PKCE support. - Introduces new option `--force-code-challenge-method` to force a specific code challenge method (either `S256` or `plain`) for instances when the server has not implemented RFC-8414 in order to detect PKCE support on the discovery document. - In all other cases, if the PKCE support can be determined during discovery then the `code_challenge_methods_supported` is used and S256 is always preferred. - The force command line argument is helpful with some providers like Azure who supports PKCE but does not list it in their discovery document yet. - Initial thought was given to just always attempt PKCE since according to spec additional URL parameters should be dropped by servers which implemented OAuth 2, however other projects found cases in the wild where this causes 500 errors by buggy implementations. See: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/pull/7804#issuecomment-578323810 - Due to the fact that the `code_verifier` must be saved between the redirect and callback, sessions are now created when the redirect takes place with `Authenticated: false`. The session will be recreated and marked as `Authenticated` on callback. - Individual provider implementations can choose to include or ignore code_challenge and code_verifier function parameters passed to them Note: Technically speaking `plain` is not required to be implemented since oauth2-proxy will always be able to handle S256 and servers MUST implement S256 support. > If the client is capable of using "S256", it MUST use "S256", as "S256" > is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are permitted > to use "plain" only if they cannot support "S256" for some technical > reason and know via out-of-band configuration that the server supports > "plain". Ref: RFC-7636 Sec 4.2 oauth2-proxy will always use S256 unless the user explicitly forces `plain`. Fixes #1361 * Address PR comments by moving pkce generation * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Encrypt CodeVerifier in CSRF Token instead of Session - Update Dex for PKCE support - Expose HTTPBin for further use cases * Correct the tests * Move code challenges into extra params * Correct typo in code challenge method Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Correct the extra space in docs Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Address changelog and new line nits * Add generated docs Co-authored-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2022-03-13 12:08:33 +02:00
logger.Errorf("Error creating session during OAuth2 callback: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
2017-03-28 03:14:38 +02:00
return
}
csrf.ClearCookie(rw, req)
nonce, appRedirect, err := decodeState(req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error while parsing OAuth2 state: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
if !csrf.CheckOAuthState(nonce) {
2020-07-21 03:34:37 +02:00
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: CSRF token mismatch, potential attack")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, "CSRF token mismatch, potential attack", "Login Failed: Unable to find a valid CSRF token. Please try again.")
2017-03-28 03:14:38 +02:00
return
}
csrf.SetSessionNonce(session)
if !p.provider.ValidateSession(req.Context(), session) {
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Session validation failed: %s", session)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, "Session validation failed")
return
}
if !p.redirectValidator.IsValidRedirect(appRedirect) {
appRedirect = "/"
}
// set cookie, or deny
2020-10-24 05:53:38 +02:00
authorized, err := p.provider.Authorize(req.Context(), session)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error with authorization: %v", err)
}
if p.Validator(session.Email) && authorized {
2019-04-23 18:36:18 +02:00
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthSuccess, "Authenticated via OAuth2: %s", session)
err := p.SaveSession(rw, req, session)
2012-12-11 04:59:23 +03:00
if err != nil {
2020-10-24 05:53:38 +02:00
logger.Errorf("Error saving session state for %s: %v", remoteAddr, err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
2012-12-11 04:59:23 +03:00
return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, appRedirect, http.StatusFound)
} else {
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authentication via OAuth2: unauthorized")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, "Invalid session: unauthorized")
}
}
2012-12-11 04:59:23 +03:00
PKCE Support (#1541) * Add the allowed_email_domains and the allowed_groups on the auth_request endpoint + support standard wildcard char for validation with sub-domain and email-domain. Signed-off-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> * Fix provider data initialisation * PKCE Support Adds Code Challenge PKCE support (RFC-7636) and partial Authorization Server Metadata (RFC-8414) for detecting PKCE support. - Introduces new option `--force-code-challenge-method` to force a specific code challenge method (either `S256` or `plain`) for instances when the server has not implemented RFC-8414 in order to detect PKCE support on the discovery document. - In all other cases, if the PKCE support can be determined during discovery then the `code_challenge_methods_supported` is used and S256 is always preferred. - The force command line argument is helpful with some providers like Azure who supports PKCE but does not list it in their discovery document yet. - Initial thought was given to just always attempt PKCE since according to spec additional URL parameters should be dropped by servers which implemented OAuth 2, however other projects found cases in the wild where this causes 500 errors by buggy implementations. See: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/pull/7804#issuecomment-578323810 - Due to the fact that the `code_verifier` must be saved between the redirect and callback, sessions are now created when the redirect takes place with `Authenticated: false`. The session will be recreated and marked as `Authenticated` on callback. - Individual provider implementations can choose to include or ignore code_challenge and code_verifier function parameters passed to them Note: Technically speaking `plain` is not required to be implemented since oauth2-proxy will always be able to handle S256 and servers MUST implement S256 support. > If the client is capable of using "S256", it MUST use "S256", as "S256" > is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are permitted > to use "plain" only if they cannot support "S256" for some technical > reason and know via out-of-band configuration that the server supports > "plain". Ref: RFC-7636 Sec 4.2 oauth2-proxy will always use S256 unless the user explicitly forces `plain`. Fixes #1361 * Address PR comments by moving pkce generation * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Encrypt CodeVerifier in CSRF Token instead of Session - Update Dex for PKCE support - Expose HTTPBin for further use cases * Correct the tests * Move code challenges into extra params * Correct typo in code challenge method Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Correct the extra space in docs Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Address changelog and new line nits * Add generated docs Co-authored-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2022-03-13 12:08:33 +02:00
func (p *OAuthProxy) redeemCode(req *http.Request, codeVerifier string) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
code := req.Form.Get("code")
if code == "" {
return nil, providers.ErrMissingCode
}
redirectURI := p.getOAuthRedirectURI(req)
PKCE Support (#1541) * Add the allowed_email_domains and the allowed_groups on the auth_request endpoint + support standard wildcard char for validation with sub-domain and email-domain. Signed-off-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> * Fix provider data initialisation * PKCE Support Adds Code Challenge PKCE support (RFC-7636) and partial Authorization Server Metadata (RFC-8414) for detecting PKCE support. - Introduces new option `--force-code-challenge-method` to force a specific code challenge method (either `S256` or `plain`) for instances when the server has not implemented RFC-8414 in order to detect PKCE support on the discovery document. - In all other cases, if the PKCE support can be determined during discovery then the `code_challenge_methods_supported` is used and S256 is always preferred. - The force command line argument is helpful with some providers like Azure who supports PKCE but does not list it in their discovery document yet. - Initial thought was given to just always attempt PKCE since according to spec additional URL parameters should be dropped by servers which implemented OAuth 2, however other projects found cases in the wild where this causes 500 errors by buggy implementations. See: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/pull/7804#issuecomment-578323810 - Due to the fact that the `code_verifier` must be saved between the redirect and callback, sessions are now created when the redirect takes place with `Authenticated: false`. The session will be recreated and marked as `Authenticated` on callback. - Individual provider implementations can choose to include or ignore code_challenge and code_verifier function parameters passed to them Note: Technically speaking `plain` is not required to be implemented since oauth2-proxy will always be able to handle S256 and servers MUST implement S256 support. > If the client is capable of using "S256", it MUST use "S256", as "S256" > is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are permitted > to use "plain" only if they cannot support "S256" for some technical > reason and know via out-of-band configuration that the server supports > "plain". Ref: RFC-7636 Sec 4.2 oauth2-proxy will always use S256 unless the user explicitly forces `plain`. Fixes #1361 * Address PR comments by moving pkce generation * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Make PKCE opt-in, move to using the Nonce generater for code verifier * Encrypt CodeVerifier in CSRF Token instead of Session - Update Dex for PKCE support - Expose HTTPBin for further use cases * Correct the tests * Move code challenges into extra params * Correct typo in code challenge method Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Correct the extra space in docs Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <Joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk> * Address changelog and new line nits * Add generated docs Co-authored-by: Valentin Pichard <github@w3st.fr> Co-authored-by: Joel Speed <joel.speed@hotmail.co.uk>
2022-03-13 12:08:33 +02:00
s, err := p.provider.Redeem(req.Context(), redirectURI, code, codeVerifier)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
2021-03-07 01:33:40 +02:00
// Force setting these in case the Provider didn't
if s.CreatedAt == nil {
s.CreatedAtNow()
}
if s.ExpiresOn == nil {
s.ExpiresIn(p.CookieOptions.Expire)
}
return s, nil
}
func (p *OAuthProxy) enrichSessionState(ctx context.Context, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) error {
var err error
if s.Email == "" {
// TODO(@NickMeves): Remove once all provider are updated to implement EnrichSession
// nolint:staticcheck
s.Email, err = p.provider.GetEmailAddress(ctx, s)
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, providers.ErrNotImplemented) {
return err
}
}
return p.provider.EnrichSession(ctx, s)
}
// AuthOnly checks whether the user is currently logged in (both authentication
// and optional authorization).
func (p *OAuthProxy) AuthOnly(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
if err != nil {
http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusUnauthorized), http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Unauthorized cases need to return 403 to prevent infinite redirects with
// subrequest architectures
if !authOnlyAuthorize(req, session) {
http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusForbidden), http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
// we are authenticated
p.addHeadersForProxying(rw, session)
p.headersChain.Then(http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
})).ServeHTTP(rw, req)
}
// Proxy proxies the user request if the user is authenticated else it prompts
// them to authenticate
func (p *OAuthProxy) Proxy(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := p.getAuthenticatedSession(rw, req)
switch err {
case nil:
// we are authenticated
p.addHeadersForProxying(rw, session)
p.headersChain.Then(p.upstreamProxy).ServeHTTP(rw, req)
case ErrNeedsLogin:
// we need to send the user to a login screen
if p.forceJSONErrors || isAjax(req) || p.isAPIPath(req) {
logger.Printf("No valid authentication in request. Access Denied.")
// no point redirecting an AJAX request
p.errorJSON(rw, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
logger.Printf("No valid authentication in request. Initiating login.")
if p.SkipProviderButton {
// start OAuth flow, but only with the default login URL params - do not
// consider this request's query params as potential overrides, since
// the user did not explicitly start the login flow
p.doOAuthStart(rw, req, nil)
} else {
p.SignInPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden)
}
case ErrAccessDenied:
2021-10-05 11:24:47 +02:00
if p.forceJSONErrors {
p.errorJSON(rw, http.StatusForbidden)
} else {
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, "The session failed authorization checks")
}
default:
// unknown error
logger.Errorf("Unexpected internal error: %v", err)
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
}
}
// See https://developers.google.com/web/fundamentals/performance/optimizing-content-efficiency/http-caching?hl=en
var noCacheHeaders = map[string]string{
"Expires": time.Unix(0, 0).Format(time.RFC1123),
"Cache-Control": "no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, max-age=0",
"X-Accel-Expires": "0", // https://www.nginx.com/resources/wiki/start/topics/examples/x-accel/
}
// prepareNoCache prepares headers for preventing browser caching.
func prepareNoCache(w http.ResponseWriter) {
// Set NoCache headers
for k, v := range noCacheHeaders {
w.Header().Set(k, v)
}
}
func prepareNoCacheMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
prepareNoCache(rw)
next.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
})
}
// getOAuthRedirectURI returns the redirectURL that the upstream OAuth Provider will
// redirect clients to once authenticated.
// This is usually the OAuthProxy callback URL.
func (p *OAuthProxy) getOAuthRedirectURI(req *http.Request) string {
// if `p.redirectURL` already has a host, return it
if p.redirectURL.Host != "" {
return p.redirectURL.String()
}
// Otherwise figure out the scheme + host from the request
rd := *p.redirectURL
rd.Host = requestutil.GetRequestHost(req)
rd.Scheme = requestutil.GetRequestProto(req)
// If there's no scheme in the request, we should still include one
if rd.Scheme == "" {
rd.Scheme = schemeHTTP
}
// If CookieSecure is true, return `https` no matter what
// Not all reverse proxies set X-Forwarded-Proto
if p.CookieOptions.Secure {
rd.Scheme = schemeHTTPS
}
return rd.String()
}
// getAuthenticatedSession checks whether a user is authenticated and returns a session object and nil error if so
// Returns:
// - `nil, ErrNeedsLogin` if user needs to login.
// - `nil, ErrAccessDenied` if the authenticated user is not authorized
// Set-Cookie headers may be set on the response as a side-effect of calling this method.
func (p *OAuthProxy) getAuthenticatedSession(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (*sessionsapi.SessionState, error) {
session := middlewareapi.GetRequestScope(req).Session
// Check this after loading the session so that if a valid session exists, we can add headers from it
if p.IsAllowedRequest(req) {
return session, nil
}
if session == nil {
2020-07-18 01:42:51 +02:00
return nil, ErrNeedsLogin
}
invalidEmail := session.Email != "" && !p.Validator(session.Email)
authorized, err := p.provider.Authorize(req.Context(), session)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error with authorization: %v", err)
}
if invalidEmail || !authorized {
logger.PrintAuthf(session.Email, req, logger.AuthFailure, "Invalid authorization via session: removing session %s", session)
2020-07-18 01:42:51 +02:00
// Invalid session, clear it
err := p.ClearSessionCookie(rw, req)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("Error clearing session cookie: %v", err)
}
return nil, ErrAccessDenied
2012-12-11 04:59:23 +03:00
}
return session, nil
}
// authOnlyAuthorize handles special authorization logic that is only done
// on the AuthOnly endpoint for use with Nginx subrequest architectures.
func authOnlyAuthorize(req *http.Request, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) bool {
// Allow requests previously allowed to be bypassed
if s == nil {
return true
}
constraints := []func(*http.Request, *sessionsapi.SessionState) bool{
checkAllowedGroups,
checkAllowedEmailDomains,
checkAllowedEmails,
}
for _, constraint := range constraints {
if !constraint(req, s) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// extractAllowedEntities aims to extract and split allowed entities linked by a key,
// from an HTTP request query. Output is a map[string]struct{} where keys are valuable,
// the goal is to avoid time complexity O(N^2) while finding matches during membership checks.
func extractAllowedEntities(req *http.Request, key string) map[string]struct{} {
entities := map[string]struct{}{}
query := req.URL.Query()
for _, allowedEntities := range query[key] {
for _, entity := range strings.Split(allowedEntities, ",") {
if entity != "" {
entities[entity] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
return entities
}
// checkAllowedEmailDomains allow email domain restrictions based on the `allowed_email_domains`
// querystring parameter
func checkAllowedEmailDomains(req *http.Request, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) bool {
allowedEmailDomains := extractAllowedEntities(req, "allowed_email_domains")
if len(allowedEmailDomains) == 0 {
return true
}
splitEmail := strings.Split(s.Email, "@")
if len(splitEmail) != 2 {
return false
}
endpoint, _ := url.Parse("")
endpoint.Host = splitEmail[1]
allowedEmailDomainsList := []string{}
for ed := range allowedEmailDomains {
allowedEmailDomainsList = append(allowedEmailDomainsList, ed)
}
return util.IsEndpointAllowed(endpoint, allowedEmailDomainsList)
}
// checkAllowedGroups allow secondary group restrictions based on the `allowed_groups`
// querystring parameter
func checkAllowedGroups(req *http.Request, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) bool {
allowedGroups := extractAllowedEntities(req, "allowed_groups")
if len(allowedGroups) == 0 {
return true
}
for _, group := range s.Groups {
if _, ok := allowedGroups[group]; ok {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// checkAllowedEmails allow email restrictions based on the `allowed_emails`
// querystring parameter
func checkAllowedEmails(req *http.Request, s *sessionsapi.SessionState) bool {
allowedEmails := extractAllowedEntities(req, "allowed_emails")
if len(allowedEmails) == 0 {
return true
}
allowed := false
for email := range allowedEmails {
if email == s.Email {
allowed = true
break
}
}
return allowed
}
// encodedState builds the OAuth state param out of our nonce and
// original application redirect
func encodeState(nonce string, redirect string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%v:%v", nonce, redirect)
}
// decodeState splits the reflected OAuth state response back into
// the nonce and original application redirect
func decodeState(req *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
state := strings.SplitN(req.Form.Get("state"), ":", 2)
if len(state) != 2 {
return "", "", errors.New("invalid length")
}
return state[0], state[1], nil
}
// addHeadersForProxying adds the appropriate headers the request / response for proxying
func (p *OAuthProxy) addHeadersForProxying(rw http.ResponseWriter, session *sessionsapi.SessionState) {
if session == nil {
return
}
if session.Email == "" {
rw.Header().Set("GAP-Auth", session.User)
} else {
rw.Header().Set("GAP-Auth", session.Email)
}
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}
// isAjax checks if a request is an ajax request
func isAjax(req *http.Request) bool {
acceptValues := req.Header.Values("Accept")
const ajaxReq = applicationJSON
// Iterate over multiple Accept headers, i.e.
// Accept: application/json
// Accept: text/plain
for _, mimeTypes := range acceptValues {
// Iterate over multiple mimetypes in a single header, i.e.
// Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
for _, mimeType := range strings.Split(mimeTypes, ",") {
mimeType = strings.TrimSpace(mimeType)
if mimeType == ajaxReq {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
// errorJSON returns the error code with an application/json mime type
func (p *OAuthProxy) errorJSON(rw http.ResponseWriter, code int) {
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", applicationJSON)
rw.WriteHeader(code)
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// we need to send some JSON response because we set the Content-Type to
// application/json
rw.Write([]byte("{}"))
}